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State Blaine Amendments are provisions in thirty-seven state
constitutions that restrict persons' and organizations' access to
public benefits on religious grounds. They arose largely in the mid
to late 1800s in response to bitter strife between an established
Protestant majority and a growing Catholic minority that sought
equal access to public funding for Catholic schools. After the failure
to pass a federal constitutional amendment-the "Blaine
Amendment"-that would have sealed off public school funds from
"sectarian" institutions, similar provisions proliferated in state
constitutions. These "State Blaines" have often been interpreted,
under their plain terms, as erecting religion-sensitive barriers to the
flow of public benefits that exceed the church-state separation
demanded by the Establishment Clause. Today, the State Blaines
are becoming increasingly relevant as the Supreme Court has
progressively softened federal constitutional barriers to religious
access to public funds. This Article examines the history, language,
and general operation of the State Blaines. It concludes that the
State Blaines generally raise explicit, religion-sensitive barriers to
the allocation of otherwise available public benefits and,
consequently, that the operation of the State Blaines would typically
violate the religious non-persecution principle of the First
Amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Larry Witters was a blind man who wanted to attend college. In
1979, he applied for vocational funds that Washington State provided
for the visually handicapped. Witters was eligible for the funds, and
he intended to use them to study to be a minister at a Christian
college. But his plans met resistance. In 1984, the Washington
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Supreme Court ruled that the federal Establishment Clause barred
Witters' use of the funds for religious training.1 Witters sought review
in the U.S. Supreme Court and won. In 1986, the Court ruled that the
Establishment Clause presented no impediment to his private decision
to apply the funds to religious education. But Witters would never
use those funds for that purpose. Three years later, the Washington
Supreme Court decided on remand that Witters' plans violated a
clause of the Washington State Constitution that prohibited "public
money" from being "applied to any religious.. . instruction."3 The
U.S. Supreme Court, over one dissent, declined to hear Witters'
subsequent claim that Washington's constitution effectively punished
him for pursuing his faith and therefore violated his right to free
exercise of religion.'
Thus, at the end of a decade-long odyssey that included a
unanimous victory in the Supreme Court, Witters was left with
nothing. Had Witters planned to use the scholarship funds to study
chemistry, American history, international law, or-interestingly-
religion from a purely secular viewpoint, he would have enjoyed
Washington's financial assistance. But precisely because Witters
wanted to use the funds to prepare for the ministry-i.e., to lay the
theological and pastoral groundwork for a career inspired by and in
service of his religious faith-he was denied that assistance.
1. See Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 54-56 (Wash. 1984)
[hereinafter Witters f]. The religion clauses of the First Amendment-"Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof"-textually restrain the federal Congress only, but have been applied against
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I; see Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying the Establishment Clause to the states);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause); see also generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction 163-214 (1998). In Witters I, the Washington Supreme Court applied
the Supreme Court's Lemon test-at that time the doctrinal framework for evaluating
Establishment Clause cases-and found that Witters' use of the state aid for ministry
training would have the "primary effect of advancing religion" and was therefore
unconstitutional. See Witters I, 689 P.2d at 56 (applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971)).
2. See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
[hereinafter Witters I1].
3. See Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989)
[hereinafter Witters III]. The court relied on the Washington Constitution which in
pertinent part states: "No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment." Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 (1889); see infra note 116.
4. See McMonagle v. N.E. Women's Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901, 903-04 (1989)
(White, J., dissenting from denials of petitions for certiorari in several cases). In
dissent, Justice White argued that the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of
its state constitution "presents important federal questions regarding the free exercise
rights of citizens who participate in state aid programs that permit recipients a private
choice in using funds received and regarding the extent to which state involvement
with religion that does not violate the Establishment Clause is required by the Free
Exercise Clause." Id. at 904.
STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
The provision that ultimately blocked Witters' claim belongs to a
class of state constitutional provisions that appear in over thirty-five
state constitutions and are known collectively as "State Blaine
Amendments." Most State Blaines arose in the mid to late 1800s, in
response to a widespread controversy over whether Roman Catholics
could obtain access to public funding for their schools.5 At that time,
American public schools were overwhelmingly and explicitly
Protestant, and private schools were predominantly Catholic. Many
people wanted to keep public funds as far from Catholic schools as
possible, a project zealously pursued and realized in its most concrete
form in the State Blaines. While collectively aimed at this object, the
language of individual State Blaines takes various forms.6 Almost all,
however, can be fairly read to thwart plans like Witters'-i.e., to bar
the use of generally available public benefits precisely because the
recipient is a person who wants to put them to a religious use or is a
religiously affiliated organization.7 These provisions have slumbered
in state constitutions for over a century,8 but they are awakening now
that the Supreme Court has relaxed federal constitutional barriers to
public funding of religious activities. This Article will explore the
question the Supreme Court declined to take up in Witters and has
never squarely addressed: If a state interprets its Blaine Amendment
to erect a religion-sensitive barrier to public funding-funding that is
permissible under the Establishment Clause-does the state violate
any principle in the federal Constitution?9
5. I discuss this controversy in detail infra, Part H.A.
6. See generally Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120
Educ. L. Rep. 1 (1997) (canvassing the various State Blaine Amendments); Linda S.
Wendtland, Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church
and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 Va. L. Rev. 625 (1985)
(discussing state courts' interpretations of State Blaine Amendments).
7. A representative State Blaine-this one from the 1885 Florida Declaration of
Rights-reads thus: "No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution." Fla.
Declaration of Rights § 6 (1885); Fla. Const. art. I, § 3.
8. But see, e.g., Walter Gellhorn & R. Kent Greenawalt, The Sectarian College
and the Public Purse (1970) (analyzing Fordham University's compliance with the
New York Blaine Amendment).
9. See Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada's
"Little Blaine Amendment" and the Future of Religious Participation in Public
Programs, 2 Nev. L.J. 551, 574 (2002) (noting that "the U.S. Supreme Court has never
had before it a challenge to the constitutionality of a Little Blaine Amendment"); see
also Rebecca G. Rees, "If We Recant, Would We Qualify?": Exclusion of Religious
Providers from State Social Service Voucher Programs, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1291,
1296 (1999) (observing that "[t]he United States Supreme Court... has never
addressed the possibility of a conflict between First Amendment principles and a
State Blaine provision that excludes a religious group or individual from a general
government program or benefit"). This may change soon, however. On May 19,
2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davey v. Locke, a Ninth Circuit
decision that rejected Washington's Blaine Amendment as justification for a state
scholarship program that excludes students seeking theology degrees. See Davey v.
2003]
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The tale of the State Blaines seems unfinished, because over the last
century state courts have applied them infrequently. The reason is
not neglect but superfluity: States have not had to rely on State
Blaines to achieve a rigorous separation between public funds and
religious institutions because the Supreme Court has interpreted the
federal religion clauses to achieve largely that result. As late as the
1980s, only a trickle of public funds could flow to religious students or
religious schools (especially elementary and secondary schools)
through the sieve of a rigidly separationist interpretation of the
federal Constitution.10 The State Blaines have simply lacked occasion
for robust application. But their moment may have arrived." Over
the last two decades, the Supreme Court has eased constitutional
restrictions on religious access to public funds,12 and, as happened on
remand in Witters III, this will force state courts to ask whether State
Blaines place stricter limitations on public funding for the religious. 3
Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003). The Court
will hear arguments in Davey on December 2, 2003. I discuss Davey infra, Part V.A.
10. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37, 56 (2002) ("American
Separationism reached its high water mark in the early 1970s, when the United States
Supreme Court laid down rules that essentially precluded any direct government
assistance to the educational program of religiously affiliated elementary and
secondary schools.").
11. See Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 574 (observing that "[t]he time may
have arrived when state and federal courts will have to reexamine the application and
constitutionality of the Little Blaine Amendments").
12. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 57 ("Over the past fifteen years, the
prophylactic character of strict Separationism has been under siege."); Thomas C.
Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 121,
122-23 (2001) (explaining that, while "[c]hurch-state separation reached its height in
the 1960s and 1970s decisions forbidding public school prayers and aid to private
religious schools ... in the 1980s and 1990s, this strain of separationism lost ground,
particularly with respect to school aid").
13. The Supreme Court's recent validation of a school voucher program allowing
substantial participation of religious schools should accelerate this process. See
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Charles Fried has noted that,
whether or not the five-Justice majority in Zelman endures, "opponents of school
choice are increasingly turning to state constitutions that contain a so-called 'Blaine
Amendment'-a provision that insists on a more stringent and clear-cut separation
between church and state than the Supreme Court requires under its First
Amendment jurisprudence-to support their legal strategy." Charles Fried, Five to
Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 174-75 & n.55
(2002). Consequently, the issue of the State Blaines' constitutionality has generated
its share of recent attention from the media. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Voucher War
Heads to States that Ban Funding of Religious Schools, Legal Times, Aug. 5, 2002, at 1;
Rob Boston, The Blaine Game, Church & St., Sept. 2002, at 4; Mark Walsh, Latest
Front for Fight on Choice: Washington State, Educ. Wk., Oct. 2, 2002, at 17; George F.
Will, School Choice: The Ugly Opposition, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 2002, at A25; see also
Adam Liptak, Courts Weighing Rights of States To Curb Aid for Religion Majors,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2003, at Al (discussing the Davey case). The Becket Fund-an
ardent opponent of the State Blaines--catalogues much of this media attention on its
website. See www.becketfund.org.
STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
Inevitably, courts will have to say whether the nature of those
limitations can withstand scrutiny under the federal Constitution.
That latter inquiry is the subject of this Article. Beyond what likely
motivated the passage of the State Blaines, the more significant
foundational question is what they purport to do and whether that
operation is consonant with a longstanding tradition of protecting
religious liberties under the Constitution. In answering these
questions, it is not enough to bring an indictment of anti-Catholicism
against the State Blaines. Few would doubt that many, if not most,
State Blaines were driven by legislators' desires to penalize a
disfavored religious group. But, for my purposes, the key question
will be how those motives translated into legal form in the language
and operation of the State Blaine Amendments. The history of State
Blaines, consequently, provides a useful context for understanding
their operation, but it is only the beginning of the constitutional
inquiry.
The religious dynamics of the State Blaines are different today than
in the nineteenth century. Public schools are no longer Protestant or
indeed traditionally religious at all-the Supreme Court's religion
jurisprudence since the mid-1960s has scoured public schools of all
formal religious practice.14  Private schools, while significantly
religious, are no longer overwhelmingly Catholic. 5 Anti-Catholic bias
may no longer be ascendant, 6 but our public institutions have
embraced, in Justice Goldberg's memorable phrase, a "brooding and
pervasive devotion to the secular" that instinctively confines serious
religion to the private sphere and recoils from its intrusion into the
public sphere." Against this reshuffled social and religious backdrop,
14. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (banning school prayer); Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting the Lord's Prayer and Bible
reading in a public school); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (barring posting the
Ten Commandments in a public school); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
(striking certain moment of silence laws); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(denouncing prayers at high school graduation as unconstitutional); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (ending prayer at high school football game).
15. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 337-39 (2001).
16. See generally Berg, supra note 12, at 122-23, 163-72. At the same time, Berg
explains that "[allthough negative attitudes toward Catholicism certainly remain
significant, they are less widely held, are less focused on Catholic schools as such, and
are only part of a broader distrust of politically active social conservatives, including
evangelical Protestants." Id. at 123. See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 67.
Lupu and Tuttle comment that a traditional "no-aid" position on government
assistance to religious schools "in practice, meant but one thing-no state assistance
to Catholic elementary and secondary schools. Most happily, such sentiment is, for a
variety of reasons, no longer intellectually respectable in the United States." Id.
17. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see, e.g., Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 120 (1992)
(criticizing the Warren and Burger Courts' "tendency to press relentlessly in the
direction of a more secular society" and "to view religion as an unreasoned,
aggressive, exclusionary, and divisive force that must be confined to the private
2003]
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the non-specific textual references to "religion," "sects," or
"sectarian" in the State Blaines will operate to restrict, not only
Catholic schools or Catholic organizations, but religious schools and
organizations generally."8 Thus, the most obvious function of the
State Blaines will be to separate the religious from the secular in the
allocation of public funds, raising explicit barriers against the use of
public assistance for a variety of, if not all, religious ends and
religiously affiliated organizations.19
If that is how the State Blaines operate, then they violate the
religious freedom guarantees of the First Amendment. Laws may not
sphere"); Berg, supra note 12, at 151-52 (arguing that "[b]y invalidating officially
sponsored prayers in state schools in 1962 and Bible readings the next year, the
Warren Court questioned the generalized civil religion that the 1950s had affirmed"
and that "the Burger Court, in a series of decisions in the 1970s. . . severely limited
government aid to religious elementary and secondary schools and their students"
(citations omitted)); see also Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square:
Religion and Democracy in America 79-82 (1984) (discussing the secularizing drift of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence).
18. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that the State Blaines' language could
ever have been correctly interpreted to apply only to Catholic schools or
organizations. I know of no commentator or court having advocated that
interpretation, nor-given the general references in the State Blaines to "religions,"
"denominations," and "sects"-does such an interpretation seem plausible. In any
event, interpreting them that way would open the State Blaines to a charge of plain
denominational discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). That said, I do think the history that I recount in this
Article strongly suggests that there was a hope or expectation behind the enactment
of State Blaines that their operation would disproportionately impact Catholic
organizations. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(linking the term "sectarian" with the anti-Catholic hostility surrounding the
attempted passage of the federal Blaine Amendment, and noting that "it was an open
secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic' (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine
Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38 (1992))); Gerard V. Bradley, An
Unconstitutional Stereotype: Catholic Schools as "Pervasively Sectarian," 7 Tex. Rev.
L. & Pol. 1, 5 (2002) (observing that "Justice Thomas noted in Mitchell that the term
was 'coined' when it 'could be applied almost exclusively to Catholic parochial
schools"' (citations omitted)); see also Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's
Discriminatory Use of the Term "Sectarian," 6 J.L. & Pol. 449, 456-60 (1990)
(discussing the provenance of term "sectarian"). In any case, as I explain throughout
this Article, the question of subjective legislative motive for the State Blaines is legally
distinct from the question of whether their objective operation is unconstitutional.
My argument for the State Blaines' unconstitutionality does not depend on the anti-
Catholic animus that brooded over their births.
19. My observation here accords with a broader point made by Ira Lupu and
Robert Tuttle (commenting on Justice Breyer's dissent in Zelman) in a recent piece.
See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers,
and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917 (2003).
Dismissing Justice Breyer's anachronistic concerns about "social strife," Lupu and
Tuttle observe that "[t]he religious wars in the United States in the early twenty-first
century are not Protestant vs. Catholic, or Christian vs. Jew, or even the more
plausible Islam vs. all others. They are instead the wars of the deeply religious against
the forces of a relentlessly secular commercial culture." Id. at 954-55. For Justice
Breyer's dissent, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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attach a civil disability to lawful behavior, status, or association
because, and only because, they are motivated by religious impulses
or connected to religious belief or observance. On this account, State
Blaines are "laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis of
religion., 2' The State Blaines unconstitutionally "punish" religious
status, behavior, and association by selectively disqualifying them
from generally available public assistance. That conclusion goes to the
deepest roots of American religious freedom: as Michael McConnell
has observed, "[f]rom the outset [of the United States], the prevention
of persecution, penalties, or incapacities on account of religion has
served as a common ground among all the various interpretations of
religious liberty., 2' The State Blaines break faith with that tradition.
This Article focuses on the Free Exercise Clause as a primary, but
not exclusive, source of principles that prohibit the discriminatory
operation of the State Blaine Amendments.22  The free exercise
violation reaches deeply to the historical and normative roots of that
clause-as originally conceived, the clause would have applied most
vigorously to federal laws aimed at religious exercise. 3 Moreover,
even laboring under the inconsistency of its religion jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has consistently (and unanimously) held that laws
20. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 557
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)). For a
recent article reaching a similar conclusion about the operation of most State Blaines,
see Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 551,
556 (2003) (arguing that "many, if not most, State Blaine Amendments violate the
First Amendment's provisions regarding religious liberty and free speech because
they unlawfully discriminate against religious believers").
21. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1474 (1990).
22. There are other plausible approaches to attacking the State Blaines. See, e.g.,
DeForrest, supra note 20, at 617-25 (arguing that State Blaines violate freedom of
speech); Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L. Rev. 117,
140-52 (2000) (arguing that Blaines violate equal protection); Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 19, at 962 n.204, 967-71 (suggesting certain State Blaines could be vulnerable
under free speech principles, because of motivating anti-Catholic animus, or through
congressional legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rees, supra
note 9, at 1313-28 (stating Blaine amendments impermissibly restrict free speech).
But my approach finds that the Free Exercise Clause is the most apt locus, both
historically and doctrinally, of principles condemning the State Blaines.
23. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 21, at 1474; see also Amar, supra note 1, at 42
(arguing that "[i]f the phrase 'Congress shall make no law' really meant that Congress
simply lacked enumerated power to intrude into religious freedom in the several
states, the kind of intrusion prohibited must have been a congressional law that
sought to abridge religious exercise as such-a congressional law targeted at the free
exercise of religion"); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:
Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106,
1108, 1114 (1994) (explaining that the original Free Exercise Clause "[a]t most...
prevented the federal government from passing laws targeting religion qua religion"
and that "even if the original Free Exercise Clause could be read as an expression of
individual rights, it would prohibit only those laws that directly targeted religion").
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targeting religiously motivated behavior, status, or association because
of their religious content or connection are presumptively
unconstitutional. Beyond free exercise, aspects of the Court's non-
establishment and free speech jurisprudence reinforce the
constitutional prohibition against invidious government classification
of religion and the religious.
Thus, a major theme in this Article is non-discrimination. The First
Amendment forbids government from selectively demoting those who
act on religious conviction to second-class citizenship in the
distribution of public benefits.24 A second theme is federalism. The
Free Exercise, Establishment and Free Speech Clauses apply to the
states because they are "incorporated" into the Fourteenth
Amendment." Before incorporation of the religion clauses, the states
24. See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note 20, at 609-10 (arguing that, with reference to
State Blaines, "the fundamental principle of equality of citizenship found at the heart
of liberal democracy" implies "a right not to be treated as a 'second-class' citizen, not
only in regard to politics, but in 'society's common project' (quoting Paul Weithman,
Religious Reasons and the Duties of Membership, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 511, 512
(2001))).
25. I will explore below some of the cognitive problems presented by "applying"
the Establishment Clause "against" the states, and how those might impact an
analysis of the State Blaines. See infra Part IV. Michael McConnell argues that
application of either religion clause to the states is "somewhat anachronistic" given
that the First Amendment explicitly applies only to Congress, but he allows that,
"[b]ecause the free exercise clause at the federal level was itself modeled on free
exercise provisions in the various state constitutions,... no structural distortions arise
from assuming that, for modern purposes (after 'incorporation'), the free exercise
clause means the same thing for states that it has always meant for the federal
government." McConnell, supra note 21, at 1485. Not so with the Establishment
Clause. Its incorporation against the states, argues McConnell, "presents far more
serious interpretive difficulties, since there existed no national consensus on the
question of governmental aid to religion, other than to leave the question to the
states." Id. at 1485 n.384. Akhil Amar has demonstrated what many commentators
have long maintained: the Establishment Clause was originally understood only as a
structural limitation on the power of the federal Congress to prevent it from meddling
with, or disestablishing, state establishments. Amar, supra note 1, at 32-42; accord
William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the
Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 1191 (1990). Mechanistic incorporation
of the Establishment Clause against the states, consequently, is incoherent. See Amar,
supra note 1, at 33-34, 41, 251-54 (criticizing mechanistic incorporation, but
advocating "refined" incorporation of the Establishment Clause); see also Kurt T.
Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1085, 1135-36, 1151-53 (1995) (describing
difficulties with incorporating the original Establishment Clause, but proposing a
"reconstructed" clause more amenable to incorporation).
Of the current Justices, only Justice Thomas has expressed a willingness to
revisit the establishment-incorporation issue. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 677-81 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas has suggested that the
Establishment Clause, even if incorporated, should bind the states "on different terms
than ... the Federal Government." Id. at 678. Picking up on arguments made by the
second Justice Harlan and more recently by Amar, Thomas suggests that states
should be freer to pass laws "that include or touch on religious matters" provided
they "do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty
interest." Id. (citing, inter alia, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan,
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presumably could discriminate against religion generally, or against
certain faiths, as much as they liked.26 But incorporation of the First
Amendment has taken religious discrimination at any level of
government off the table. 7
The effects of incorporating the religion clauses foreclose a general
conceptual objection to my argument. This objection, addressed
below in Part V.A., is posited on a federalism rationale that states
may, through their more restrictive Blaine Amendments, legitimately
"define[] [a] vision of religious freedom as one completely free of
governmental interference. ' 28 In the course of my argument, I will
demonstrate that the settled application of the Free Exercise,
Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses to the states significantly
restrains states in how they pursue this elusive vision of a society
where religion and government are "completely free" from one
another. Specifically, states cannot further such a goal by erecting, on
the basis of their Blaine Amendments, "secular" or "non-religious" as
motivational, behavioral or associational requirements for access to
generally available public benefits. If the origins and operation of the
State Blaines are properly understood, then the principle of non-
persecution embedded in the First Amendment will strictly
J., concurring); see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale
L.J. 1131, 1159 (1991); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 948 (observing that
Justice Thomas has "urged that the Court limit its intervention into religious liberty
issues arising under state law to those properly cognizable under the Free Exercise
Clause"). These arguments will be relevant to my discussion of incorporation's
impact on the State Blaines. See infra Part IV.
26. In 1845, the Supreme Court first held explicitly that "[tihe Constitution makes
no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious
liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: Nor is there any inhibition
imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states."
Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845). For a general
discussion of Permoli, see, for example, Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First
Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48
Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1571-73 (1995) [hereinafter Bybee, Liberties]; Jay S. Bybee,
Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise of Religion: Meyer, Pierce and the Origins
of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 Cap. U. L. Rev. 887, 912-13 (1996) [hereinafter Bybee,
Origins]. As Bybee observes, "[t]he Court had reaffirmed this position, both prior
and subsequent to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 913 (citations
omitted).
27. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and
a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 251, 327 (2000).
Although the First Amendment applies, by its terms, to Congress alone, the
Court's jot-for-jot incorporation has brought the First Amendment to the
states on precisely the same terms. The First Amendment, applied to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, has
become a subject matter disability to the states as well. Incorporation has
blurred both the federalism and separation of powers aspects of the original
First Amendment.
Id.
28. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003) (discussed infra Part V.A.).
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circumscribe, if not completely nullify, their impact on the freedom of
religious persons and organizations to participate equally in public
benefits.
II. HISTORY
America's collective obsession with public schooling began in the
early 1800s, when a fever of enthusiasm in the form of the "common
school" movement swept the nation. The idea of public education
was closely linked to the idea of moral education-and that in turn
was linked with religious training. Unsurprisingly, American public
schools had a distinctively religious flavor marked by the majority
Protestant ethos of the day. This dismayed the growing number of
American Catholics, who, with increasing volume and intermittent
success, began asking for public money for their own private schools.
But the Protestant majority was alarmed in turn, fearing its tax dollars
would be siphoned off for "dark Catholic purposes," and so cries went
up for laws to prevent public money going to "sectarian"
organizations.29  The movement culminated, disappointingly for
Protestants, in the narrow defeat of a federal constitutional
amendment-the Blaine Amendment-in 1875. But rising from the
ashes of the federal attempt, a host of like-minded state constitutional
provisions flourished over the next quarter-century. Thus were the
State Blaines born.3°
A. Common Schools
Before the middle third of the 1800s, there was no public education
in America to speak of. Education was largely administered by
churches and clergy and was intertwined with religious instruction.3'
But in the 1830s, riding the tide of a "massive evangelical resurgence,"
29. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 12, at 130 ("The Protestant majority was always
particularly intense and united in opposing state aid to religious schools, which were
historically primarily Catholic.").
30. Another recent retelling of the State Blaines' genesis can be found in
DeForrest, supra note 20, at 556-76; see also Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The
Triumph of Pluralism, and Its Effects on Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1105, 1121-22 (2003) (discussing Protestant-Catholic conflicts presaging passage
of the State Blaines).
31. See, e.g., Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 657, 663 (1998)
(citing Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (1960);
Richard J. Gabel, Public Funds for Church and Private Schools (1937)). Viteritti
notes Tocqueville's statement that, in America, "[ajlmost all education is entrusted to
the clergy." Id. at 663 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 320
n.4 (Phillips Bradley ed., Random House 1945) (1839)). Philip Hamburger clarifies
that Tocqueville's observation was likely suggested by his American editor, John C.
Spencer, and referred to Protestant clergy. See Philip Hamburger, Separation of
Church and State 220 n.75 (2002).
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the common-school movement took hold.32 Its leading figure was
Horace Mann, Massachusetts' secretary of education from 1837-49,
who championed the infusion of common schools with explicitly
religious moral instruction-a curriculum whose theological content
evidenced a "pan-Protestant compromise, a vague and inclusive
Protestantism" designed to tranquilize conflict among Protestant
denominations.33 Daily reading, without divisive commentary, of the
King James Bible-along with recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the
singing of hymns-thus became the foundation of religious instruction
in the common schools.34 So entrenched was this vague Protestant
ethos that educators like Mann could claim that the common schools'
religious content was not "sectarian," insofar as the curriculum
excluded doctrines "peculiar to specific denominations but not
common to all."35 Only in this narrow liberal Protestant sense could
32. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 297 n.83 (citing 1 Anson Phelps Stokes,
Church and State in the United States 242 (1950); David B. Tyack, Onward Christian
Soldiers: Religion in the American Common School, in History and Education: The
Educational Uses of the Past 212, 217 (Paul Nash ed., 1970)).
33. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 299 (citing Robert Michaelsen, Piety in
the Public School 78-79 (1970)). Jeffries and Ryan explain that the architects of the
common school, Mann chief among them, kept religion in the schools and controversy
out by "promoting least-common-denominator Protestantism and rejecting
particularistic influences." Id. at 298; see also Berg, supra note 12, at 144 (explaining
that "the state-operated, or 'common,' schools had been created to overcome the
division between Protestant denominations during the first nineteenth-century wave
of Catholic immigration-to educate those various Protestant children (and
ultimately, it was hoped, their Catholic counterparts) in 'common"' (citing Joseph P.
Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, The Constitution, and Civil Society 147-
56 (1999))).
34. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 298 ("Mann insisted on Bible reading,
without commentary, as the foundation of moral education."); id. at 298 n.86 (noting
that "the first textbook used in the United States, the Hornbook" contained only the
alphabet and the Lord's Prayer); see also Bybee, Origins, supra note 26, at 894 ("The
public schools had long been the domain of Protestant Americans. Bible readings
and prayers in school reflected Protestant beliefs. Both Protestants and Catholics
regarded each other with the suspicion that their respective school systems were tools
for propaganda and evangelization."); Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38, 41 (1992) (noting the "obvious evangelical
Protestant overtones to public education"); Hamburger, supra note 31, at 220
(describing the Protestant character of instruction in New York City public schools of
this period); Viteritti, supra note 31, at 666-67 (noting that "Mann's schools required
daily reading from the King James version of the Bible... [tihe recital of prayers and
the singing of hymns").
35. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 298 (quoting David B. Tyack, Onward
Christian Soldier: Religion in the American Common School, in History and
Education: The Educational Uses of the Past 212, 217 (Paul Nash ed., 1970)). Mann,
a theologically liberal Unitarian, clashed with more conservative Massachusetts
denominations, such as orthodox Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists. He
dismissed criticism of the common-schools' watered-down Protestant theology, and
demands for more substantive religious content, as "sectarian." Id. Viteritti highlights
the essentially intolerant character of this kind of universalism: "The common-school
curriculum promoted a religious orthodoxy of its own that was centered on the
teachings of mainstream Protestantism and was intolerant of those who were non-
2003]
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American public schools in the mid-1800s be fairly characterized as
"religious but nonsectarian."36 But the common consensus supporting
the common schools' religious and moral foundations plainly excluded
Catholics, other non-mainstream believers (Mormons, Jehovah's
Witnesses, and the like), and non-believers.37
B. Growing Catholic Population and Influence
At this time, American Catholics were increasing in numbers and
political influence. Through immigration mostly from Ireland and
Germany, the Catholic population in the United States increased
sharply from a mere 1% of the population during the Revolution to
about 3.3% in 1840, 10% in 1866, and 12.9% by 1891.38 These
Catholic immigrants, poor and unfamiliar with American society,
flooded into major northern cities such as New York, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Boston, and Cincinnati. 39 They were easy targets for
discrimination by the "nativist" Protestant population, and such
sentiments readily blended with religious hatred. As Philip
Hamburger writes:
Fearful of the foreigners, many native-born Protestants self-
consciously identified themselves with America and its native
population and, on this basis, these 'nativists' opposed foreign
immigration, especially by Irish Catholics. Yet even this sort of
secular ethnic and class animosity often blended into the religious
prejudice that would do so much to popularize the separation of
church and state.4°
Nonetheless, through sheer numbers, ethnic cohesion and religious
identity, American Catholics gained increasing political influence.4'
believers." Viteritti, supra note 31, at 666.
36. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 299 (observing that "[f]rom its inception ...
American public education was religious but nonsectarian").
37. Id.; see also Viteritti, supra note 31, at 666 (observing that, while "[t]he
American common school was founded on the pretense that religion has no legitimate
place in public education ... [i]n reality it was a particular kind of religion that its
proponents sought to isolate from public support").
38. See Heytens, supra note 22, at 135 & nn.101-10 (providing statistical overview
of U.S. Catholic population from 1789 through 1921, relying primarily on U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States (1975), and James Hennesey,
American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Church Community in the
United States (1981)); see also Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 555 (explaining the
same statistics); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 299-300 & nn.98-103 (using similar
statistical sources).
39. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 31, at 202; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 669.
40. Hamburger, supra note 31, at 202; see also Berg, supra note 12, at 130
(discussing the "long history" of American anti-Catholicism).
41. See, e.g., Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 555; Green, supra note 34, at 42-
43; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 669. Bybee and Newton observe that "by 1876, it was
generally assumed that the Catholic vote had 'determined the results of elections
since 1870."' Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 555 (quoting Marie Carolyn
Klinkhamer, The Blaine Amendment of 1875: Private Motives for Political Action, 42
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The Protestant-dominated public school system would furnish the
inevitable political battleground, pitting Catholics' desires for
educational and societal equality against nativist Protestants' fears of
Catholic influence.
C. Conflict over School Funding
The explicit religious practices widespread in American public
schools of this period were a direct affront to Catholics' religious
beliefs.42 Not only did the Catholic Church not recognize the King
James translation of the Bible-the only officially approved English
translation of the Bible was the Douay version-but daily
"[u]naccompanied Bible reading, which was the cornerstone of the
Protestant consensus," violated Catholic conviction that scripture
should be read only in the context of the Church's authoritative
doctrinal tradition.43  Textbooks, moreover, often denigrated
Catholics and their faith.' Catholics responded by exercising their
growing political power to oppose Protestant religious practices in
public schools and, beyond that, to request public funds for their own
schools.45 This provoked from the Protestant establishment "a display
Cath. Hist. Rev. 15, 32 (1957)).
42. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 31, at 667 (noting that although Massachusetts
was the only state to mandate Bible reading in public schools by law, "between
seventy-five and eighty percent of the schools in the country voluntarily followed the
practice"). Viteritti discusses the 1854 decision in Donahue v. Richards, in which the
highest court in Maine ruled that requiring students to read the King James Bible in
public schools was "not an infringement of religious freedom," thereby upholding the
expulsion of a Catholic teenager for refusing to read the Bible in class. Id. at 667-68
(discussing Donohue v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854)).
43. See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 300 (observing that "the very fact
of a direct and unmediated approach to God contradicted Catholic doctrine," that the
Douay Bible-aside from being the Church's approved translation-"also [provided]
authoritative annotation and comment," and that, according to Church teaching,
"[r]eading the unadorned text invited the error of private interpretation").
44. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 31, at 220 (observing that the New York City
"Public School Society," which received public funds, operated ostensibly
nondenominational schools that "required children to read the King James Bible and
to use textbooks in which Catholics were condemned as deceitful, bigoted, and
intolerant"); id. at 223 (noting that the Public School Society later attempted to
bolster the claim that its schools were nonsectarian "by offering to black out the most
bigoted anti-Catholic references in its textbooks"); id. at 223 n.83 (discussing the
report of a special school committee that, while generally defending the nonsectarian
character of New York City public schools, nonetheless reported as "not wholly
unfounded" charges that "the books used in the public schools contain passages that
are calculated to prejudice the minds of children against the Catholic faith").
45. See, e.g., Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and
Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
113, 145 (1996) ("Church leaders in Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and New York
City resisted the blatant Protestantism that had dominated the public school
curriculum in the form of prayers, hymns, and bible reading (the King James version,
of course) and eventually began to set up their own schools."); see also Bradley, supra
note 18, at 9 (stating that "a separate Catholic school system was started in this
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of majoritarian politics of unprecedented brutality. 4 6  Catholics'
request for school funds inflamed latent Protestant fears of Catholic
domination. For instance, the Board of Assistants of New York
City-a focal point for the school funding controversy-issued an
influential report that invoked fears of "[rieligious zeal, degenerating
into fanaticism and bigotry, [that] has covered many battle-fields with
its victims" as well as macabre images of "the stake, the gibbet, and
the prison."47 Such rhetoric provoked mob violence against Catholics,
as, for example, when the residence of the Catholic Bishop of New
York City, John Hughes, was destroyed and the militia were enlisted
to defend St. Patrick's Cathedral.48
country to protect Catholic children from the scandal of aggressive Protestantism in
the public schools" (citations omitted)).
46. See Viteritti, supra note 31, at 669.
47. See Hamburger, supra note 31, at 222 (reproducing the New York City Board
of Assistants' report rejecting the Catholics' petition for school funding); see generally
id. at 219-29 (discussing the New York City school funding controversy). Partly
fueling Protestant fears was the belief that Catholic doctrines were incompatible with
American ideals of freedom and individual conscience: This belief was
understandable in light of Papal statements of the period criticizing the separation of
church and state and religious liberty. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Diversity and
Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy 61 (2000) (observing that
America's "core principles of individual freedom and democratic equality" were seen
to be threatened by the Catholic Church's "authoritarian institutional structure, its
long-standing association with feudal or monarchical governments, its insistence on
close ties between church and state, its endorsement of censorship, and its rejection of
individual rights to freedom of conscience and worship"); see also Jeffries & Ryan,
supra note 15, at 302-03 (stating that "Rome hampered attempts by American
Catholics to abandon the Church's legacy by issuing reactionary pronouncements
ideally suited to confirm the rankest prejudice," and discussing attacks by Pope
Gregory XVI and Pius IX on secular education and freedom of conscience); Bybee &
Newton, supra note 9, at 555 (noting that "[t]he Vatican Decree of Papal Infallibility
of 1870 added to the anti-Catholic sentiment during this time" (citing Anson Phelps
Stokes & Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States 329 (1964))); see also
generally Hamburger, supra note 31, at 229-34 (discussing American Protestant
reactions to Papal condemnation of separationism, especially Gregory XVI's 1832
encyclical Mirari Vos). Indeed, as Thomas Berg explains, as late as the 1950s,
Protestants continued to be plausibly threatened by the Vatican's official position that
"religious freedom was not a moral ideal in itself, but at most a prudential
accommodation to the fact of diversity in religious beliefs," and that the ideal was "a
Catholic confessional state with support for the Church and at least some restrictions
on the educational and evangelistic activities of other faiths." Berg, supra note 12, at
133. With the Second Vatican Council of the 1960s, however, the Vatican clearly
recognized religious freedom as a human right in its Declaration on Religious
Freedom, which was strongly influenced by the work of John Courtney Murray. Id. at
135-36 (citing John Courtney Murray, Governmental Repression of Heresy (1948),
and John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom (1965)); see also
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of
Religious Freedom 333 (1998) (discussing Murray's conflicts with the Vatican over
the question of religious freedom).
48. See Viteritti, supra note 31, at 669; see also Hamburger, supra note 31, at 216-
17 ("Aroused by religious prejudice, fears about political and mental liberty, and
fantasies about sexual violation, American mobs violently attacked Catholics.").
Hamburger points to the Protestant practice in the 1830s of "burning down Catholic
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A more systematic reaction arose in the form of legislation
forbidding "sectarian control" over public schools and blocking any
diversion of public money to religious institutions.49 Roughly by the
time of the attempted federal Blaine Amendment in 1875, fourteen
states had passed state laws-some in the form of constitutional
amendments-to seal off public funds from sectarian control. 0
Emblematic was the 1840s New York law (a direct precursor of an
1894 provision in the New York Constitution) that prohibited public
funding of any school where "'any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet
shall be taught, inculcated, or practiced."'51
D. The Federal Blaine Amendment
The bitter fight over school funding eventually began to have
national reverberations. On September 30, 1875, President Ulysses S.
Grant gave an important speech in which he capitalized on Protestant
alarm at perceived Catholic incursions into American education.
Delivered in Des Moines, Iowa, to a convention of the Society of the
Army of the Tennessee, Grant's address palpitated with anti-Catholic
implications:
If we are to have another contest in the near future of our national
existence, I predict that the dividing line will not be Mason and
Dixon's, but it will be between patriotism and intelligence on one
side, and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the other. In this
centennial year, the work of strengthening the foundation of the
structure laid by our forefathers one hundred years ago, should be
begun. Let us all labor for the security of free thought, free speech,
and pure morals, unfettered religious sentiments, and equal rights
and privileges for all men, irrespective of nationality, color or
religion. Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar
appropriated to them shall be applied to the support of any sectarian
school. Resolve that neither the State or nation, nor both combined,
shall support institutions of learning other than those sufficient to
afford every child in the land the opportunity of a good common
school education, unmixed with atheistic, pagan, or sectarian tenets.
churches, their most notorious achievement being the destruction in 1834 of the
Ursuline convent in Charlestown, Massachusetts." Id. at 216. Thomas Berg notes that
"[a]nti-Catholicism has had a long history in America, from outbreaks of mob
violence in the mid-1800s against Catholic immigrants in Philadelphia and New York
to the nativist, anti-immigrant campaign in the 1920s to make private schools illegal."
Berg, supra note 12, at 130 (citing Lloyd Jorgensen, The State and the Nonpublic
School, 1825-1925, at 69-110 (1987), and Viteritti, supra note 45, at 151).
49. See Green, supra note 34, at 43; see also Viteritti, supra note 31, at 669
(describing the drafting, in the 1854 Massachusetts legislature controlled by the anti-
Catholic "Know-Nothing" Party, of "the first state laws to prohibit aid to sectarian
schools").
50. See Green, supra note 34, at 43; Berg, supra note 12, at 130.
51. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at 301 (citation omitted); see also Viteritti,




Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church, and the
private schools, supported entirely bY2 private contribution. Keep
the Church and State forever separate.
Grant's speech was an obvious partisan move to shore up his
Republican party, which had been wounded by corruption and had
lost significant political capital in the last national election.53 The
speech effectively allied the Republicans with mainstream Protestants
and with a popular, anti-Catholic form of church-state separation.54
Less than three months later, in his annual message to Congress on
December 7, 1875, Grant proposed a constitutional amendment
making it the duty of each of the several States to establish and
forever maintain free public schools.., forbidding the teaching in
said schools of religious, atheistic, or pagan tenets; and prohibiting
the granting of any school funds or taxes, or any part thereof, either
by the legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit or in
aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination, or in
aid or for the benefit of any other object of any nature or kind
whatever. 55
Grant ornamented his proposal with warnings that, lacking
adequate intelligence and education, "ignorant men [may] sink into
acquiescence to the will of intelligence, whether directed by the
demagogue or by priestcraft."' 6 Grant's proposal was hailed by the
New York Times and Tribune, by Harper's Weekly, and by the
Chicago Tribune.57 But, as Philip Hamburger describes, not everyone
was so sanguine about the amendment's assault on federalism: "The
proposed amendment's intrusion into traditional state powers
provoked astonishment among such Americans as were not utterly
blinded by anti-Catholicism." '58
Unfazed by such subtleties, Congressman James G. Blaine of Maine
52. See Hamburger, supra note 31, at 322 (reproducing the text of Grant's speech)
(emphasis added); see also Green, supra note 34, at 47-48 (discussing Grant's speech);
Viteritti, supra note 31, at 670 (discussing the same speech).
53. See Green, supra note 34, at 48-49.
54. Green, supra note 34, at 48; see also Hamburger, supra note 31, at 322
(observing that in the speech, Grant "made separation part of the Republicans'
agenda"); Viteritti, supra note 31, at 670 (Grant's speech, followed by his proposal for
a constitutional amendment, "would align the Republican party with the anti-Catholic
wing of the public-school lobby").
55. Green, supra note 34, at 52; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 670.
56. Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 551 (quoting Grant's proposal to Congress);
see also 4 Cong. Rec. 175 (1876). A less remarked part of the proposal advocated the
taxation of church property-Grant provided an exaggerated estimate of expected
revenues-hinting darkly that "[t]he contemplation of so vast a property as here
alluded to, without taxation, may lead to sequestration without constitutional
authority and through blood." Hamburger, supra note 31, at 323-24; see also Green,
supra note 34, at 53 n.95 (noting that only the Catholic World criticized the taxation
proposal).
57. Green, supra note 34, at 52-53.
58. Hamburger, supra note 31, at 323 n.93.
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eagerly picked up Grant's gauntlet when, one week later on
December 14, 1875, Blaine proposed a constitutional amendment
embodying the most popular of Grant's ideas.59 Having lost the
House Speaker's chair in the Republican congressional reversals of
1874, Blaine had set his sights on the Republican presidential
nomination for the 1876 election. 6  The substance of Blaine's
proposed amendment met with widespread approval (except, of
course, from Catholics), but most people saw, beneath the veneer of
fashionable anti-Catholicism, a transparent attempt to garner political
support. 61  Blaine himself-whose own mother was Catholic and
whose daughters went to Catholic boarding schools-denied any anti-
Catholic motivations and explained in an open letter that his proposal
was merely designed to suppress religious conflict by definitively
settling the school funding controversy. 62 Blaine was more likely
engaged in rank political opportunism. Once it was clear that Blaine
had lost the presidential nomination to Rutherford B. Hayes, he lost
all interest in the amendment, participated in none of the
congressional debates, and-strikingly, as Blaine had assumed a seat
in the Senate by the time that body considered the amendment-did
not even show up for the Senate vote on the proposal, which failed to
pass by only four votes.63
Blaine's proposed amendment "rewrote the First Amendment to
apply it to the states and to specify a single logical consequence of
separation-the one most popular with anti-Catholic voters":'
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by
taxation in any State for the support of public schools, or derived
from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto,
shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any
money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious
sects or denominations. 65
59. See id. at 324.
60. See Green, supra note 34, at 49.
61. Id. at 53-54 ("[F]ew people were fooled by Blaine's motives. Blaine was
running for President, and the school amendment was recognized as a means of
garnering support." (citation omitted)); see also Viteritti, supra note 31, at 671 (noting
that "Blaine's transparent political gesture against the Catholic Church provoked
considerable press commentary," including denunciations from the Catholic World).
Even the Nation, sympathetic to Blaine's cause, conceded that the "anti-Catholic
excitement was, as everyone knows now, a mere flurry" and that "all that Mr. Blaine
means to do or can do with his amendment is, not to pass it but to use it in the
campaign to catch anti-Catholic votes." Viteritti, supra note 31, at 672 (citation
omitted); see also Green, supra note 34, at 54.
62. Green, supra note 34, at 49-50, 54 & n.103.
63. See id. at 54 & n.107, 67-68; Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 557 n.31.
64. See Hamburger, supra note 31, at 297.
65. Id. at 297-98; see 4 Cong. Rec. 205 (1875); see also Bybee & Newton, supra
note 9, at 551-52, 557 & n.31 (summarizing and quoting the text of the amendment);
Green, supra note 34, at 53 n.96 (quoting the text of the amendment).
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The proposed amendment passed the House, with an addendum
specifying that it did not "vest, enlarge, or diminish legislative power
in the Congress," by a vote of 180 to 7.66 During the more extensive
Senate debate on the proposal, some senators expressed confusion
about the scope and application of its language.67 The Senate
subsequently proposed a more absolutist version that would have
categorically prohibited any "public property," "public revenue" or
"loan of credit" from being "appropriated to or made or used for the
support of any school or other institution under the control of any
religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination" or
where the "creed or tenets" of such groups were taught.68 Notably,
the Senate proposal provided that its language "shall not be construed
to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution."69 The
Senate version failed to garner the required two-thirds majority by a
mere four votes-twenty-eight to sixteen (with twenty-seven members
not present, including Blaine himself)-and failed.70
A final political wrinkle, developed in detail in Philip Hamburger's
recent work, deserves mention.71 Whereas the 1830s-50s surge in anti-
Catholicism was almost exclusively fueled by nativist Protestants, the
1860s-70s surge that culminated with the failed Blaine Amendment
included a significant additional motivating force: the "secularists" or
"Liberals." This diverse group united a wide variety of atheists,
theists, and spiritualists in a common resentment and mistrust of
Christianity's influence on government.72 They were best exemplified
by the Free Religious Association, in its central publication, The
Index, and by the founder of The Index, Francis Ellingwood Abbot.73
The Liberals were fueled in part by the misguided efforts of some
Protestants under the banner of the National Reform Association, to
pass a "Christian Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution. Abbot
formed the National Liberal League-devoted to "the absolute
separation of church and state"-to fight the Christian Amendment
66. See 4 Cong. Rec. 5189-92 (1876); Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 557 &
n.32; Green, supra note 34, at 58-59.
67. See Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 557-58. There appeared to be confusion
over whether the language prohibited only certain sources of public funds from being
applied to sectarian education, and also whether public funds might still be used for
other sectarian activities besides education. Id.
68. See 4 Cong. Rec. 5453 (1876); Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 558 & n.37
(discussing the text of the Senate proposal); see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 15, at
302 (stating that "[t]he [Senate's] final version laboriously attempted to close every
possible loophole through which public money might flow to religious schools").
69. See Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 558 n.37.
70. 4 Cong. Rec. 5595 (1876); see Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 558; see also
Green, supra note 34, at 67; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 672 & n.72 (citing Alfred W.
Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 939, 942, 944
(1951)).
71. See generally Hamburger, supra note 31, at 287-334.




with secularizing counter-proposals.74 He distilled Liberal philosophy
into the 1872 publication, The Demands of Liberalism, which
presciently tracked many of the most difficult church-state issues that
the Supreme Court would face in the twentieth century, including
church tax-exemptions, legislative chaplains, Sunday laws, and Bible
reading in public schools.75 Significantly, Abbot included in his
Demands that "all public appropriations for sectarian educational and
charitable institutions shall cease," and that in both the federal and
state constitutions "no privilege or advantage shall be conceded to
Christianity or any other special religion" and that "our entire
political system shall be founded and administered on a purely secular
basis. "76
Liberals did not think the Blaine Amendment went nearly far
enough in extirpating all vestiges of religion from government. They
viewed it merely as an anti-Catholic measure that explicitly preserved
a generalized, non-divisive Protestantism in public schools. 77 The
competing amendment proposed by Liberals in 1876 contained more
explicit and comprehensive safeguards than the Blaine Amendment
(particularly the House version). For instance, the Liberal
amendment would have prohibited "taxing the people of any State,
either directly or indirectly, for the support of any sect of religious
body or of any number of sects or religious bodies;" it would have
protected a person's right not to be "required by law to contribute
directly or indirectly to the support of any religious society or body of
which he or she is not a voluntary member;" and, reminiscent of the
absolutist language that would appear sixty years later in the seminal
Everson decision, it would have prevented any governmental unit
from "levy[ing] any tax, or mak[ing] any gift, grant or appropriation,
for the support, or in aid of, any church, religious sect, or
denomination," or any religious school or charity.79
As such proposals show, the Liberal ethos took separationism to its
logical extreme. "Liberals," writes Philip Hamburger, "viewed all
Christians with the same fear and horror Protestants reserved for
Catholics."8  All government connections to religion had to be
uprooted. Significantly, Liberals asserted that religious groups should
be barred from participating even in public benefits distributed on
74. Id. at 290-93.
75. See id. at 294-95 n.21.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 298.
78. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (claiming that "[n]o tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion").
79. Hamburger, supra note 31, at 294 n.21.
80. Id. at 302.
20031
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
secular grounds.81 This principle would have excluded all neutrally
available public appropriations for religious education or religious
charities. Interestingly, the Liberals seemed to make an exception for
appropriations to individuals who were religious, but not for religious
groups.82
But the Liberals' radically secular project was a political failure. 3 It
was the traditionally Protestant, anti-Catholic version of
separationism that proved to be more politically viable, even if it, too,
did not achieve ultimate national success in the federal Blaine
Amendment. The narrower House version of the amendment in
particular, as well as the Bible-reading proviso of the more rigorous
Senate version, plainly departed from Liberal secularist dogma.'
Consequently, in the wake of the federal Blaine Amendment's defeat,
the nativist Protestants were more successful at securing passage of
local versions in state constitutions.85 The Liberals, who had made
themselves distasteful to mainstream Americans through their rigid,
fundamentalist attachment to separation and secularism, were
reduced to "piecemeal lobbying and cultural agitation" to spread their
cause.86 Yet, it will be useful to keep in mind the Liberals' radical
secularist agenda when considering some of the similarly absolutist
approaches in many of the State Blaine Amendments.
E. The Spread of State Blaines
Charles Russell, one of James Blaine's biographers, provided this
bleak summary of Blaine's accomplishments: "No man in our annals
has filled so large a space and left it so empty."87  But from the
perspective of actual laws passed, Blaine's real legacy lay in the
numerous state constitutional amendments spawned after the failure
of his federal amendment.88 The nativist Protestant version of
separationism had gradually become part of the Republican agenda
and thus, while many states adopted Blaine-like provisions
voluntarily, many others were required to incorporate some form of a
81. Id. at 304-05 n.43 (explaining the Liberal view that "[e]ven government
benefits distributed on purely secular grounds could not be given to religious
organizations").
82. Id. at 305.
83. See generally id. at 321-28.
84. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
85. See Hamburger, supra note 31, at 335, 338.
86. Id. at 338.
87. See Marvin Olasky, Breaking Through Blaine's Roadblock, World, Aug. 24,
2002, at 1 (quoting Charles Russell's 1933 biography of Blaine).
88. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 45, at 146; see also Bybee & Newton, supra note
9, at 559 ("What Congress failed to adopt for the nation, most of the states enacted
for themselves.").
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"non-sectarian" provision into their state constitutions as a price for
entering the union. 9
The general rise and spread of State Blaines can be charted as
follows. The school funding controversy beginning in the 1830s gave
rise to increasing state legislation restricting religious school funding,
sometimes in the form of state constitutional amendments. The failed
attempt in the 1870s to pass the federal Blaine Amendment lent
momentum to this anti-funding movement, resulting in a proliferation
of state constitutional amendments in the closing years of the
nineteenth century. As discussed above, New York adopted a
restrictive funding law in the 1840s, and, by 1876, fourteen other states
had "joined New York in passing measures prohibiting the division of
public school funds, often in the form of constitutional
amendments."9
During the 1870s alone, twelve states-Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Missouri, Alabama, Nebraska, Colorado, Texas, Georgia, New
Hampshire, Minnesota, California and Louisiana-adopted provisions
similar to the federal Blaine Amendment.91 Following the defeat of
the federal Blaine Amendment, Congress also began to require newly
admitted states to adopt some form of an anti-sectarian amendment in
their own constitutions.92 For example, the 1889 Enabling Act that
89. See Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 559 (noting that "Congress began
requiring new states, as a condition of their entering the union, to include some kind
of Little Blaine Amendment in their constitution"); Hamburger, supra note 31, at 322
(observing that Grant's 1875 speech "made separation part of the Republicans'
agenda"); Viteritti, supra note 31, at 672-73 (documenting the Republican agenda to
force new states to enact Blaine Amendments focused primarily on new western
states). The actual substance of the various state provisions will be discussed infra,
Part III.
90. Green, supra note 34, at 43; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
91. My primary source for the texts of State Blaine Amendments from 1848-1909
is the 1909 edition of the Thorpe treatise. See generally 1-7 The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1909) [hereinafter Federal and State Constitutions]; see also Bybee & Newton,
supra note 9, at 559 n.44; Green, supra note 34, at 43 n.33 (citing W. Blakey,
American State Papers 237-66 (1890)). Other commentators have estimated that only
eight or nine states enacted anti-funding provisions in the 1870s. See, e.g., Bybee &
Newton, supra note 9, at 559 n.44; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 673 n.78 (citing Lloyd P.
Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public School, 1825-1925, at 114 (1987)). My
count-which, as explained below, takes the view that a relevant provision is one that
explicitly bars access to public funds on religious grounds-shows twelve states. I do
not find that any anti-funding provision was added to the New Jersey Constitution in
the 1870s, as other commentators have stated. See 7 Federal and State Constitutions,
supra, at 4186-4204; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 673 n.78. Also, I would mention the
Alabama provision of 1875, the Georgia and New Hampshire provisions of 1877, and
the Louisiana provision of 1879, which seem to often escape notice. Finally, I do not
include Nevada's anti-funding provision in the 1870s because it was not finally
approved until the Nevada general election of 1880. Bybee & Newton, supra note 9,
at 566.
92. See Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 559 n.46; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 673
& n.76; see also Hamburger, supra note 31, at 335 (observing that "[n]ativist
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ushered North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington into
the union required that those states' constitutional conventions
"'provide, by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the
United States and the people of said States... for the establishment
and maintenance of systems of public schools, which shall be open to
all the children of said States, and free from sectarian control."93 The
same requirement was contained in the Enabling Acts authorizing the
statehood of Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona and Wyoming.94
By 1890, twenty-nine states in all had incorporated into their
constitutions explicit prohibitions against the allocation of public
funds to sectarian schools and other institutions. 95 The next section
Protestants... because of the strength of anti-Catholic feeling, managed to secure
local versions of the Blaine amendment in a vast majority of the states"); id. at 338
("Not only did [nativist Protestants] renew their efforts to obtain state constitutional
prohibitions on the distribution of benefits to sectarian-controlled schools, but they
also demanded that Congress require such clauses in the constitutions of territories
seeking admission to the Union.").
93. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 220 n.9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). One should be cautious in making too much of congressional
"compulsion." As the language of the Enabling Acts indicates, Congress did not
specify that the newly-admitted states must adopt Blaine-type formulations in their
constitutions. But see DeForrest, supra note 20, at 573 (stating that "Congress did
compel the inclusion of Blaine Amendment language in some state constitutions,"
and referring to the 1889 Enabling Act (citing Viteritti, supra note 31, at 673)). But
the heightened national sensitivity to Catholic incursion into education, was, I think,
evidenced by Congress' requirement that public school systems be "free from
sectarian control." See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 220 n.9 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The states presumably could have complied with such a directive through a variety of
constitutional formulations-most obviously, by providing that state public schools
would be "free from sectarian control." But, as detailed below, in response to the
Enabling Acts, the states went further, adopting explicit religion-sensitive restrictions
in their constitutions that either tracked or went beyond the federal Blaine
Amendment. See infra Part III.
94. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 220 n.9 (citing 28 Stat. 107, 108 (Utah); 34 Stat. 267,
270 (Oklahoma); 36 Stat. 557, 559, 570 (New Mexico and Arizona); Wyo. Const.,
1889, Ordinances, § 5); see also Viteritti, supra note 31, at 673 (discussing requirement
for inclusion of State Blaine Amendment in the New Mexico Constitution); cf Bybee
& Newton, supra note 9, at 560 (discussing earlier Nevada Enabling Act, which
required Nevada to secure in its constitution "'perfect toleration of religious
sentiment"' and that "'no inhabitant of said state shall ever be molested in person or
property on account of his or her mode of religious worship"' (quoting 13 Stat. 31, § 4
(1864))). Bybee and Newton note that "Congress placed similar restrictions in the
enabling acts for the constitutions of Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming." Id. at 560 n.51 (citing Anson
Phelps Stokes & Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States 158 (1964)).
95. See, e.g., Green, supra note 34, at 43; Viteritti, supra note 31, at 673; Viteritti,
supra note 45, at 146-47; see also Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 559 & n.46 (noting
some counting inconsistencies among commentators); Heytens, supra note 38, at 123
n.32 (stating that approximately thirty state constitutions currently contain some form
of Blaine Amendment, but that commentators often report numbers varying from
twenty-four to thirty-three). My own canvass confirms that, by 1890, twenty-nine
states had incorporated Blaine provisions into their constitutions. As the following
section will demonstrate, I find thirty-six State Blaine Amendments by 1911 and
thirty-eight after Alaska and Hawaii entered the union in 1959. Because Louisiana
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will examine the various linguistic formulas in which the State Blaine
Amendments concretized those objectives, and how that language
may operate today. While the State Blaines arose out of a specific
historical context-as described in this section, they are the legal
offspring of the Protestant-Catholic school funding crisis and the
political opportunism of Grant and Blaine96 -today the State Blaines
have a far more generalized operation in American public life. They
are a widespread mechanism for separating public benefits from all
religious institutions and religious individuals.
II1. STATE BLAINES: LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION
The categorization of a particular state constitutional provision as a
"Blaine Amendment" can be plausibly approached from various
perspectives-e.g., when the provision was adopted, whether it is
directly traceable to the aftermath of the failed attempt to amend the
federal constitution, how state courts have interpreted it, etc.-and
this probably explains why different treatments of the subject find
different numbers of existing State Blaines.97 Given the parameters of
my legal analysis, I propose a straightforward method of
characterizing a constitutional provision as a State Blaine
Amendment, focusing principally on language. For my purposes, a
State Blaine means a state constitutional provision that bars persons'
and organizations' access to public benefits explicitly because they are
religious persons or organizations.
This is a broad definition and, consequently, the parameters of
individual State Blaines will vary. For instance, some bar equal
participation in public aid only to religious schools; others bar
religious organizations or institutions; yet others bar non-public
institutions generally, while explicitly including religious institutions in
that category. State Blaines also vary in the language used to describe
the bar on equal participation. But, whatever range of disabilities or
disqualifications exists in the various State Blaines, all of them turn on
the religious affiliation of the disabled or disqualified person, status,
deleted its Blaine Amendment in 1974, I find that the present number of State Blaine
Amendments is thirty-seven.
96. See, e.g., Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 560 (explaining that "[a]lthough
the states adopted various... Blaine Amendments, it is at least clear that the states
generally intended to forbid the use of public funds in sectarian schools; and in some
cases, it appears that the amendments extended to other sectarian institutions as
well"); see also DeForrest, supra note 20, at 555 (arguing that the State Blaines "were
motivated by a desire to preserve an unofficial Protestant establishment in public
education, and to ensure that minority religions-Catholicism, in particular-would
be unable to officially challenge that unofficial establishment").
97. See, e.g., Heytens, supra note 38, at 123 & n.32 (discussing counting
discrepancies); see also supra notes 91, 95.
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or organization. The plain object of disabling religion is what unifies
the State Blaines.98
State courts' interpretation of the nuances of how a particular State
Blaine applies will not be exhaustively explored, but two aspects of
state court interpretation will be emphasized. First, I will point out
when a state court has explicitly recognized that a State Blaine creates
a greater separation between church and state than the federal
Establishment Clause. Second, I will point out when a state court has
done the reverse, interpreting a plainly separationist State Blaine
Amendment as doing nothing more than mimicking the parameters of
the federal religion clauses. In either case, focusing on these state
court interpretations will highlight the federalism aspects of the State
Blaine Amendments-i.e., whether they have been interpreted simply
to reinforce at the state level the separation the federal clauses
already achieve, or whether they have been read to further a
distinctive form of church-state separation that exceeds the separation
between religion and public funds imposed by the federal religion
clauses.
A. Language
As discussed before, by 1876-just after the failure of the federal
Blaine Amendment-fifteen states had adopted some kind of law that
explicitly prohibited public funding of religious organizations.99 These
anti-funding measures often found their way into state constitutions.
As early as 1848, the Wisconsin Constitution provided: "nor shall any
money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious
societies, or religious, or theological seminaries."'" In the 1850s, five
states incorporated similar provisions into their constitutions. The
Michigan Constitution of 1850 provided that "[n]o money shall be
appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any
religious sect or society, theological or religious seminary, nor shall
property belonging to the State be appropriated for any such
98. My treatment of the State Blaines does not foreclose an analysis that
categorizes them along a "continuum" according to how restrictively or expansively a
particular provision bars public funding of religion. See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note
20, at 576-601 (categorizing State Blaines generally as "less restrictive," "moderate,"
or "most restrictive"). My argument does suggest, however, that in whatever context
a State Blaine operates (for instance, whether it bars "direct" funding only or also
"indirect" funding, or whether it applies only to education or to a broader range of
persons and institutions), State Blaines generally impose disabilities on the basis of
religion and, to that extent, are unconstitutional. For instance, even though Mark
DeForrest distinguishes among the State Blaines according to the severity of their
funding restrictions, id., he concludes that "[w]ith some notable exceptions, State
Blaine provisions specifically target religious institutions for disparate treatment from
other private organizations and individuals," id. at 607.
99. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
100. Wis. Const. art. I, § 18 (added 1848).
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purposes."' ' In 1851, Indiana added a similar prohibition to its
Constitution. 0 2 Taking an obverse approach, the Ohio Constitution
of 1851 required that "no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever
have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds
of this state."' 1 3 In 1855, Massachusetts provided in its constitution
that funds raised for "public" or "common" schools "shall never be
appropriated to any religious sect for the maintenance exclusively of
its own schools."' 4 Both Kansas'015 and Oregon 6 followed suit in
1859.
The end of the 1860s and the first half of the 1870s saw similar
provisions adopted by South Carolina, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Missouri, Alabama and Nebraska.0 7 Illinois adopted an unusually
detailed provision barring any payments "in aid of any church or
sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution,
controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever" and
also forbidding any grant of "land, money, or other personal
101. Mich. Const. art. IV, § 40 (1850); see Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2 (amended
1970).
102. Ind. Const. art I, § 6 (added 1851) (providing that "[n]o money shall be drawn
from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution").
103. Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 (added 1851).
104. Mass. Const. art. XVIII (1855).
105. Kan. Const. art. VI, § 8 (1859) (providing that "[n]o religious sect or sects shall
ever control any part of the common-school or University funds of the State"). This
language was amended and moved to art. VI, § 6 in 1966. See Kan. Const. art. VI, § 6
(amended 1966).
106. Or. Const. art. I, § 5 (providing that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the
Treasury for the benefit of any religeous [sic], or theological institution" and
forbidding that "any money be appropriated for the payment of any religeous [sic]
services in either house of the Legislative Assembly").
107. See Ala. Const. art. XIII, § 8 (1875) (forbidding educational funds being
"appropriated to, or used for, the support of any sectarian or denominational
school"); id. art. XIV, § 263 (amended 1901); Ill. Const. art. VIII, § 3 (1870)
(forbidding, inter alia, appropriation of public funds for "anything in aid of any church
or sectarian purpose") (renumbered art. X, § 3 (1970)); Mo. Const. art. XI, § 11
(1875) (forbidding any payment of public funds "in aid of any religious creed, church
or sectarian purpose" and to any school "controlled by any religious creed, church or
sectarian denomination whatever") (renumbered art. IX, § 8); Neb. Const. art. VIII, §
11 (1875) (forbidding "sectarian instruction ... in any school or institution supported
in whole or in part by [public school funds]" and state acceptance of any grant of
property "to be used for sectarian purposes"); id. art. VII, § 11 (amended 1976); Pa.
Const. art. III, § 18 (1874) (forbidding appropriations "for charitable, educational or
benevolent purposes.., to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation
or association"); id. art. III, § 29 (1967); S.C. Const. art. X, § 5 (1868) (providing that
"[n]o religious sect or sects shall have exclusive right to or control of any part of the
school-funds of the State"), renumbered and amended by S.C. Const. art. XI, § 4
(1973). The Pennsylvania and Nebraska Constitutions were further amended in 1963
and 1976, respectively, to impose more specific restrictions against the use of public
funds for religious purposes. See Neb. Const. art. VII, § 11 (amended 1976); Pa.
Const. art. III, § 29 (added 1963); see also infra notes 127, 129 and accompanying text.
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property ... to any church or for any sectarian purpose."10  In the
latter half of the 1870s-the period directly coinciding with the failure
of the federal Blaine Amendment-Colorado, Texas, Georgia, New
Hampshire, Minnesota, California, and Louisiana also adopted anti-
funding provisions.10 9 Georgia ° and Minnesota's I 1877 provisions
were notably explicit about the range and character of excluded
institutions.
New Hampshire was an instructive and ironic case in point. Since
1784, New Hampshire's constitution had eloquently charged its
legislature with promoting the educational flourishing of New
Hampshire citizens:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community,
being essential to the preservation of a free government; and
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through
the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote
this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all
future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of
literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to
encourage private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities
for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades,
108. Ill. Const. art. VIII, § 3 (1870) (renumbered art. X, § 3 (1970)).
109. See Cal. Const. art. IV, § 30 (1879) (providing that no governmental body
"shall ever.., grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or
sectarian purpose"); Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 5, art. IX, § 8 (amended 1966); Colo.
Const. art. IX, § 7 (adopting an anti-funding provision identical to article VIII, §3 of
the 1870 Illinois Constitution, article 8, section 33 (1874)); id. art. V, § 34 (1876)
(prohibiting "charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent" appropriations to any
"denominational or sectarian institution or association," much like article III, section
18 of the 1874 Pennsylvania Constitution (1874)); Ga. Const. art. I, §1, 1 XIV (1877)
(including a similar prohibition); Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 2 (enacting the same
provision); N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII (1877) (enacting the same type of
provision); Tex. Const. art. I, § 7 (providing that "[n]o money shall be appropriated,
or drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious society,
theological or religious seminary"); id. art. VII, § 5(a) (barring school funds from
"ever be[ing] appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school"); see
also La. Const. art. LI (1879) (providing that "[n]o money shall ever be taken from
the public treasury, directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or denomination of
religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof"); id. art.
CCXXVIII (providing that no school funds "shall be appropriated to or used for the
support of any sectarian schools"); cf La. Const. art. CXL (1868) (prohibiting
appropriation to "any private school or any private institution of learning whatever"
but lacking any reference to "sectarian" schools). Louisiana's anti-funding provisions
were deleted from its constitution in the 1974 revision. See La. Const. art. I, § 8
(paralleling federal religion clauses).
110. See Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, T 14 (1877) (stating that "[n]o money shall ever be
taken from the public Treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult,
or denomination of religionists, or of any sectarian institution"); Ga. Const. art. I, § 2,
7.
111. See Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 2 ("In no case shall any public money or property
be appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines,
creeds or tenets or any particular Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or
taught.") (amended and restructured in 1974).
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manufactures, and natural history of the country; to countenance
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence,
public and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and
punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and
generous sentiments, among the people .... 112
Somewhat marring the harmony and inclusiveness of these
sentiments, New Hampshire added this exception in 1877: "Provided,
nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or
applied for the use of the schools or institutions of any religious sect
or denomination. 11 3
In the 1880s and 1890s another thirteen states added their numbers
to this growing trend of religiously sensitive anti-funding provisions.14
As discussed above, during this period Congress began requiring
newly admitted states to provide in their constitutions for a system of
public schools "free from sectarian control." '115  Consequently,
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming all
placed some form of anti-funding provision in their constitutions in
1889.116 Idaho and Mississippi added similar provisions in 1890;
Kentucky, in 1891.117 New York added its anti-funding provision in
1894 after a long and bitter fight, previously discussed, over parochial
112. N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII.
113. Id. (added 1877).
114. For instance, in 1880 Nevada ratified the addition of article XI, section 10 to
its constitution, providing that "[n]o public funds of any kind or character whatever,
State, County or Municipal, shall be used for sectarian purpose." Nev. Const. art. XI,
§ 10 (added 1877); see generally Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 565-67. In 1885,
Florida provided in its Declaration of Rights that no public revenue "shall ever be
taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or
religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution." Fla. Declaration of
Rights § 6 (1885), amended by Fla. Const. art. I, § 3.
115. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text; see also 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889).
116. See Mont. Const. art. XI, § 8 (1889) (forbidding any direct or indirect
appropriation from public funds "for any sectarian purpose" or "to aid" any learning
institution "controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination")
(renumbered art. X, § 6); N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 152 (1889) (providing that no public
funds "shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school"); S.D.
Const. art. VIII, § 16 (added 1889); Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 (added 1889) (providing
that "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment"); Wyo. Const. art. VII, § 8 (providing that no portion of public school
funds may be used to "support or assist" any institution of learning "controlled by any
church or sectarian organization or religious denomination whatsoever"); id. art. III, §
36 (forbidding "charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent" appropriations to
any "denominational or sectarian institution or association").
117. See Idaho Const. art. IX, § 5 (prohibiting aid to sectarian schools via a broad
anti-funding provision); Ky. Const. § 189 (providing that "[n]o portion" of any
educational fund "shall be appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of, any church,
sectarian or denominational school"); Miss. Const. art. VIII, § 208 (added 1890)
(providing that "[n]o religious or other sect" should ever control any part of the
public school funds, and that no funds should be "appropriated toward the support of
any sectarian school").
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school funding."' Rounding out the nineteenth century, Utah and
Delaware added anti-funding provisions in 1896 and 1897,
respectively." 9
This era of proliferating anti-funding amendments seemed to wind
down in the first decade of the twentieth century. Virginia first
included an explicit anti-funding provision in article IV, section 67 of
its constitution in 1902.12° Oklahoma (1907),121 Arizona (1910),122 and
New Mexico (1911)123 each included anti-funding provisions in their
new constitutions. With these four constitutions, a long period of
lawmaking-stretching back over sixty years to the Wisconsin
Constitution of 1848-seemed to pause for breath. When it did, the
American state constitutional landscape could boast of some thirty-six
states that explicitly barred a wide range of religious schools and
institutions from access to an impressive array of public benefits. The
constitutional landscape was not significantly altered until the
admission of Hawaii and Alaska into the union in 1959, each new state
118. Supra notes 47-48, 51 and accompanying text; see N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 4
(1894) (prohibiting public funds from being used "directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious
denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught")
(renumbered art. XI, § 3).
119. See Del. Const. art. X, § 3 (prohibiting any part of educational funds from
being "appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of any sectarian, church or
denominational school"); Utah Const. art. I, § 4 (providing that "[n]o public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment").
120. See Va. Const. art. IV, § 67 (1902) (prohibiting the General Assembly from
making "any appropriation" of public funds "to any church, or sectarian society,
association, or institution of any kind whatever, which is entirely or partly, directly or
indirectly, controlled by any church or sectarian society"). Interestingly, that same
section also authorized the General Assembly to, in its discretion, "make
appropriations to non-sectarian institutions for the reform of youthful criminals." Id.
Article IX, section 141 of the 1902 Virginia Constitution generally forbade
appropriation of public funds to "any school or institution of learning not owned or
exclusively controlled by the State or some political subdivision thereof," but it
specifically empowered counties, cities, towns and districts to "make appropriations
to non-sectarian schools of manual, industrial, or technical training." Id. art. IX, § 141
(1902).
121. Okla. Const. art. II, § 5 (providing that "[n]o public money or property shall
ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the
use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such").
122. Ariz. Const. art. II, § 12 (forbidding public funds from being "appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any
religious establishment"); id. art. IX, § 10 (1910) (prohibiting taxes or appropriations
"in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school").
123. N.M. Const. art. XII, § 3 (added 1911) (barring the use of any educational
funds "for the support of any sectarian, denominational or private school, college or
university").
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with anti-funding constitutional provisions.'24 That brought the total
of such provisions at that time to thirty-eight.
The remaining developments in relevant state constitutional
language are piecemeal but reflect a preoccupation with singling out
religiously affiliated organizations. For instance, both in 1956 and in
1971, Virginia amended its anti-funding provisions to create more
pointed religion-based exclusions. In 1956, Virginia amended article
VIII, section 10 of its constitution to allow the expenditure of public
education funds for "Virginia students in public and nonsectarian
private schools and institutions of learning."'" In 1971, Virginia
added article VIII, section 11, allowing its General Assembly to
provide loans or grants to "students attending nonprofit institutions of
higher education in the Commonwealth whose primary purpose is to
provide collegiate or graduate education and not to provide religious
training or theological education."'1 26 Pennsylvania had made a similar
adjustment to its constitution in 1963 when it allowed for the provision
of scholarship grants or loans for higher education "except that no
[such] scholarship, grants or loans.., shall be given to persons
enrolled in a theological seminary or school of theology."'27 In 1970,
Michigan amended its constitution with the apparent purpose of
specifically barring any kind of school voucher program."' Finally, in
1976, Nebraska made perhaps the most pointed adjustment in any
state constitution by providing that its legislature could allow
government contracts with non-public institutions to provide
"educational or other services" to handicapped persons under twenty-
one years old, but only "if such services are nonsectarian in nature."'12 9
In this section, I have taken care to acquaint the reader with the
specific linguistic formulas by which the State Blaines erect religion-
sensitive barriers to the allocation of public benefits. I have done this
to allow the State Blaines, in a sense, to speak for themselves. State
Blaines are undeniably multi-faceted, which makes it tricky to treat
124. Alaska Const. art. VII, § 1 (enacted 1959) (providing that "[n]o money shall
be paid from public funds for the direct benefit of any religious or other private
educational institution"); Haw. Const. art. X, § 1 (1959) (forbidding public funds from
being "appropriated for the support or benefit of any sectarian or private educational
institution").
125. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 10 (amended 1956) (emphasis added). The former
provision had been interpreted to limit the expenditure of public educational funds to
public schools only, thus excluding private schools altogether.
126. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 11 (added 1971) (emphasis added).
127. Pa. Const. art. III, § 29 (added 1963).
128. See Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2 (amended 1970) (providing that "[n]o payment,
credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of
public monies or property shall be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the
attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any [private,
denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary]
school"); Kemerer, supra note 6, at 4-6 (observing that this amendment was
specifically designed to bar vouchers).
129. See Neb. Const. art. VII, § 11 (amended 1976).
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them generally. I will nonetheless offer four interrelated observations
about the nature of the State Blaines' common objectives, as reflected
in their language.
First, the State Blaines apply their prohibitions to a wide spectrum
of public benefits. Restrictions are sometimes limited to particular
sources of public funds-e.g., to a "public school fund" or to
"educational funds"-but more commonly they apply broadly to, for
instance, "public funds" or "state property," to "money raised by
taxation" or "money drawn from the treasury," or simply to "money,"
categorically forbidding "appropriations" or "payments" from these
generic public sources. Second, the State Blaines restrict the
application of public benefits to religious institutions in terms that not
only circumscribe the destination of the benefits but, separately, their
purpose and effect. So, for instance, public funds may not be applied
"in aid of," "for the benefit of," or to "support or sustain" any
religious organization, and, additionally, these forbidden applications
may not be achieved "directly or indirectly." Another way of
effecting this kind of restriction is to forbid the appropriation of funds
for religious "purposes," or to prohibit religious groups from having
any "control" over public funds. Third, some State Blaines limit their
prohibitions to religious "schools," while many strike more broadly at
religious "institutions," "associations,' ''establishments," and
"societies." Others dictate the tenor of instruction offered at
institutions "supported" by public funds, prohibiting "sectarian
instruction" at such places.
But the most significant and overarching quality that links State
Blaines is that all explicitly tailor their restrictions to religion. They
target institutions that are "religious," "sectarian," "theological,"
"ecclesiastical," "denominational," or affiliated with a "church." They
prohibit appropriations to places where the "doctrines," "creeds," or
"tenets" of religion are practiced or taught, or where religious
"worship," "exercise," or "instruction" occurs. They delimit the
"purposes" for which public benefits may be applied, removing
"religious" purposes from the universe of other purposes. They single
out individuals who, because of their religious affiliation, cannot be
included in the distribution of public benefits-people such as
"priests," "preachers," "ministers" and "teachers" of religious
doctrine. 30
Recall that the State Blaine Amendments arose largely in response
to widespread Protestant fears of Catholic influence on society,
politics and education. Yet, it is perhaps stating the obvious to
observe that the words "Roman Catholic" appear nowhere in any of
130. See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note 20, at 602 (observing that "[t]he overall effect
of these Blaine-style provisions, by their express wording or through later judicial
interpretations, was usually to preclude both the direct or indirect transfer of state
funds to religious or sectarian schools and institutions").
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the provisions. The State Blaines survive today in thirty-seven state
constitutions as broad, explicit, and generic prohibitions on public
funding of all religion. Their historical antecedents can help us
contextualize the amendments but they should not control their
application or our assessment of their constitutionality. The social
and religious contexts in which the State Blaines operate today are far
different from those of their origins and, consequently, faithful
applications of the language of the State Blaines no longer divides, for
purposes of public funding, the Protestant public schools from the
Catholic private schools. Instead, they divide the thoroughly
secularized public schools and other public institutions from a growing
array of private religious schools and other private religious entities.
They divide persons with religious affiliations or religious purposes
from persons with non-religious affiliation and purposes. This
operation is fully consonant with the changing dynamic of religious
conflicts in modern American society. As Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle
have observed, "[t]he religious wars in the United States in the early
twenty-first century are not Protestant vs. Catholic, or Christian vs.
Jew, or even the more plausible Islam vs. all others. They are instead
the wars of the deeply religious against the forces of a relentlessly
secular commercial culture."'31 One hopes that such modern conflicts
are fairly described as something more benign than "wars," but,
regardless, there is little doubt what side the State Blaines are fighting
for: The State Blaines are, today, a widespread legal obstacle
separating the secular from the religious in the allocation of public
benefits. It will be that operation that I will measure against the
requirements of the First Amendment.
B. Interpretation
There is no doubt room for nuanced interpretation of the various
linguistic formulas that appear in State Blaines. For instance, a court
might decide that a provision banning funds "in aid of" a religious
school has a broader prohibitory scope than a provision simply
banning direct funding.'32 This section will take a broader approach to
interpretation. I will discuss state court decisions that explicitly
recognize that a State Blaine Amendment has created a greater
separation between public benefits and religious organizations than
the federal religion clauses require. Conversely, I will note other state
court decisions that do the opposite-i.e., despite a State Blaine's
restrictive language, decide that the provision imposes no greater
obstacles than the federal Constitution to religious groups' access to
131. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 954-55.
132. See, e.g., Lenstrom v. Thone, 311 N.W.2d 884 (Neb. 1981); see also Kemerer,
supra note 6, at 16 (discussing the impact of this specific language on courts'
application in terms of Nebraska's State Blaine Amendment).
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public funds. My purpose is to demonstrate that state courts have
often-but not always-interpreted the State Blaine Amendments
both as going beyond the federal Establishment Clause and also as
creating an explicitly religion-sensitive barrier to the allocation of
public funds and other benefits.
A prime example of the first kind of interpretation-one
recognizing greater state separation-was provided by the Idaho
Supreme Court in 1971. In Epeldi v. Engelking, the court considered
a provision that provided a neutral transportation reimbursement to
public and non-public schoolchildren alike, including children
attending religious schools.'33 The reimbursement would have passed
muster under the federal Establishment Clause, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court years before in Everson and again in Allen.134 But the
Idaho Supreme Court observed that, "unlike the provisions of the
Federal Constitution, the Idaho Constitution contains provisions
specifically focusing on private schools controlled by sectarian,
religious authorities." '35 Referring to Idaho's Blaine Amendment-
article IX, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution-the court confessed
that "one cannot help but first be impressed by the restrictive
language contained therein.' ' 36  Based on that language, the court
reasoned that "the framers of our constitution intended to more
positively enunciate the separation between church and state than did
133. Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860, 861-62 & n.1 (Idaho 1971) (discussing Idaho
Code § 33-1501 (Michie 1970)).
134. See id. at 865. Everson, the seminal establishment decision, concluded that a
neutral transportation reimbursement did not violate the Establishment Clause
merely because it incidentally helped some children attend religious schools by paying
for their bus transportation. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Allen,
the Supreme Court applied Everson to conclude that the neutral provision of free
secular textbooks to public and nonpublic schools-including religious schools-also
did not constitute a forbidden "establishment" of religion. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968). In going beyond Everson, Epeldi was not an aberration, but was
merely one example of a mode of interpretation that had prevailed in state courts for
many years since Everson. Thomas Berg notes that "[t]his stricter anti-aid position
prevailed in many other forums; between 1949 and 1963, seven of the eight state
supreme courts to consider bus reimbursement for Catholic students ruled it invalid
under state constitutional provisions." Berg, supra note 12, at 128. Berg cites several
cases striking down bus aid, including: Bd. of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla.
1963); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1962); Matthews v.
Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961); McVey v. Hawkins, 258 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 1953);
Zellers v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (N.M. 1951); Visser v. Nooksack Valley Sch. Dist., 207
P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949); Silver Lake Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Parker, 29 N.W.2d 214 (Iowa
1947); see also Anson Phelps Stokes & Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the United
States 431 (1964). But see Snyder v. Newtown, 161 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1961) (upholding
aid).
135. Epeldi, 488 P.2d at 865.
136. Id. Idaho's State Blaine Amendment is discussed supra note 117. It broadly
prohibits appropriation of public funds, inter alia, "to help support or sustain any
school.., controlled by any church, sectarian or religious denomination whatsoever."
Idaho Const. art. IX, § 5.
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the framers of the United States Constitution.' 37  The court then
struck down the transportation reimbursement provision under the
Idaho Blaine Amendment.'38 It remarked, logically enough, that its
disposition under the state constitution rendered irrelevant the federal
Establishment Clause standards used by the Supreme Court in
Everson and Allen. 139
The Washington Supreme Court followed a similar rationale in
Witters III, already alluded to in Part I, when in 1989 it barred a blind
student's use of generally available public funds for religious
training-a use which the U.S. Supreme Court had already, in the
same case, allowed under the federal Establishment Clause. 4° The
Washington Supreme Court relied on what it called the "sweeping
and comprehensive" language of the Washington Blaine
Amendment-article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution-
"which prohibits not only the appropriation of public money for
religious instruction, but also the application of public funds to
religious instruction.'' The court reasoned that in this restrictive
language "lies a major difference between our state constitution and
the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution," thereby making application of federal constitutional
standards superfluous.'42 Significantly, the court referred to prior
decisions construing the phrase "religious instruction" in article I,
section 11, and concluded that the kind of instruction constitutionally
barred from funding was "devotional in nature and designed to induce
faith and belief in the student," as opposed to the "open, free, critical,
and scholarly examination of the literature, experiences, and
knowledge of mankind" that would occur, for instance, in a "Bible as
Literature" course. 43
137. Epeldi, 488 P.2d at 865.
138. Id. at 868.
139. Id. at 867-68. This expansive reading of the Idaho Constitution was reiterated
in 1996 by the Idaho Supreme Court, when, citing Epeldi, it remarked that "[tjhe
Idaho Constitution has been held to provide greater restrictions on the state's
involvement in parochial activities than the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment." See Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist., 919 P.2d 334, 342 (Idaho
1996). Interestingly, in that case the court additionally held that the Idaho
Constitution's anti-funding provision was preempted by the reimbursement
provisions of the IDEA, a federal disability law. Id.
140. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Witters v. State Comm'n for the
Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (Witters III).
141. Witters 111, 771 P.2d at 1122 (citations omitted). The Washington Blaine
Amendment, dating from 1889, is discussed in supra note 116. For a general
discussion of the origins of the Washington Blaine, see DeForrest, supra note 20, at
574-76.
142. Witters III, 771 P.2d at 1122.
143. Id. (quoting Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Regents, 436 P.2d
189, 193 (Wash. 1967) (en banc)); see generally State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811-13
(Wash. 1986) (containing an extensive discussion of general analysis for determining
whether the Washington Constitution provides broader civil liberties than the federal
Constitution). For a detailed discussion of Washington's "uniquely developed body
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Further examples of this kind of expansive (i.e., resulting in greater
separation than federal constitutional standards) interpretation are
easy to find. For instance, in 1963, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
concluded that the Blaine Amendment in article II, section 5 of its
constitution created a more rigorous funding restriction than the
federal Constitution and therefore prohibited the kind of busing
reimbursement allowed by Everson.1" The court reasoned that the
construction of the Establishment Clause in Everson had no bearing
on the effect of state constitutional provisions.145 The court was frank
and unapologetic about the practical inequity of its decision. It flatly
stated that if a parent exercises his right to "provide for the religious
instruction and training of his own children" and consequently places
them in religious schools, then, as a matter of law, the parent must
"assum[e] the financial burden which that choice entails. 14 6  The
court thus left no doubt that the Oklahoma Blaine Amendment
explicitly allocated that financial burden based purely and simply on
the religious nature of the parents' choice.
Moreover, when state courts interpret their own constitutions as
more restrictive than the federal Establishment Clause, often they
also purport to "reject" the reasoning underlying the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause decisions. For instance, the California and
South Dakota Supreme Courts have both explicitly rejected the "child
benefit" theory relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson and
other cases. 147 Joseph Viteritti observes that "[a]t one time or another
courts in nearly half the states have issued pronouncements indicating
that they do not consider the Court's [school aid] decisions to be
binding in interpreting their own constitutions," and that "several
have specifically rejected the 'child benefit theory."'148 Finally, states
sometimes reach beyond weaker or even non-existent anti-funding
provisions to create rigid barriers against religious funding. For
instance, in 1979 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted its fairly
narrow Blaine Amendment-prohibiting only the payment of public
of Blaine Amendment jurisprudence," see DeForrest, supra note 20, at 590-601.
144. See Bd. of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 912-13 (Okla. 1963). Oklahoma's
Blaine Amendment, discussed supra note 121, provides that no public money "shall
ever be appropriated.., directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any.., sectarian institution." Okla. Const. art. II, § 5.
145. Antone, 384 P.2d at 912-13.
146. Id. at 913; accord Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789, 790-92 (Okla. 1972).
147. See, e.g., Elbe v. Yankton Indep. Sch. Dist., 372 N.W.2d 113, 117 (S.D. 1985)
(noting that it had "clearly rejected the child benefit doctrine" in an earlier case and
deeming that doctrine irrelevant in applying the South Dakota Blaine Amendment);
Cal. Teachers' Ass'n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953, 960-64 (Cal. 1981) (criticizing and refusing
to follow child benefit doctrine in applying stricter provisions of the California Blaine
Amendment). For a general discussion of the child benefit doctrine, see, for example,
Viteritti, supra note 30, at 1123-25.
148. Viteritti, supra note 45, at 149, nn.194-98 (citing Chester James Antieu et al.,
Religion Under the State Constitutions (1965), G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the
States, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 73 (1989), and Wendtland, supra note 6).
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funds for "the direct benefit" of any religious school-to achieve a
strict funding prohibition.149  Vermont has no explicit anti-funding
provision in its constitution, but in 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court
decided that the provision in chapter 1, article III (protecting persons
from being "compelled to... support any place of worship") erected a
stronger barrier against a neutral voucher program than the
Establishment Clause.150
On the other hand, several state courts have interpreted the plainly
restrictive language in their Blaine Amendments as creating no
greater separation than the federal Establishment Clause. In one
significant recent decision, Kotterman v. Killian, the Arizona Supreme
Court refused to interpret Arizona's anti-funding provision in a rigidly
absolutist manner, while at the same time criticizing the
discriminatory motives behind the federal Blaine Amendment.'
Other states have chosen either simply to ignore the separationist
language in their own constitutions or to interpret it in a manner
coextensive with the federal religion clauses. 5 2  For instance, in
approving the loaning of free textbooks to religious schools, the
Mississippi Supreme Court leniently interpreted the language in its
constitution prohibiting any public funds from being "appropriated
toward the support of any sectarian school," and added that "[t]here is
no requirement that the church should be a liability to those of its
citizenship who are at the same time citizens of the state, and entitled
to privileges and benefits as such."' 53  Similarly, the Ohio Supreme
Court has suggested that its state constitution provides greater free
exercise rights than the federal Free Exercise Clause, while indicating
that its religious anti-funding provision-although phrased in
absolutist terms-is merely coextensive with the federal
Establishment Clause. 15 4
149. Sheldon Jackson Coll. v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 129-32 (Alaska 1979)
(interpreting Alaska Const. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added)).
150. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 562-63 (Vt.
1999); Vt. Const. Ch. I, art. III (1777).
151. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 623-24 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc); see also
DeForrest, supra note 20, at 583 (discussing Kotterman).
152. See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. State, 648
P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (interpreting art. IX, § 7 and art. V, § 34 of the
Colorado Constitution); People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 129 (Ill. 1973)
(interpreting art. X, § 3 of the Illinois Constitution); Chance v. Miss. State Textbook
Rating & Purch. Bd., 200 So. 706 (Miss. 1941); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d
203 (Ohio 1999) (interpreting art. VI, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution); Durham v.
McLeod, 192 S.E.2d 202 (S.C. 1972) (interpreting former art. XI, § 9 of the South
Carolina Constitution); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (interpreting
art. I, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution); Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead,
870 P.2d 916 (Utah. 1993) (interpreting art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution).
153. Chance, 200 So. at 707, 710 (interpreting Miss. Const. art. VIII, § 208).
154. See Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044-45 (Ohio 2000) (stating that the
"rights of conscience" provision in art. I, § 7 of the Ohio Constitution provides
broader free exercise rights than the federal Constitution); Simmons-Harris, 711
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This section simply highlights expansive state court decisions which
are significant for two reasons. First, state courts have interpreted
State Blaines in a manner that explicitly goes beyond the church-state
separation mandated by the federal Establishment Clause, specifically
in the area of public aid to religious schools. This expansive
interpretation has been occurring for as long as the Supreme Court
has been interpreting the boundaries of the Establishment Clause;
indeed, such state court decisions tend to cluster around instances in
which the Supreme Court has allowed some form of public benefit (as
with free transportation in Everson and free textbooks in Allen) to be
shared equally between public and religious schools.'55 Second, state
courts have frankly recognized that, under their application of the
State Blaine Amendments, religiously motivated behavior pays a
special price. Those burdens on religion are not incidental but rather
are targeted disabilities, the predictable and intended result of a policy
of self-consciously distancing the public sphere from religious persons
and institutions.
More lenient interpretations of State Blaines are possible, of course,
but it is fair to say that such decisions must work hard to hurdle the
plainly separationist implications of the language of State Blaines. The
more expansive decisions are not aberrations, however. Rather, they
faithfully cleave to what the State Blaines say and to the separationist
objectives that their language plainly aims to achieve. It will be the
remaining task of this Article to say whether those objectives violate
the First Amendment.
IV. THE JURSIPRUDENTIAL ROOTS OF NON-PERSECUTION
The foregoing cross-section of the State Blaines reveals that a
preference for separating public benefits from religious persons and
organizations persists in over two-thirds of our state constitutions.
Broadly speaking, the State Blaines are the residue of the second
great historical controversy to raise profound questions about the
shape of American religious liberties-the rise of public schools and
the withdrawal of public funds from private religious schools.156 Those
N.E.2d at 212 (interpreting the Ohio Blaine Amendment in art. VI, § 2 in a non-
separationist manner and as generally coextensive with federal Establishment
Clause).
155. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 45, at 149 (observing that "[flederal rulings to the
contrary, many state courts have, from time to time, invalidated public assistance to
private or parochial school students in the form of transportation or textbooks"
(footnotes omitted)).
156. See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
Emory L.J. 43, 48-53 (1997). The first great historical controversy, as Laycock
explains, was the 1780s dispute over church financing that gave rise to Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance. Id. at 48-49; see also McConnell, supra note 17, at 183
("One of the most important eighteenth-century abuses against which the no-
establishment principle was directed was mandatory support for churches and
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amendments "arguably represent[ed] a political judgment on the
constitutional questions raised by such funding." '157 But we should be
skeptical about accepting the judgments of State Blaines as the last
constitutional word on those questions. As we have seen, the anti-
funding advocates of that era failed to amend the federal Constitution,
naturally raising the question whether the State Blaines themselves
conflict with federal norms of religious liberty. More importantly, as
Douglas Laycock observes, "the nineteenth century movement was
based in part on premises that were utterly inconsistent with the First
Amendment," given that "opposition to funding religious schools
drew heavily on anti-Catholicism." '158 Anti-Catholic motives alone
may not, in the final analysis, be enough to invalidate the State
Blaines under the First Amendment, but their presence should at least
raise some red flags. And, raising further suspicions, the plain terms
of most State Blaines go well beyond the narrower questions raised by
the school funding controversy.
The movement spawning the State Blaines only lapped at the
shores of the federal Constitution, but failed to alter it. Thus, the
federal constitutional standards governing public aid to religion have
charted their own jurisprudential course. The stark kind of strict
separationism between all public benefits and religion required by
most State Blaines has never been regnant in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Even the first major non-establishment decision,
Everson, allowed indirect state aid to religious schools,
notwithstanding Justice Black's strict separationist dicta. 59 Some of
ministers. This system was support for religion qua religion; it singled out religion as
such for financial benefit.").
157. Laycock, supra note 156, at 50.
158. Id. Laycock contrasts the nineteenth-century resolution of the school funding
problem (i.e., the proliferation of State Blaines) with the eighteenth-century
resolution of the church funding problem. He argues that Madison's solution to the
latter problem was a principled one that virtually everyone today still accepts, and
that itself is firmly embedded in federal religion clause jurisprudence: Government
cannot directly fund religious teaching and it certainly cannot exclusively fund
teachers of only one kind of religion. See id. at 49 (explaining that the General
Assessment was "a tax solely for the support of clergy in the performance of their
religious functions," that only Christian teachers were subsidized, and that "[t]he
essence of the general assessment was massive discrimination in favor of religious
viewpoints"). In sharp contrast, the school funding crisis "did not produce a
principled resolution to a difficult problem" but "produced instead a nativist
Protestant victory over Catholic immigrants" that was "only a pretense of neutrality."
Id. at 52.
159. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that "[n]either a
state nor the Federal Government can ... aid one religion, [or] aid all religions ...
[and] [n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions"). At the same time, as I discuss below, Everson contains an
equally strong condemnation of discrimination against religion. See id. ("On the
other hand ... [a state] cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own
religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
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the Court's non-establishment decisions may skirt the borders of
Blaine-like separationism-Charles Fried recently referred to the
Court's mostly-defunct decision in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist16 ° as "a kind of Court-imposed Blaine
Amendment" 161-but the Court has generally proceeded in a non-
absolutist (if sometimes counterintuitive) manner in sketching the
boundaries between permissible and impermissible government aid to
religious persons and entities. Furthermore, the direction the Court
has been taking over the last two decades highlights the gulf between
federal standards of non-establishment and the rigid barriers thrown
up by the State Blaines over a century ago.
For instance, it is becoming increasingly evident that the
government acts within the bounds of the federal Establishment
Clause when it provides secular benefits to a broad range of public
and private recipients, including religiously affiliated private
recipients, based on criteria that are "neutral"-in the sense that the
benefits are not distributed on the basis of any religious quality, or
lack thereof, in the recipient.162 Relatedly, when those secular
benefits, neutrally distributed, end up in the hands of religious
organizations because of the private choices of individuals-and not
because of any deliberate government design to nudge the benefits
toward religious ends-government has not impermissibly
"subsidized" religion.163 Generally, the Court has emphasized that the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislation."). Douglas Laycock observes that "the essence
of both the no-aid and the nondiscrimination theories is succinctly laid out in [these]
two paragraphs." Laycock, supra note 156, at 53.
160. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
161. See Fried, supra note 13, at 196. In Nyquist, the Court invalidated a New York
program that gave grants to nonpublic schools and tax credits to parents whose
children attended those schools, which included religious schools. 413 U.S. 756, 798
(1973). The scope of Nyquist seems to have been sharply limited by Zelman. See
infra note 360.
162. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (finding a
program of generally available school vouchers, neutral with respect to religion, does
not violate the Establishment Clause); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-10 (2000)
(Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (finding that a program of secular governmental aid,
neutrally offered to a wide range of private groups without reference to religion, does
not violate Establishment Clause).
163. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649 (distinguishing between provision of
government aid "directly to religious schools" and "programs of true private choice,
in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of private individuals"); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (observing that
the Court has, "[als a way of assuring neutrality," considered whether government aid
is channeled to religious schools only because of private choice); see also Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (arguing that because a
government-provided sign-language interpreter was present in a religious school
"only as a result of the private decision of individual parents," the aid did not violate
the Establishment Clause); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488-89 (1986) (determining that a blind student's private decision to use neutral,
generally available scholarship funds for ministry training did not violate the
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Establishment Clause does not require a wholesale exclusion of
religious entities from participation in government programs and
government funding. In other words, the argument is steadily
evaporating that selective discrimination against religion finds its
justification in the Establishment Clause itself. To be sure, the clause
"singles out" religion for a kind of disability, as Michael McConnell
explains: "The disestablishment principle prevents the government
from using its power to promote, advocate, or endorse any particular
religious position."'" 6 But this principle stands diametrically opposed
to a posture of hostility toward religion that is required, or even
justified, by the Establishment Clause. Again, to quote McConnell:
[T]he suggestion that religious organizations must categorically be
barred from participation in all government-funded programs must
be rejected. Although favored by the so-called "strict
separationists," this has never been the rule in establishment clause
cases and has been rejected by the Supreme Court in every case in
which it has been seriously advanced. 16P
Indeed, McConnell argues that, in both the abortion and religion
contexts, "denying federal money for activities that would otherwise
be funded would amount to a substantial penalty for exercising one's
constitutional rights. 1 66
Doubtless, there is clarifying work left to do at the federal level, but
for present purposes one may observe, uncontroversially, that federal
constitutional barriers to public funding of religious institutions have
demonstrably softened, that "the [Supreme] Court has become more
solicitous of innovative partnerships between governments and
religious institutions,"'67 and that both states and Congress will likely
respond-and have already responded-by enacting laws allowing
Establishment Clause).
164. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul
L. Rev. 1, 43 (2000); see also Laycock, supra note 156, at 70-71 (explaining that
sometimes even a substantively neutral view of the religion clauses "requires that
religion be treated in ways that are arguably worse than the treatment available to
similar secular activities," such as prohibiting the government from "celebrat[ing]
religion or lead[ing] religious exercises").
165. Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 989, 1027 (1991) (citing cases).
166. Id. at 1028; see also Berg, supra note 12, at 163.
Since about 1980, we have been in a third period of modern church-state
relations. The last two decades have seen the decline of strong
separationism as the dominant church-state ideal-a slow, partial, but
continuing decline-and the corresponding rise of the principle that religion
can be an equal participant with other ideas and activities in public life,
including in government benefit programs.
Id. I will say more below about "selective" funding of "non-religious" persons and
entities, about whether that is a plausible way of defending some operations of State
Blaines, and about the relationship of that issue to selective funding of childbirth over
abortion. See infra notes 397-412.
167. Bybee & Newton, supra note 9, at 574.
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religious groups to enjoy generally available public benefits.168 Enter
the State Blaine Amendments.
If I may indulge in metaphor for a moment, the role of the State
Blaines will become clearer. The federal constitutional standards for
permissible aid to religion were, for many years, murky water in a
lake-one illustrative example was the distinction, supposedly of
constitutional magnitude, between giving secular textbooks to
religious schools (constitutional) and giving them maps, globes, and
film-strip projectors (unconstitutional).'69 Over the last few decades,
that water has gradually been clearing until we can better see what
principles govern which kinds of aid the federal Constitution allows
and disallows. 7 ° But simultaneously, we are now beginning to discern
another layer of murk representing the State Blaines. As we have
seen, the State Blaines are far more stringent than the federal
Constitution about the barriers raised against public funding of
religious persons, schools and other organizations. The real question
now is whether the State Blaines are the bottom of the lake.
If they are the bottom of the lake-if, so to speak, there is nothing
"beneath" them to temper or annul what they plainly do-then the
resulting legal landscape among the states is fairly predictable.
168. Bybee and Newton discuss several federal and state initiatives that take
advantage of a more flexible approach to government involvement with religious
organizations. See id. at 552-53. For instance, they discuss the 1996 Charitable Choice
Act, a federal law allowing states that participate in certain federally funded programs
"to contract with religious organizations, or to allow religious organizations to accept
certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement [under these programs]." Id. at
552 (quoting Charitable Choice Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. 1, § 104, 110
Stat. 2161 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §604(b) (1996)). They also point to President
Bush's announced policy of "encouraging faith-based solutions in partnership with
the federal government" and the extensive media coverage of that initiative. Id. at
552-53 & n.10. Finally, they mention the increasing number of states that have begun
experiments with school vouchers. Id. at 552-53 & n.11; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 10, at 45-47 (commenting on the increasing role of religious organizations in
Charitable Choice).
169. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (finding that the
Establishment Clause was not violated by lending of secular textbooks to students
attending religious schools), with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975)
(determining the Establishment Clause was violated by providing secular instructional
materials to religious schools), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977)
(finding the same). See also Viteritti, supra note 30, at 1130 (discussing the "disarray"
and "inconsistency" in the Court's non-establishment and school aid jurisprudence of
the 1970s).
170. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 849-52 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (explaining why distinctions made in Meek and Wolman "created an
inexplicable rift within our Establishment Clause jurisprudence concerning
government aid to schools"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (observing that the Court's non-establishment jurisprudence, at the
time, meant that "a State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United
States for use in geography class"); see also Viteritti, supra note 30, at 1132-41
(charting gradual clarification of school aid aspects of the Court's non-establishment
jurisprudence, from Mueller through Zelman).
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Depending on how each state constitution is framed and interpreted,
we will have in this country a kaleidoscope of separationism: One
state will hermetically seal off all public benefits from religious
schools; another might do the same for all religious organizations
generally; another might focus on individuals who plan to put the
benefits to faith-oriented uses; and still another might decide to erect
no separationist barriers at all. My canvass of the State Blaines
suggests that the balance will be tilted significantly in the direction of
shutting off religion from public funds. The ability of religious
persons and institutions to enjoy public benefits on an equal basis will
be-quite apart from how permissively the federal Establishment
Clause is interpreted-refracted through the anti-funding provisions
of fifty state constitutions.
But this will only be true if there exists no principle in the federal
Constitution that can restrain the process. In this part, I will
demonstrate that there is. That principle consists of three
conceptually related strands found in Free Exercise, Establishment,
and Free Speech jurisprudence. But they combine in one overarching
rule-what the Supreme Court has referred to as the "fundamental
nonpersecution principle of the First Amendment. 171 Simply stated,
the non-persecution rule means, among other things, that neither state
nor federal governments may, consistently with the First Amendment,
restrict access to generally available public benefits based on persons'
or organizations' religious status, purpose, affiliation, or identity.
A. Free Exercise and Non-Persecution
Prohibiting religious discrimination lies at the heart of the free
exercise clause, but it is important to carefully define "discrimination"
by reference to the Supreme Court's long history of balancing the
conflicting claims of religion and government. Paradoxically, the
principle condemning religious discrimination-or "fundamental
nonpersecution principle," as the Court has most recently called it-is
best understood against the backdrop of another important free
exercise principle, one that restricts religious freedom. That
background rule is the "non-exemption" rule, which was best
articulated in the 1990 Smith decision but which goes back over 125
years to the Court's earliest religion clause cases. 72 Non-exemption
means that the Free Exercise Clause does not require courts to grant
religion-based exemptions from the burdens of genuinely neutral laws.
The mere statement of the rule suggests that it interacts significantly
with the narrower rule that laws may not target religious behavior or
affiliation for special disabilities.
171. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523
(1993); see infra Part IV.A.2.
172. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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The non-exemption rule (which has been the subject of sharp
scholarly debate) 73 illuminates the parameters and continuing force of
the non-persecution rule, particularly as it applies to the State Blaine
Amendments. As Michael McConnell has explained, whether the
Free Exercise Clause requires religious exemptions (as he argues), or
whether Smith correctly decided that such exemptions lie only within
the province of the legislature, it is clear that the Free Exercise Clause
unambiguously forbids laws that directly target religious conduct for
penalties or disabilities:
Under both conceptions, it is unconstitutional.., to inflict penalties
on religious practices as such. For example, zoning ordinances
disallowing churches while allowing meeting halls and other uses
with comparable effects are unconstitutional, as are "anti-cult"
legislation, laws barring clergy from public office, and charitable
solicitation regulations crafted to disadvantage a particular religious
sect.
1 4
The non-exemption rule has jurisprudential roots in the nineteenth
century conflict between the Mormon Church and the territorial laws
of the United States prohibiting polygamy. In its first significant
religion clause decision, Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the Mormons' religious tenets-which at the time
commanded polygamy as a religious duty for male members-did not
exempt them, under the Free Exercise Clause, from obedience to a
generally applicable criminal prohibition against polygamy.1 5 Twelve
years later in Davis v. Beason, the Court explained (again with
reference to Mormon polygamy) that the Free Exercise Clause
permitted no interference with "man's relations to his Maker and the
obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an
expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects,...
provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and
173. Compare, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Should the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution Be Amended?, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 9 (1998), and Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1109 (1990), with Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the
Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 245 (1991); Jay S. Bybee, Common
Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First
Amendment, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 251 (2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm
Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little
Rock L. Rev. 555 (1998); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992).
174. McConnell, supra note 21, at 1418 (citing cases); see also Lash, supra note 23,
at 1113 (agreeing with McConnell that "[elven if the original Free Exercise Clause
was intended to express norms of individual freedom, the scope of the Clause appears
to be limited to a prohibition of laws that abridge religion qua religion").
175. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court drew a basic
distinction between "mere opinion," which the Free Exercise Clause clearly
protected, and "actions... in violation of social duties or subversive of good order,"
which Congress could proscribe. See id. at 164.
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prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with." '176
Free exercise, then, "must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the
country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent
as properly the subjects of punitive legislation."'77
Since 1940, when it recognized that the Free Exercise Clause
applied to the states, 178 the Court has had more opportunities to
develop the non-exemption rule. In Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, the Court gave a more nuanced description of the rule's
scope, even as it denied that Jehovah's Witnesses merited a religious
exemption from compulsory flag-salute laws: "The religious liberty
which the Constitution protects has never excluded legislation of
general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular
sects."17 9  Again, in Braunfeld v. Brown, the Court rejected an
176. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
177. Id. at 343. Provocatively, the Court glossed this statement by including
examples both of sects with tenets requiring "the necessity of human sacrifices, on
special occasions," as well as of "sects which denied as a part of their religious tenets
that there should be any marriage tie, and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the
sexes as prompted by the passions of its members." Id. at 343.
Another "pre-incorporation" instance of the non-exemption principle was
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, which concluded that the
University did not violate Methodist conscientious objectors' "liberty" under the
Fourteenth Amendment, when it refused to exempt them from mandatory military
science instruction. See 293 U.S. 245, 263-65 (1934). Concurring, Justice Cardozo
assumed that the Free Exercise Clause applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Relying on Davis, 133 U.S. at 333, Cardozo concluded that the
objectors' religious scruples did not entitle them to an automatic exemption from the
required military instruction. See id. at 265-66 (Cardozo, J., concurring). Cardozo
broadly observed that "[t]he right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted
above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government," and concluded
in vintage oracular style that "[o]ne who is martyr to a principle ... does not prove by
his martyrdom that he has kept within the law." Id. at 268 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
178. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
179. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940) (emphasis added).
The Court also explained that "[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the
long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs." Id. (emphasis
added). Only three years later, Gobitis was overruled by West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, but in a way that left intact Gobitis' reasoning about the
tempered scope of the non-exemption rule. See 319 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1943). The
Barnette majority opinion relied on the principle that laws may not compel speech
under the First Amendment. Id.; but cf. id. at 643-44 (Black, J., concurring) (relying,
by contrast, on a free exercise rationale); id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring) (relying
on the same rationale). Much later in Smith, the Supreme Court explicitly relied on
Gobitis for its discussion of the non-exemption rule. Employment Div. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594-95);
see infra Part IV.A.1. Jay Bybee's explanation of the dynamic between Gobitis and
Barnette accords with my reading of Gobitis. Justice Jackson, the author of Barnette,
"broadened the [Gobitis] inquiry to take the focus off of the religious aspects of the
conflict between the Witnesses and the Board of Education. The issue was compelled
speech, not infringement of religious beliefs." Bybee, supra note 27, at 279. Indeed,
as Bybee explains it, Justice Jackson's general approach to the First Amendment
accords with the later non-exemption/non-persecution rationale illuminated by Smith
and Lukumi: "In large measure, the First Amendment applied principally when
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Orthodox Jew's claim that a generally applicable Sunday-closing law
violated his free exercise rights by imposing an "indirect" burden on
his religious beliefs, which honored Saturday and not Sunday as a day
of rest. 180 But, in doing so, Braunfeld observed that, unlike a truly
general law, "[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect." '  Most
strikingly, in the seminal Everson decision the Court stated in dicta
that, as a consequence of free exercise, a state "cannot exclude
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews,
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislation. 182
Thus, the Court's gradual refinement of the non-exemption rule
seemed to reveal a corollary condemning laws that were not general
but were instead targeted at particular faiths or at religion generally.
So, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court could affirm the state's
power to regulate, by general and non-discriminatory legislation, the
time, place and manner of door-to-door solicitation, while, at the same
time, striking down the discriminatory application of that rule to
Jehovah's Witnesses on free speech and free exercise grounds.18 3 The
governments attempted to regulate religion qua religion or speech qua speech, but
not religion or speech qua something else." Id. at 290 (citations omitted).
180. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
181. Id.
182. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Everson, of course, was an
Establishment Clause decision and thus did not actually resolve any dispute about the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court had made an equally striking statement
condemning religious discrimination--one, moreover, in the context of school
funding-almost forty years before in Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). That
case principally involved the construction of a treaty with the Sioux tribe regarding
whether the treaty terms permitted contracts with and payments to religious schools
for tribe members' education. Id. But, in dicta, the Court rejected the notion that the
Constitution would forbid such payments. Id. at 81-82. The Court adopted the
statement of the Court of Appeals that:
[I]t seems inconceivable that Congress should have intended to prohibit [the
Sioux] from receiving religious education at their own cost if they so desire
it; such an intent would be one 'to prohibit the free exercise of religion'
amongst the Indians, and such would be the effect of the construction for
which the complainants contend.
Id. at 82 (quoting the Court of Appeals). It should be noted, however, that the Court
specifically characterized the treaty funds as the Sioux's "own money" and "the only
moneys that [they] can lay claim to as matter of right; the only sums on which they are
entitled to rely as theirs for education." Id. at 81-82. It should also be noted that the
Supreme Court has recently referred to Quick Bear as only "indirectly" addressing
the free exercise issue. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 n.4 (2000) (plurality
opinion).
183. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-10 (1940); see also Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (striking
down solicitation licensing requirement as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses under the
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licensing scheme struck down in Cantwell effectively empowered local
officials to clamp down on religious solicitation that the officials
deemed did not "conform[] to reasonable standards of efficiency and
integrity."'84 It is easy to see how such an unbounded power could be
used, as it was in Cantwell, in the service of discriminating against
unpopular or marginal faiths.
Similarly, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court took a non-
discrimination approach to Maryland's requirement that state
officeholders make a "declaration of belief in the existence of God" or
forfeit their right to office.'85  In the Court's view, the oath
requirement placed "[t]he power and authority of the State of
Maryland... on the side of one particular sort of believers [sic]-
those who are willing to say they believe in 'the existence of God."" 86
The Court struck down the requirement under free exercise,
explaining that "neither a State nor the Federal Government .... can
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs."' 87 There is but a small step-no step at
all, really-from this reasoning to the notion that government also
cannot express raw preferences for the non-religious over the religious
in marking off political categories.
It comes as no surprise, then, that non-discrimination based on
First Amendment).
184. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302. Solicitation was allowed only after case-by-case
review, under which the secretary of public welfare determined whether the
promoted cause met the requirements quoted above. Id. The Court concluded that
this licensing scheme amounted to "the exercise of a determination by state authority
as to what is a religious cause... lay[ing] a forbidden burden upon the exercise of
liberty protected by the Constitution." Id. at 307. Cantwell may be more about
religious speech than about religious conduct. See, e.g., Bybee, supra note 27, at 266-
67. I agree with Bybee that Cantwell "concerned religious liberty only because the
Connecticut statute specifically regulated religious canvassing." Id. at 267. But, again,
I think that very point is what makes Cantwell relevant to the issue of religious non-
persecution. Douglas Laycock, for instance, has observed that the "religious free
speech cases from the Jehovah's Witness era" are an important aspect of the
foundation of the Court's religious "nondiscrimination theory." Laycock, supra note
156, at 63 & n.124 (citations omitted).
185. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961) (quoting Md. Const. art.
XXXVII).
186. Id. at 490.
187. Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted). The Court quoted James Iredell, later a
Supreme Court Justice, during the North Carolina Convention ratification debates.
Discussing the prohibition of religious tests for federal officers in proposed Article
VI, see U.S. Const. art. VI, § 3, and responding to the fear that the people may
consequently "choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that pagans and
Mahometans may be admitted into offices," Iredell asked: "But how is it possible to
exclude any set of men, without taking away that principle of religious freedom which
we ourselves so warmly contend for?" Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.10 (quoting 4
Jonathan Elliot, Debates in the Several States Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 194, 200).
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religious affiliation or status was the controlling factor in McDaniel v.
Paty, unanimously striking down Tennessee's practice of excluding
ministers from public office.'88 The Tennessee Constitution embodied
the last hold-out of that discredited practice, which dated back to the
early republic.189 The dispute in McDaniel arose when Tennessee tied
eligibility to be a delegate at its 1977 constitutional convention to
eligibility to be a state representative, by implication excluding
ministers from the constitutional convention. 190
The Supreme Court unanimously invalidated Tennessee's clergy-
disqualification provision. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, for a four-
Justice plurality, struck down the provision under the Free Exercise
Clause alone. Burger found that right to free exercise encompassed
the right "to be a minister," and he reasoned that the clergy-exclusion
wrongly forced a minister to choose between that free exercise right
and his right to hold state office recognized by the Tennessee
Constitution. 9' Additionally, while Burger did not find that the
188. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622-25 (1978). Article IX, section 1 of the
Tennessee Constitution provided: "Whereas Ministers of the Gospel are by their
profession, dedicated to God and the care of Souls, and ought not to be diverted from
the great duties of their functions; therefore, no Minister of the Gospel, or priest of
any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the
Legislature." Id. at 621 & n.1. The provision dated from article VIII, section 1 of the
1796 Tennessee Constitution. Id. In 1978, Tennessee remained the only state in the
union that excluded ministers from some public offices. Id. at 625. Maryland's clergy-
disqualification provision had been struck down by a federal district court in 1974. Id.
189. See id. at 622-25. The Court noted Madison's condemnation of the practice,
underscoring the equality notions inherent in his view of religious liberty:
Does not The exclusion of Ministers of the Gospel as such violate a
fundamental principle of liberty by punishing a religious profession with the
privation of a civil right? does it [not] violate another article of the plan
itself which exempts religion from the cognizance of Civil power? does it
not violate justice by at once taking away a right and prohibiting a
compensation for it? does it not in fine violate impartiality by shutting the
door [against] the Ministers of one Religion and leaving it open for those of
every other.
Id. at 624 (quoting 5 Writings of James Madison 288 (G. Hunt ed., 1904)) (emphasis
added). The Court remarked that Madison's view "accurately reflects the spirit and
purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." Id. In a recent essay on
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, Vincent Blasi underscores Madison's linkage
of equality with religious liberty: "There can be no dispute that considerations of
equal treatment lay at the core of Madison's conception of religious liberty, both his
aversion to any form of religious establishment and his emphasis on the notion of
'free exercise."' Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven
Questions From Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 783, 802
(2002); see also DeForrest, supra note 20, at 614-15 (discussing Madison's Memorial in
relation to State Blaines).
190. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 618. The justifications for the minister's disqualification
put forward by the Tennessee Supreme Court were not novel-they were the same
reasons that proponents of such measures had long relied on. See Hamburger, supra
note 31, at 79-83.
191. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626. Burger relied on the "balancing" approach of
Sherbert v. Verner in this part of his opinion. Id.; see infra note 414 (discussing
Sherbert). Sherbert has been limited by Smith, but Smith independently emphasized
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exclusion targeted beliefs as such-in which case the law would have
been absolutely prohibited192 -he did conclude that it targeted "status
as a 'minister' or 'priest,"' a status defined by religiously affiliated and
motivated conduct.193 Burger then explained that the disqualification,
targeted as it was at a religiously defined status, could only escape
invalidation if it were justified by compelling interests. 94 Significantly,
Burger rejected Tennessee's asserted interest in "preventing the
establishment of a state religion," a goal Tennessee sought to shelter
under the federal Establishment Clause.'95 While Tennessee's fears
about the influence of clergy on politics were once "held in the 18th
century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day,"
Burger reasoned that those fears had been overwhelmingly found
baseless and provided no justification for continuing to burden
ministers' free exercise rights today.'96
Concurring, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, would
have gone beyond the plurality opinion and found the clergy
disqualification absolutely prohibited under Torcaso as a "religious
classification ... governing the eligibility for office." '197 Brennan's
opinion was strongly influenced by his perception that the ministerial
exclusion was essentially a religious discrimination, "impos[ing] a
unique disability upon those who exhibit a defined level of intensity of
involvement in protected religious activity."'98
McDaniel's continuing force. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
192. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-27 (emphasis omitted). Burger was referring
principally to Torcaso v. Watkins, see supra note 185, in which Maryland conditioned
access to public office on the willingness to swear to the existence of God.
193. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-27. The Court relied in part on the language of the
Tennessee Constitution, which "inferentially defines the ministerial profession in
terms of its 'duties,' which include the 'care of souls,"' and also on its construction by
the Tennessee Supreme Court, which reasoned that the exclusion reaches, e.g., "those
filling a 'leadership role in religion."' Id. at 627 n.6.
194. See id. at 627-28. Burger relied principally on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), a case that invalidated on free exercise grounds Wisconsin's attempt to
force the parents of Amish children to attend public schools after the age of 14. Like
Sherbert, Yoder has also been limited by Smith. See infra notes 199-202 and
accompanying text. But, again, Smith itself confirms that McDaniel still has
significant impact for analyzing laws that target religiously affiliated statuses or
behavior. See supra note 179.
195. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628.
196. Id. at 629. The Court's earlier quotation of Madison, as well as its observation
that even in the founding era "many clergymen vigorously opposed any established
church," both suggest that the discriminatory exclusion of ministers from public office
was never justified under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 629 n.9 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan would have also invalidated the
exclusion under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 636-42.
198. Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring). That this was Brennan's perception of the
law is reinforced by his citation to the language in Everson condemning laws that
disabled various denominations "because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation." Id. at 633 n.7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)); see also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 635 n.8
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McDaniel remains a vital precedent that forbids government from
"impos[ing] special disabilities on the basis of religious views or
religious status." '199 The decision is strong evidence of the non-
persecution principle in that it particularly disfavors laws that impose
disabilities on religious status-and more precisely on the behavior
that is associated with the status-specifically because of its
connection to religion. Significantly, McDaniel also treats with
skepticism any justification for targeting religious affiliation based on
discarded historical attitudes about religion that are incompatible with
properly understood principles of religious freedom, or that are
themselves of doubtful historical lineage. Finally, notice what little
separated the plurality and concurring Justices-four subjected the
law to strict scrutiny as "religious conduct discrimination," while
Brennan, Marshall and Stewart would have summarily invalidated the
law as a "religious belief discrimination."
The foregoing jurisprudential foundations for the non-exemption
and non-persecution rules set the stage for the clearest interaction of
those rules in two decisions from the 1990s. Those were Employment
Division Department of Human Resources v. Smith-reaffirming and
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that, because the clergy disqualification "[b]y its
terms... operates against McDaniel because of his status as a 'minister' or 'priest,' it
runs afoul of the Free Exercise Clause simply as establishing a religious classification
as a basis for qualification for a political office" (citation omitted)).
In a separate concurrence, Justice Stewart agreed with Brennan that the clergy
exclusion implicated the absolute prohibition against laws targeting beliefs, a principle
supported by "the judgment that.., government has no business prying into people's
minds or dispensing benefits according to people's religious beliefs." Id. at 643
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White's concurrence stated that he would have
invalidated the exclusion under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 643-46 (White, J.,
concurring).
199. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990);
accord DeForrest, supra note 20, at 615-16 (relying on McDaniel, in part, to condemn
State Blaines as generally unconstitutional). It is an error to read McDaniel narrowly
to forbid only religious disqualification from "participation in the political process" or
as presenting a unique conflict between state and federal rights. See, e.g., Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 19, at 965 n.218 (characterizing clergy disqualification in McDaniel
as "coercively exclud[ing] clergy from one aspect of the right of self-government");
Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 763 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting) (arguing
McDaniel merely involved the "juxtapos[ition] [of] two fundamental rights," one of
which was the right "to directly engage in the political process"). The precedential
value of the decision is better described by the Supreme Court itself-in Smith, the
Court described McDaniel as forbidding government to "impose special disabilities
on the basis of religious views or religious status." See 494 U.S. at 877; see also Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)
(reiterating Smith's interpretation of McDaniel); id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(reinforcing the same). The fact that Tennessee had imposed a religious disability on
"the right to self-government" likely made the case that much easier to decide, but
the controlling factor was the religious disability itself, as Smith and Lukumi make
clear. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520; Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. It is implausible to suggest
that McDaniel would have come out differently if Tennessee had instead, for instance,
generally forbidden clergy from participating in an otherwise accessible government
charity program, simply because of their identity as clergy.
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clarifying the non-exemption rule-and Church of theLukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah-reaffirming and clarifying the non-
persecution rule. Each decision reinforced the strength of the non-
persecution rule and placed it in the context of the Court's overall
Free Exercise jurisprudence.
1. Smith and Peyote
In Smith, the Court confronted whether Oregon could "include
religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal
prohibition on use of that drug," and could, consequently, deny
unemployment benefits to persons who had been fired for using the
drug sacramentally during a Native American Church ceremony. z° In
deciding that Oregon could do so without violating the Free Exercise
Clause, the Court focused on the general nature of the criminal
peyote prohibition, repeatedly characterizing it as a "neutral" or
"generally applicable law." '  "Generally applicable" laws were
explicitly contrasted with laws that "were specifically directed against"
or that "discriminated against" religious behavior. 02 The Court
recognized that the religious free exercise protected by the First
Amendment often extends to physical acts-listing as examples
devotional or otherwise religion-motivated actions such as
"assembling with others for a worship service, participating in
sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from
200. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. Oregon classified peyote, "a hallucinogen derived
from the plant Lophophora williamsii Lemaire," as a Schedule I controlled substance,
the possession of which was punishable as a felony. See id. (citations omitted).
201. See id. at 874 ("general criminal prohibition" on peyote use), 878 ("generally
applicable law"), 879 ("'valid and neutral law of general applicability"'), 880 ("a
neutral, generally applicable regulatory law"), 881 (a "neutral, generally applicable
law"), 884 ("a generally applicable criminal law" and "an across-the-board criminal
prohibition"), 885 ("generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct").
The Court was careful to distinguish the general criminal prohibition at issue in Smith
from the individualized denials of unemployment compensation the Court had
invalidated in Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876, 882-84; see
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987). Smith left
these decisions intact, while limiting their applicability outside the context of
"individualized" denials of religious exemptions. See 494 U.S. at 884.
202. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (observing that "[t]he government may not...
impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status" (citing
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), and Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69
(1953))); see also id. (explaining that government would be prohibiting free exercise if
it "sought to ban [religious] acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display"); id. at 878
(characterizing respondents' argument that their religious motivation "places them
beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious
practice"); id. at 886 n.3 (explaining that the Court "strictly scrutinize[s] governmental
classifications based on religion" (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 618, and Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961))).
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certain foods or certain modes of transportation. 2 °3  Further
demonstrating what a generally applicable law does not do, the Court
hypothesized the following scenario:
It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the
point), that a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they
are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious
belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for
example, to ban the casting of "statues that are to be used for
worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down before a golden
calf.2°4
Finally, the Court also relied on the text of the Free Exercise Clause
to develop that distinction. The Court explained that the clause could
plausibly be read "to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion...
is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended."' 5
Smith thus solidified a sharp distinction between "generally
applicable" or "across-the-board" laws that are not targeted at
religious behavior but may incidentally burden it, and laws that are in
fact "religion sensitive"-i.e., where the very operation penalizes
behavior because of its connection to religious belief or practice.
Smith's ruling thereby suggests that the way laws structure their
burdens is constitutionally determinative: If a law structures its
burdens deliberately to fall on religious conduct alone, then it is not
generally applicable. Three years later in its Lukumi decision, the
Court reinforced that distinction and demonstrated that laws of this
variety-imposing religion-sensitive burdens-presumptively violate
free exercise rights.
2. Lukumi and Animal Sacrifice
While the Court was evaluating judicial exemptions for religious
peyote use in Smith, the Lukumi case was still working its way
through the federal courts. Supporting the non-exemption rule, the
Smith Court cited the federal district court's 1989 opinion in Lukumi.
The Court did so merely to give an example of one of the many kinds
of general civic obligations-in Lukumi, animal cruelty laws-that
ought not to be forced by the Free Exercise Clause to exempt
religious conduct that has been only incidentally burdened.2 6 But in
203. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
204. Id. at 877-78.
205. Id. at 878 (emphasis added); accord Amar, supra note 1, at 42-43 (referring to
the "unreconstructed" free exercise clause). But see id. at 254-56 (discussing the
"reconstructed" clause).
206. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
[Vol. 72
STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
1993, when the Court examined the animal cruelty laws at issue in
Lukumi, it discovered that, on closer inspection, those laws were in
fact a coordinated web of prohibitions and exceptions deliberately
designed for one purpose-to criminalize the ritual sacrifices
performed by adherents of the Santeria religion.2"7 Thus, Lukumi
allowed the Court to refine the distinction between generally
applicable laws on the one hand, and, on the other, those rarer
instances of laws whose "object or purpose... is the suppression of
religion or religious conduct."2 8
The exercise of Santeria-a fusion of Roman Catholicism with
traditional African religious practices-involves ritual animal
sacrifice. As the Santeria Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was
preparing to begin worship in the southern Florida community of
Hialeah, the Hialeah city council held an emergency session, during
which it passed a number of resolutions and ordinances concerning
animal cruelty and ritual sacrifice.2"9 None of the ordinances passed to
further the resolutions mentioned Santeria by name,210 but, as the
Court would remark in the course of its opinion invalidating them,
"almost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances] is the religious
exercise of Santeria church members. 211
In essence, Lukumi announced no new rule of religious liberty. But
by articulating and reinforcing the non-persecution rule implicit in the
text and structure of the religion clauses, and developed throughout
the Court's jurisprudence, Lukumi brings a necessary doctrinal
balance to Smith. In that sense, Lukumi confirms that Smith's non-
exemption rule has teeth-it may allow religious conduct to suffer
incidental burdens but it draws a non-negotiable line at laws that
target religion for specially tailored burdens. Reflecting this balance,
at the outset of Lukumi, the Court reiterated the overarching
standards from Smith:
[O]ur cases establish the general proposition that a law that is
207. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
208. Id. at 533.
209. See generally id. at 524-28. Various resolutions expressed, for example,
"'concern"' that "certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are
inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety," and aimed to oppose "'the ritual
sacrifices of animals."' Id. at 526-27 (quoting Resolutions 87-66 and 87-90).
210. Id. at 527-28 (quoting Ordinances 87-52, 87-71, and 87-72). For instance, the
ordinances (1) prohibited animal "sacrifice," defined as "to unnecessarily kill ... an
animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption;" (2) restricted that prohibition to any individual or group that "kills,
slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual;" (3) exempted certain "licensed
establishment[s]" from the slaughtering prohibition for animals "specifically raised for
food purposes" and set zoning areas for slaughterhouse use; and (4) further exempted
from regulation the slaughter or processing for sale of "small numbers of hogs and/or
cattle per week" in accordance with other state law. Id.
2!1. Id. at 535.
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neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Neutrality and
general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in
this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that
the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these
requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
212
Elaborating further, the Court explained that minimal free exercise
standards are violated when a law "discriminates against some or all
religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons," and that instances of such
"religious persecution" lie at the historical roots of the clause. 3 A
law is not neutral under the Smith standards if its object is to "infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation., 214 A
law blatantly violates neutrality when it "discriminate[s] on its face,"
by, for instance, "refer[ring] to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernable from the language or context., 21 But a law may
advance its discriminatory object more subtly-engaging in "masked"
or "covert suppression of particular religious beliefs" 2 1 6-when its
operation "targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment., 217 To
illuminate what it meant by covert discrimination, the Court quoted a
directive from its Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "The Court
must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. ' '211
The Court unanimously concluded that the Hialeah ordinances
violated these fairly straightforward standards of non-persecution
because, essentially, the ordinances prohibited a form of conduct
(animal killing) only when performed in observance of the Santeria
religion. The ordinances were carefully structured to exempt every
other form of animal killing that could conceivably fall within their
212. Id. at 531-32 (discussing Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)).
213. Id. at 532 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 533. Using largely the same expression, the Court also remarked that
neutrality is violated when "the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of
religion or religious conduct." Id.
215. Id.
216. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (Burger, C.J.)
217. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
218. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax. Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)); see infra notes 275-80. As to "general applicability," the Court
explained that this inquiry focused on equality-of-treatment concerns and was guided
by "[t]he principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a
selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief." Id.
at 542-43. The Court admitted that the "general applicability" and "neutrality"
inquiries are "interrelated." Id. at 531. Concurring, Justice Scalia "frankly
acknowledge[d] that the terms are not only 'interrelated,'... but substantially
overlap." Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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prohibitions-for instance, large-scale slaughterhouses, small-scale
farm slaughter, kosher butchers, and hunting.29  The Court
characterized this as a religious "gerrymander" whose effect was "that
few if any killings of animals are prohibited other than Santeria
sacrifice, which is proscribed because it occurs during a ritual or
ceremony and its primary purpose is to [fulfill Santeria religious
requirements], not food consumption. '220 The ordinances, therefore,
were not neutral because they "had as their object the suppression of
religion."22' Therefore the Court applied strict scrutiny to the
ordinances, citing McDaniel and Smith, and candidly acknowledging
that "[a] law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or
advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with
a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases."222
Unsurprisingly, given the plain object and operation of the Hialeah
ordinances, Lukumi was not one of those rare cases.2 23
Justice Scalia's concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
sheds additional light on Lukumi's analysis, particularly because
Scalia wrote Smith. Scalia clarified that the "terms 'neutrality' and
'general applicability' are not to be found within the First
Amendment itself," but instead have been used by the Court "to
describe those characteristics which cause a law that prohibits an
activity a particular individual wishes to engage in for religious
reasons nonetheless not to constitute a 'law... prohibiting the free
exercise' of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. 24
In Scalia's view, laws are not neutral in that sense when "by their
terms [they] impose disabilities on the basis of religion (e.g., a law
excluding members of a certain sect from public benefits). 225  By
219. Id. at 535-37. The Court observed that, under Florida case law, even "the use
of live rabbits to train greyhounds" would not violate the Florida animal cruelty laws,
which the Hialeah ordinances had incorporated. Id. at 537 (citing Kiper v. State, 310
So. 2d 42 (Fla. App. 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1975)).
220. Id. at 536.
221. Id. at 542. For largely the same reason, the ordinances were also not
"generally applicable"-while they pursued legitimate governmental interests, at least
broadly speaking, in seeking to prevent animal cruelty and to protect public health,
they did so "only against conduct motivated by religious belief." Id. at 542, 545. The
Court reasoned that the ordinances were blatantly "underinclusive" in furthering the
asserted legislative goals-failing to encompass many non-religious kinds of animal
cruelty and public health hazards. Id. at 543-45. For no legitimate reason, the
ordinances forced religiously motivated conduct alone to "bear the burden" of their
prohibitions and they therefore had "every appearance of a prohibition that society is
prepared to impose upon [a Santeria worshiper] but not upon itself." Id. at 544, 545
(quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
222. Id. at 546 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978), and Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)).
223. Id. at 546-47.
224. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
225. Id. Illustrating that proposition, Scalia cited McDaniel and also Chief Justice
Burger's opinion in Bowen v. Roy, in which Burger stated that "denial of
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contrast, laws lack general applicability when, "though neutral in their
terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement [they] target
the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment. 226
Scalia allowed that his line between these two qualities of
discriminatory laws was "somewhat different" from the one drawn in
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, but he judged the distinction
inconsequential because the categories overlapped significantly.227
3. Summary: Non-Persecution and Free Exercise
The consistent rejection in the Court's free exercise jurisprudence
of laws that target religious conduct for special disabilities-laws that
impose religion-sensitive penalties-undergirds the non-persecution
principle. The Court has long recognized that the laws of a pluralist
society will inevitably intrude on certain behavioral demands that
religions make of their adherents. In early cases like Reynolds and
Davis, Mormons' religious obligation to engage in polygamous
marriages had to give way before society's different conception of
marital limits. Over a century later in Smith, Native Americans'
celebration of a sacrament of their religion bowed before society's
need to regulate harmful substances. But there is a deeper principle
at work governing the burdens society may legitimately place on
religious conduct, one evident in the parameters of the non-exemption
[governmental] benefits by a uniformly applicable statute neutral on its face is of a
wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or prohibition, by
threat of penal sanctions, for conduct that has religious implications." Id.; see Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 704 (1986) (Burger, C.J.).
226. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Jay Bybee
provides an accurate synthesis of Scalia's opinions in Lukumi and Smith. As Bybee
explains, the law upheld by Scalia's majority opinion in Smith "prohibited the use of
peyote generally,.. . [and] necessarily prohibited the religious use of peyote." Bybee,
supra note 27, at 313. The impact on religiously motivated conduct was incidental,
not deliberate. The prohibition was not religion-sensitive. By contrast, in Lukumi,
Scalia concurred in invalidating "a city ordinance barring the ritual slaughter of
animals," a law in which "ritual use was an element of the crime." Id. The Lukumi
law's prohibition was tied to religious motivation; its burden on the Santeria
practitioners was unique and deliberate. The law was religion-sensitive. See also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public
Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access" for Religious Speakers and
Groups, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 698 (1996) (observing that Smith's "less well
known" holding, which was confirmed in Lukumi, "reiterated that laws 'impos[ing]
special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status' are presumptively
unconstitutional, and subject to strict scrutiny").
227. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557, 558 (Scalia, J., concurring). Any difference seems
slight and immaterial. Scalia and the majority agree on the qualities of a law that
render it discriminatory for purposes of free exercise analysis, but they merely group
those qualities differently under the rubrics of "neutrality" and "general
applicability." Id. at 557. It appears that Scalia would treat "neutrality" more
narrowly than the majority-focusing more on the actual terms of the law-but would
treat "general applicability" more broadly-including the "design [and] construction"
of the law. See id. at 557-58 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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rule itself. For that rule coherently operates only in the context of
laws that further legitimate governmental goals through "neutral and
generally applicable" means and that, by definition, place burdens on
religiously motivated conduct only incidentally. In other words, the
Court has always premised the soundness of the balance struck in the
non-exemption rule on the notion that the laws in question
circumscribe conduct for legitimate reasons independent of its
religious affiliation or motivation. Once laws begin to impose burdens
based on whether a status, organization, or behavior is connected to
religion, then the entire basis for the non-exemption rule crumbles.
Gerard Bradley has persuasively explained the intersection between
these two complementary lessons. Commenting on the relationship
between Smith and Lukumi, Bradley argues that "[t]hose cases stand
for the proposition that where an action is legitimately generally
prohibited, the Constitution does not require different treatment for
believers who engage in the activity for religious reasons, or for the
religious significance they see in or attach to it. 228 But the necessary
corollary to this rule, Bradley is careful to add, flows from what I have
described as the backbone principle of non-persecution: "Where
public authority generally permits an activity-say, slaughtering
animals-it may not discriminate against persons who would engage
in the activity for religious reasons or for the religious significance
they see in or attach to it." '29 Thus, we can broadly say that the Free
Exercise Clause does not withhold from government the power to
prohibit all polygamy, but does withhold power to prohibit Mormon
polygamy only or polygamy engaged in "for religious purposes."
Government may forbid peyote use across-the-board for the religious
and non-religious alike, but it may not prohibit the "ritual" or
''sacramental" use of peyote while exempting all other uses.
Eligibility for public office may be regulated based on any number of
general criteria (age, citizenship, and criminal record come to mind),
but eligibility may not be premised on the nature of a person's
connection to religion or to a person's role in a church. Government
may enact generally applicable public health rules for animal
slaughter and disposal, but it may not tailor those rules to target
religious animal slaughter only, while leaving the butcher, the farmer,
and the hunter inexplicably unregulated.
What counts here is whether religion is the triggering mechanism
for the burden imposed. The distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate burdens on religious practice shows that the constitutional
defect arises when categorizations such as "religious," "religious
affiliation," or "religious purposes" are used as the organizing
principle for imposing legal disabilities. "Incidental" burdens-those




which, in a sense, accidentally occur only because general laws may
conceivably burden someone's religious practice in a religiously plural
society-are constitutionally permissible. But laws that reserve their
burdens for religious conduct only-"religious gerrymanders," in
Justice Harlan's phraseZ30 -are impermissible because, in allocating
the burdens and benefits of society's laws, they force religiously
motivated conduct alone to bear the burdens and forego the benefits.
The Free Exercise Clause condemns such laws because, as Michael
McConnell explains, "[t]he free exercise principle 'singles out' religion
for special protection against governmental hostility or
interference. "231
Notice how the subtle ripening of the non-persecution principle, as
seen in the long progression from Reynolds in 1878 to Lukumi in 1993,
reinforces the idea that, at bottom, precisely what non-persecution
prohibits is invidious religious categorization. Reynolds seemed to
stingily protect only Mormons' religious opinions and leave their
actions entirely open to legal prohibition, provided they were "in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order. 2 32 In 1890,
Davis perhaps promised slightly more protection-shielding not only
"man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they
impose," but also "the manner in which an expression shall be made
by him of his belief on those subjects., 233 Like Reynolds, Davis also
recognized the trumping power of criminal law, but added that such
laws must be "passed with reference to actions regarded by general
consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation. 2 34 Looking
forward to Gobitis in 1940, we find the Court suggesting that
"religious liberty" is offended by laws "directed against the doctrinal
loyalties of particular sects" or laws "aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious beliefs., 235 A short seven years later gives us
the Court's striking dicta in Everson that free exercise prohibits states
from "exclud[ing] individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." '36 Braunfeld, in
1961, condemned laws imposing even indirect burdens on religious
practice if their "purpose or effect" was "to impede the observance of
230. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 680, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
231. McConnell, supra note 164, at 43.
232. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
233. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890).
234. Id. at 343.
235. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940).
236. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); see also Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (stating that, unlike a "general" law, "[i]f the purpose or
effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate
invidiously between religions, the law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect").
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one or all religions" or "to discriminate invidiously between
religions. "237 In 1978, McDaniel invalidated laws targeting religious
status-in the sense of conduct or activity affiliated with religion-for
special disabilities.238 And, in the 1990s, Smith and Lukumi solidified
the prohibition against laws that impose disabilities on a category
defined in religious terms.239
This can plausibly be viewed as a progression of free exercise
principles from simply forbidding laws targeting religious beliefs, to
forbidding encroachments on religious observance and practice, to
forbidding exclusions based on religiously motivated conduct, status,
and affiliation. Overall, the movement has been toward forbidding
invidious religious categorization altogether. The elaboration of
"general" versus "targeted" laws in Smith and Lukumi cannot be
properly understood apart from this matrix of free exercise decisions
stretching back over a century. And Lukumi explicitly invoked that
long history when it glossed "religious persecution" as laws that
"discriminate[] against some or all religious beliefs or regulate[] or
prohibit[] conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. "24 °
Thus, the Court does not invoke the loaded term persecution
carelessly or outside the context of its own jurisprudence, and it has
not suggested that the term is confined to the grossest instances of
official religious discrimination. Understanding the term's proper
place in free exercise jurisprudence shows that persecution is
constitutionally accomplished by the more sophisticated method of an
invidious classification based on religion alone.24'
237. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
238. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-28 (1978).
239. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
240. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532. Lukumi specifically says that "it was 'historical
instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who
drafted the Free Exercise Clause."' Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703
(1986) (Burger, C.J.)).
241. Just as it is wrong to read McDaniel narrowly, see supra notes 188-199, it is
wrong to restrict Lukumi to its facts. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 963
n.211 (distinguishing Lukumi because it involved "coercive, animal protection
legislation upon a particular religious sect, rather than the limitation of a government
benefit to secular organizations"); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 762 (9th Cir. 2002)
(McKeown, J., dissenting) (declining to find "any guidance in Lukumi beyond the
criminal ordinances at issue there"). Not only does this ignore the Court's language
in Lukumi-which broadly teaches that, "[a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious
beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious
reasons"-it more fundamentally ignores Lukumi's place in the larger development
of the Court's religious non-discrimination jurisprudence-again, which the Court
made clear in its opinion. 508 U.S. at 532-33 (emphasis added). The laws at issue in
Lukumi doubtlessly presented egregious violations of free exercise, because they were
designed to stamp out a central religious practice of a minority religious group. But
neither the opinion itself, nor the Court's non-discrimination jurisprudence generally,
gives any reason to think that Lukumi represents a minimum level of "religious
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In the next section, I will examine how principles from Court's non-
establishment and free speech jurisprudence reinforce and round out
the scope of this non-persecution rule. But it will be useful to pause at
this point and assess the State Blaines in light of the basic tenets of
non-persecution drawn from the Court's free exercise cases. Those
tenets call the obvious textual applications of the State Blaine
Amendments into serious question.242 All State Blaines explicitly
single out religious purposes, religious institutions, and religious
affiliation for exclusion from otherwise generally available public
benefits. The object of the amendments, which is plain on the face of
all the State Blaines, is to place religion at a civil disadvantage with
respect to all conduct, institutions, and persons that are "non-
religious." In doing so, the State Blaines explicitly exclude themselves
from the category of "neutral and generally applicable laws"-the
only kind of laws which, under the Free Exercise Clause, may place
burdens on religious conduct. Like the clergy exclusion in McDaniel,
the State Blaines force persons whose behavior or status affiliates
them with religion to choose between adhering to that affiliation and
receiving public benefits to which eligible "non-religious" persons are
entitled. Like the animal sacrifice laws in Lukumi, the State Blaines
tailor their burdens and exclusions to conduct that is undertaken for
religious reasons--only the State Blaines add to that the additional
defect of discriminating against religion openly.243
persecution" which must be reached before the Free Exercise Clause is triggered.
242. In a recent article, Mark DeForrest reaches a similar conclusion about the
State Blaines. See DeForrest, supra note 20, at 607. More generally, DeForrest also
argues that the State Blaines violate a "principle of nondiscrimination" inherent in
liberal democracy itself and in principles of distributive justice. See generally id. at
607-13 (relying principally on Paul Weithman, Religious Reasons and the Duties of
Membership, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 511 (2001); Ashley Woodiwiss, Ecclesial
Profiling, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 557 (2001); John Courtney Murray, We Hold These
Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition (1960)).
243. My application of the non-persecution rule to the State Blaines does not rely
on the subjective motivations legislators may have had, individually or collectively, in
promulgating them. It is not clear whether such "legislative purposes"-those hopes
or fears which may lurk in lawmakers' breasts but find no objective expression in the
language, structure, or operation of the laws they pass-should figure in analyzing the
validity of laws under the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses. See, e.g., Mark
Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 17-18 (2002) (suggesting that
the "bad motivations" behind many State Blaines should be irrelevant to assessing
their constitutionality). Some of what the Court has said in non-establishment cases
suggests that legislators' subjective motivations could be relevant. See, e.g., Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (stating that "we continue to ask whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion"); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985) (considering legislators' subjective motivations for
"moment of silence" law in determining "'whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion' (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))); see also id. at 73-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(generally discussing use of legislative history, including some limited use of
legislators' statements, in assessing secular purpose of the law). But see Tushnet,
supra, at 17 & n.55 (relying on Sunday Closing Cases to argue that "bad motivation at
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B. "Neutrality" and Non-Persecution
It is often stated that the religion clauses demand that laws be
"neutral" toward religion.21  The notion continues to play a major
conceptual role in the Supreme Court's non-establishment
jurisprudence. But "neutrality" is an incomplete and open-ended
term; as Douglas Laycock observes, "[t]hose who think that neutrality
is meaningless have a point. We can agree on the principle of
neutrality without having agreed on anything at all. ' 45 Yet Laycock
rightly does not dismiss neutrality as an intelligible concept-indeed,
he argues that one of the jurisprudential roots of religious non-
discrimination lies in the Court's repeated assurances over the last two
decades that the Constitution mandates government neutrality toward
religion. 246 Neutrality, in short, has something to tell us about the non-
the outset can become irrelevant over time, if eventually a law can be justified by
identifying some permissible goals the legislature might be pursuing (today) in
keeping it on the books"). As to free exercise cases, the evidence is shakier. In
Lukumi, only two Justices relied on statements of individual council members'
subjective motivations for the animal cruelty ordinances. See 508 U.S. at 540-42
(Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.). That reliance was strongly rejected in Justice
Scalia's concurrence. See id. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.). In any event, the parameters of the non-persecution rule I have analyzed in this
article suggest that an objective notion of legislative purpose is the relevant one for
free exercise purposes. Non-persecution asks how a law operates objectively with
respect to religious persons, organizations, and purposes. It would not seem to regard
as a necessary or a sufficient condition for a law's invalidity that the lawmakers who
passed it subjectively wished to persecute religion-provided those subjective wishes
found no objective expression in the language, structure, or operation of the law. A
view that such subjective wishes are alone enough to invalidate a law seems
inconsistent with the distinction clarified in Smith and Lukumi between "religion
neutral" and "religion targeted" laws.
This issue impacts an analysis of the State Blaines. If invalidation of a
particular State Blaine required a specific showing that the legislators passing it
subjectively intended to persecute Catholics, the task would be difficult indeed. See
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 967-70 (describing difficulties in mounting a purely
"animus-based" attack on State Blaines). Further, it would raise the hard question of
whether lawmakers' subjective purposes in the late nineteenth century should even
matter today. But my analysis of the State Blaines regards such subjective motivation
as irrelevant. The State Blaines, on their face, objectively structure categories of
public beneficiaries to exclude the religious. Understanding the State Blaines'
historical provenance, of course, helps explain why such laws exist. But if we had no
knowledge about why the State Blaines came into being, they would still operate
unconstitutionally against religion. On this point, I disagree with Ira Lupu and
Robert Tuttle that a subjective "animus-based" attack is the only way to invalidate
the State Blaines. See id.
244. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (remarking that the
First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers"); see also Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993,
993 (1990) (observing that "[a] wide range of courts and commentators commonly say
that government must be neutral toward religion" and assuming that "neutrality is an
important part of the meaning of the religion clauses" (citations omitted)).
245. See Laycock, supra note 244, at 994.
246. See Laycock, supra note 156, at 63.
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persecution principle and, in turn, how that principle applies to the
State Blaines. 24
7
Among scholars of American religious liberties, there are two
prominent competing views of what a principle of neutrality toward
religion requires. My purpose is not to choose one over the other.248
Instead, my modest point is that either view of neutrality supports the
non-persecution principle gleaned from the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence. I will briefly demonstrate that the Court has often
suggested as much-i.e., that religious discrimination is inconsistent
with any plausible notion of government neutrality toward religion-
when elaborating the requirements of neutrality in its non-
establishment cases.
One account of neutrality posits that the religion clauses are co-
belligerents in the cause of promoting religious freedom: free exercise
forbids discrimination against particular religions and against religion
generally, while non-establishment "prevents the government from
using its power to promote, advocate, or endorse any particular
religious position. '249  Douglas Laycock has coined the influential
term "substantive neutrality" to capture this notion-i.e., that "the
religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it
either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice
or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance. '25" The religion
clauses, so often accused of being in tension, should instead be read
holistically as mutually reinforcing guarantees of positive religious
liberty.251  Seen that way, "most of the tension between them
disappears. They are complementary provisions, both in the service
of the same fundamental right. They bar Congress from abridging
religious freedom in one specific way (by legislation 'respecting an
establishment of religion'), and in general ('or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof')., 252 In a similar vein, Michael McConnell explains
that "[t]he Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses serve a
complementary function: to reduce the power of government over
247. See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note 20, at 608 n.468 (linking State Blaines'
discriminatory operation to the Court's use of neutrality in its religion jurisprudence).
248. A substantive conception of neutrality does seem, however, more congruent
with the religion-promoting text and purposes of the religion clauses.
249. McConnell, supra note 164, at 43.
250. Laycock, supra note 244, at 1001; see also Laycock, supra note 156, at 45
(reiterating argument for substantive neutrality that "an underlying purpose of
religious liberty is to minimize government influence on religious choices"); Berg,
supra note 12, at 122 n.5 (agreeing with Laycock's view of "substantive neutrality");
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 66 n.96 (contrasting Laycock's "substantive
neutrality" with a more formalist view of neutrality).
251. See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 Mich. L.
Rev. 477, 541 (1991).
252. Id.
[Vol. 72
2003] STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
religion, whether to help, hurt, or control, to the greatest extent
consistent with the achievement of legitimate secular objectives. "253
A competing notion of religious neutrality is "formal neutrality."
This view holds that "government cannot utilize religion as a standard
for action or inaction," because the unified thrust of the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses "prohibit[s] classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden. '254 Formal
neutrality thus draws a strikingly different inference from the
complementarity of free exercise and non-establishment. Although it
reads the clauses as stating a single precept,255 that precept directs
government not merely to avoid interfering with religion, but rather to
adopt a mechanistic evenhandedness toward religion, "without regard
to whether such evenhandedness helps or hinders religion., 256
These two views of neutrality make a difference on some important
issues. For instance, does the Establishment Clause allow legislatures
253. McConnell, supra note 164, at 11. In an earlier article, McConnell proposed a
similar view of what he called a "pluralistic" approach to interpreting the
Establishment Clause. According to him, "a pluralistic approach would not ask
whether the purpose or effect of the challenged action is to 'advance religion,' but
whether it is to foster religious uniformity or otherwise distort the process of
preaching and practicing religious convictions. A governmental policy that gives free
rein to individual decisions (secular and religious) does not offend the Establishment
Clause, even if the effect is to increase the number of religious choices. The concern
of the Establishment Clause is with governmental actions that constrain individual
decisionmaking with respect to religion, by favoring one religion over others, or by
favoring religion over nonreligion." McConnell, supra note 17, at 175.
254. See Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 96 (1961); see also Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court:
Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 373; Laycock, supra note 244, at 999-1000 &
nn.22-23; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 66 & n.96.
255. Kurland, supra note 254, at 96.
256. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 66 & n.96; cf Glendon & Yanes, supra note
251, at 541 (arguing that the First Amendment should be read holistically as a
straightforward declaration that "forbids Congress to interfere with a group of
important freedoms," first among which is simply "religious freedom"). Purely
formal neutrality has been widely criticized. For instance, Laycock claims that
"formal neutrality has been almost universally rejected," that "[n]o major
commentator [has] endorsed it for a generation" (he excepts Tushnet, supra note
243), and that "[h]ardly anyone else has been willing to apply it universally, because it
produces surprising results that are inconsistent with strong intuitions." Laycock,
supra note 244, at 1000. McConnell rejects what he calls religion-blindness as an
across-the-board standard for interpreting the religion clauses, and he points out that
Kurland's formulation itself illogically uses "religion" as a legal categorization. See
McConnell, supra note 164, at 11. I would add that it is difficult to derive a rule of
formal neutrality from the text and purposes of the religion clauses themselves. If the
religion clauses, as Akhil Amar has persuasively demonstrated, see Amar, supra note
1, at 33-34, 41, simply withdrew two objects of legislative power from Congress (i.e.,
the power to forbid the free exercise of religion and to meddle with state
establishments of religion), then why should we read them as impliedly making the
additional and vastly broader withdrawal of any power to legislate on religious
matters altogether? Indeed, based on text and purposes alone, it would seem more
plausible to reason, by negative implication, that the religion clauses empower
Congress to promote the flourishing of religion generally.
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to make specific exemptions from laws for religiously-motivated
behavior or religious organizations? A "substantively neutral" view
would hold that, generally speaking, government may (or perhaps
must) do so, and this, indeed, is how the issue has been resolved
historically in American legislatures and courts.257  A "formally
neutral" view would reject any special religious exemptions by courts
or legislatures. Smith indicates that the Supreme Court was guided by
concerns with formal neutrality when deciding whether religious
behavior should receive judicial exemptions from generally applicable
laws.258 At the same time, Smith did not wholly embrace formal
neutrality, as the opinion itself approves of legislative exemptions. 259
Many proponents of substantive neutrality have, nonetheless,
criticized Smith.26
For present purposes, I need not resolve the tensions between
formal and substantive neutrality. Why? On either account of
neutrality, laws that explicitly target religion for special disabilities are
non-neutral. Such laws violate substantive neutrality because they
promote not religious freedom, but hostility toward religion: their
object and effect is to demote and penalize religious belief, behavior,
or association.261 Such laws violate formal neutrality for formal
257. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 164, at 5-6 (arguing that "[tihe Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that religious accommodations are constitutionally
permissible, even if not constitutionally required" (citations omitted)). McConnell
also states:
[N]ot one historian or constitutional scholar has [in recent years] claimed
that the founding generation deemed religious accommodations illegitimate.
Accommodations of religion during the years leading up to the framing of
the First Amendment were common (the most frequent examples were
exemption from military conscription or jury duty, exemption from oath
requirements, and exemption from tithes).
Id. at 14; see also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (stating that
"we do not deny that the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious
needs by alleviating special burdens" and that "[o]ur cases leave no doubt that in
commanding neutrality the Religion Clauses do not require the government to be
oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on
religious belief and practice").
258. See supra Part IV.A.1.
259. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 17, at 166-67.
The formal neutrality position would make unconstitutional all legislation
that explicitly exempts religious institutions or individuals from generally
applicable burdens or obligations. Yet the theory of Smith is that
exemptions are a form of beneficent legislation, left to the discretion of the
political branches .... Smith thus rejects the formal neutrality position
under the Establishment Clause.
Id.
260. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 244, at 1000 (strongly criticizing Smith); Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 10, at 71-72 & nn.113-15 (discussing criticism and defense of Smith);
see also supra Part IV.A.1.
261. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 17, at 184-87 (arguing that selective exclusion
of religious institutions from generally available public benefits would violate
neutrality insofar as it "use[s] the government's coercive power to disadvantage
religion" (citing Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized
2003] STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
reasons; they use religion as a category for imposing legal burdens.262
Either conception of neutrality, then, would forbid religious
discrimination and therefore accords with the general non-persecution
principles under the Court's free exercise jurisprudence. A brief look
at the Court's treatment of neutrality (whether that treatment reflects
a more formal or more substantive view of neutrality) in its non-
establishment cases will demonstrate that idea.
Neutrality as religious non-hostility can be seen as one fixed star in
the otherwise untidy constellation of the Court's non-establishment
cases. The Establishment Clause is neutral toward religion in that it
does not "compel the exclusion of religious groups from government
benefit programs that are generally available to a broad class of
participants. '263  But the Court has often suggested that neutrality
goes beyond merely "not compelling" religious exclusion; neutrality
affirmatively condemns governmental hostility toward religion
itself.26 As Justice O'Connor has observed, "The Religion Clauses
prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no
warrant for discriminating against religion., 265 For instance, neutrality
means that government may not deliberately skew how it distributes
aid either in favor of or against religious recipients.266 In other words,
Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 255 (1989))).
262. See Kurland, supra note 254, at 96 (religious clauses "prohibit classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden" (emphasis added));
see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10, at 66 n.96 (stating that the "Neutralist believes
that religious entities and causes are to be treated exactly like their secular
counterparts-no worse but no better," and is one "who equates neutrality with
nondiscrimination between religious institutions and their secular counterparts"
(emphasis added)).
263. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 609 (1988) (observing that the Court has never held, under the Establishment
Clause, "that religious institutions are disabled... from participating in publicly
sponsored social welfare programs"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)
(refusing to find under the Establishment Clause any "constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion").
264. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 ("More than once have we rejected the
position that the Establishment Clause even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to
extend free speech rights to religious speakers who participate in broad-reaching
government programs neutral in design."); id. at 846 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that "insistence on government neutrality toward religion explains why we
have held that schools may not discriminate against religious groups by denying them
equal access to facilities that the schools make available to all" (emphasis added));
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (declaring that "State power is no more
to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them" (emphasis added)).
265. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original).
266. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (finding Ohio
voucher program "neutral in all respects toward religion" in that the aid is "allocated
on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion"
(emphasis added) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997)). The Court
in Agostini found that government aid does not advance religion by creating religious
incentives "where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that
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no particular universe of aid recipients may be defined in a way that
religious groups get more aid because they are religious groups;
conversely, because potential recipients are religious groups, they may
not designedly get less.
This religion-friendly side of neutrality is most clearly distilled in
the doctrine that laws violate the federal Establishment Clause if they
deliberately "inhibit" religion.267 The notion runs back to the seminal
Establishment Clause decision, Everson itself, which declared that
"[s]tate power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it
is to favor them. '' 26  Everson also closely links this aspect of non-
establishment jurisprudence to the Free Exercise Clause.269 None of
this is to say, however, that the most comfortable argument against
religiously-hostile laws lies in the Establishment Clause proper. The
Court has rarely, if ever, applied the "inhibition" prong, and there is
some doubt as to the coherence of the argument that government
disapproval of religion somehow establishes religion.27° Furthermore,
neither favor nor disfavor religion and is made available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (emphasis
added).
267. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (law is an
"establishment" of religion if its "primary effect ... advances [or] inhibits religion");
see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23 (confirming that "we continue to ask whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion").
268. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Further linking neutrality
to non-hostility, Everson also stated that the First Amendment "requires the state to
be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary." Id.
269. See id. at 16 ("[The Free Exercise Clause] commands that New Jersey cannot
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot
exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists,
Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith,
or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." (emphasis in
original)).
270. As to the State Blaines, the argument would be that they themselves
"establish" religion, because their purpose and effect is to "inhibit" religion by
disqualifying it from generally available public benefits. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (a
law's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion"); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636-42 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Tennessee clergy exclusion also violated the Establishment
Clause since the clause, "properly understood, is a shield against any attempt by
government to inhibit religion as it has done here" (citations omitted)); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856-57 n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that legal categorization that explicitly discriminates against
religion is unconstitutional because it wrongly takes "cognizance" of religion) (citing
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance). Cutting against this line of argument,
Michael McConnell has argued that the "apparent symmetry" of the Lemon
"inhibition" prong is "spurious," pointing out that "in actual practice, actions
'inhibiting' religion are dealt with under the Free Exercise Clause" and that the only
case in which the Supreme Court has applied "inhibition" as a matter of
establishment law is Larson v. Valente, 452 U.S. 904 (1981), a case involving
denominational discrimination. See McConnell, supra note 17, at 118 n.9, 152. In a
similar vein, Douglas Laycock has argued that "the Court never took the 'inhibiting'
prong of Lemon seriously in the context of school finance." Laycock, supra note 156,
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four members of the current Court have recently suggested that "to
require exclusion of religious schools from [a genuinely neutral aid
program] would raise serious questions under the Free Exercise
Clause." '271 My narrower purpose is to point out that, like free
exercise jurisprudence, non-establishment jurisprudence contains a
background assumption that laws violate basic canons of legitimacy
when they purposefully single out religion for disfavored treatment.
This background assumption is evident in much of the Court's
elaboration of the neutrality requirement, as the following examples
underscore.
Even when forbidding Bible reading in public schools in School
District v. Schempp-a decision regarded by some as an apogee of
Court-imposed separationism272-the Court emphasized that the
Establishment Clause did not sanction purposeful religious
discrimination. Constitutional limits of legislative power were
transgressed, the Court said, if the "purpose and the primary effect of
the enactment" is "either the advancement or inhibition of
religion." '273 Justice Goldberg's concurrence better articulated this
idea, explaining that "[t]he fullest realization of true religious liberty
requires that government neither engage in nor compel religious
practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion
and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief." '274
at 56.
271. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 n.19 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citing
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1990);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819).
272. See Berg, supra note 12, at 151-52.
273. Sch. Dist. of Abbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)
(emphasis added). The Schempp majority underscored the religious neutrality and
non-hostility guaranteed by both religion clauses, noting that "the two clauses may
overlap." Id. As a general matter, the Court remarked that "the ideal of our people
as to religious freedom ... [is] one of 'absolute equality before the law, of all religious
opinions and sects' and that "'[t]he government is neutral, and, while protecting all,
it prefers none, and it disparages none."' Id. at 214-15 (quoting Minor v. Bd. of Educ.,
23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872) (Taft, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). The Court
described the religion clauses' overarching approach as "wholesome 'neutrality."'
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. The Court added that "[w]e agree of course that the State
may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or
showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe."' Id. at 225 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314
(1952)).
274. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg's
elaboration of neutrality seems to have more of a "substantive" flavor than the
majority's articulation, insofar as Goldberg emphasized that non-establishment
disabled the government from engaging in or compelling religious practices, from
showing "favoritism" to particular sects or to religion generally, and from "deterring"
religious belief. Id. The majority, by contrast, reasoned that laws may not have the
"effect" of either advancing or inhibiting religion. Id. at 222. As Douglas Laycock
points out, the first two prongs of the Lemon test (in particular, the "neither advances
nor inhibits" language) "are taken almost verbatim from the Court's elaboration of
'benevolent neutrality' in [Schempp]." Laycock, supra note 156, at 56.
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Plainly absent from this conception of neutrality was any justification
for governmental hostility toward religion.
That benevolent view of neutrality was prominent in Walz v. Tax
Commission, a decision which validated the venerable practice of
granting tax exemptions to churches.275 Walz stated categorically that
"[t]he general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all
that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either
governmentally established religion or governmental interference
with religion." '276 In a thoughtful concurrence, Justice Harlan
articulated two related concepts underlying the Court's application of
the religion clauses-"neutrality" and "voluntarism., 277  By
voluntarism, Harlan meant the principle that "legislation neither
encourages nor discourages participation in religious life. 278 Harlan
saw in neutrality an "equal protection mode of analysis," requiring the
Court to "survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. '2 79 These
concepts were, as Harlan explained, "short-form for saying that the
Government must neither legislate to accord benefits that favor
religion over nonreligion, nor sponsor a particular sect, nor try to
encourage participation in or abnegation of religion. "280 Here, again,
we have on display a relationship between government and religion-
positively sanctioned by the interplay of the religion clauses-that
forbids government from acting either as God's patron or as God's
persecutor.
One thus sees that neutrality, which is central to the Court's non-
establishment jurisprudence, is itself bottomed on the twin commands
275. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
276. Id. at 669. In the same passage, the Court also disclaimed undue rigidity in
adhering to "[tjhe course of constitutional neutrality," warning that "rigidity could
well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be
sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." Id.
277. See id. at 694-700 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
278. Walz, 397 U.S. at 696. Harlan cited examples such as school-sponsored prayer
or Bible reading or "released-time" programs that were structured to encourage
participation in religious instruction. Id. As Harlan described it, "voluntarism" still
factors significantly into the Court's approach to "neutrality," as seen in the Court's
recent discussions of when "religious indoctrination" can be ascribed to the
government. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(discussing governmental indoctrination).
279. Walz, 397 U.S. at 696. As already discussed, in Lukumi the Court drew on
Harlan's idea of "religious gerrymanders" to describe a significant impermissible
aspect of the Hialeah ordinances-i.e., that they pursued otherwise legitimate
governmental objectives only against religious conduct. See supra Part IV.A.1.
280. Walz, 397 U.S. at 694. Supporting this statement, Harlan quoted the passage
from Justice Goldberg's Schempp concurrence discussed earlier in this section, and
also cited the Court's free exercise discussion in Torcaso, discussed supra in Part
IV.A., which condemned government discrimination in favor of some or all religions.
Id. at 695 (discussing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring), and
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)).
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that government neither favor nor disfavor religion. But what does
neutrality add to the non-persecution principle I have already
discussed? Principally, neutrality should foreclose the notion that the
free exercise and establishment clauses are somehow in tension with
each other on the substantive issue of government religious hostility.
The proper interaction of the clauses regarding religious benefits may
still be murky, but their interaction on religious hostility is clear-both
categorically condemn it. Secondly, neutrality reinforces the
proposition that it is invidious governmental religious categories
themselves that impinge on religious freedom. It is the government
categorization that must be scrutinized-i.e., how the government has
chosen to structure the exclusions and inclusions in its scheme of
distributing benefits. When it is apparent that government has
engaged in religious gerrymandering by creating a category of
beneficiaries designed to exclude "religious persons" or "religious
entities," then government has likely fallen short of the neutrality that
the Establishment Clause specifically, and the religion clauses more
generally, demand.
Does this mean that government is constitutionally forbidden from
ever conferring a special benefit on religious persons? Or does this
mean that government may allow certain narrow exemptions from
general laws for religious reasons? These hard questions throw us
back on the original debate discussed previously over formal versus
substantive neutrality. And regardless of the resolution of that
debate, one concept unites both sides: Government may not confer
special disabilities on religious persons or entities through its
structuring of beneficiary categories. That much should be clear from
the overlap between the two competing theories of neutrality, and
also from the Supreme Court's consistent condemnation of categories
explicitly disfavoring religion. There is, in short, some real substance
behind the Court's label of neutrality as "benevolent." Whatever
benevolence may mean regarding government's favoring of religion,
the idea plainly excludes governmental categories that embody
malevolence toward religion.
C. Free Speech and Non-Persecution
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has consistently
validated the "fundamental First Amendment proposition that
government may not discriminate against individuals' or groups'
speech on account of its religious nature or the speaker's religious
identity.""28  Two aspects of this religious speech jurisprudence
reinforce the non-persecution principle that government may not
target religion for special disabilities in distributing public benefits. 82
281. Paulsen, supra note 226, at 655.
282. In this Article, I do not address at length the argument that certain
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First, the Court's treatment of laws targeting religious viewpoints for
exclusion from limited public fora echoes the Court's approach to
non-persecution in the free exercise context and to neutrality in the
non-establishment context. Second, the Court has consistently
rejected as justifications for religious viewpoint discrimination both
exaggerated fears of violating the federal Establishment Clause and
also states' interests in crafting greater church-state separation. Each
of these points reinforces my general argument that an overarching
non-persecution principle forbids most of the obvious applications of
the State Blaine Amendments.
Since the early 1980s, the Court has repeatedly addressed variations
on the following general theme: A governmental body creates a
limited public forum for the discussion or dissemination of a broadly
defined range of topics, but it explicitly excludes participants if they
bring speech or ideas of an overtly religious character. Thus, in
Widmar v. Vincent, the University of Missouri opened its facilities to
any student discussion group, but disallowed facility access to any
student group that would engage in religious worship or discussion.283
Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, a local school board made public school property available
for after-school use for "social, civic and recreational meetings" and
other "uses pertaining to the welfare of the community," while
excluding "meetings for religious purposes. ' '2 4  The school board
applied that policy to forbid a group from showing a film that
discussed child-rearing from an explicitly Christian perspective.285
More recently, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, an
elementary school opened its facilities for the same range of uses as in
Lamb's Chapel but refused to allow a Christian organization access
applications of State Blaines independently violate the Free Speech Clause. There are
undoubtedly applications of State Blaines that would squarely abridge free speech-
e.g., if State Blaines are used to justify excluding religious viewpoints from public or
limited public fora. But the more difficult question, which I do not explore here, is
whether the concept of a speech forum is sufficiently expansive to cover the wider
array of situations where religious persons and institutions seek equal access to public
benefits. See, e.g., Rees, supra note 9, at 1313-28 (arguing that excluding religious
providers from neutral voucher programs would abridge free speech); see also
DeForrest, supra note 20, at 618-25 (applying free speech principles to State Blaines);
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 962 n.204 (advocating a narrower viewpoint-
discrimination ground for result in Davey v. Locke, discussed infra notes 326-32).
Again, however, this Article focuses on free exercise principles as a primary source
for attacking the vast majority of the State Blaines' conceivable applications, and so I
discuss the Court's religious speech cases insofar as they support my general non-
persecution argument.
283. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The student group in Widmar
was called "Cornerstone," an evangelical Christian organization whose meetings
"included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and
experiences." Id. at 265 & n.2.
284. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386
(1993).
285. See id. at 386-89.
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for after-school meetings that involved religious instruction and
activities.286  Finally, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the University established a Student Activity
Fund that provided indirect financial assistance to a wide array of
student publications. A student newspaper with an explicitly
Christian viewpoint qualified to participate in the Fund but was
denied access because of the religious content of the newspaper.287 In
each of these cases, the governmental body claimed that it could
legitimately deny equal participation in otherwise generally available
benefits-here, participation in a limited public forum-because of
the avowedly "religious" content or affiliation of certain groups. But,
in every case, the Supreme Court invalidated the religious exclusion as
viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech Clause and,
moreover, refused to justify the discrimination under any theory of
non-establishment.288
The Court's consistent invalidation of the religious speech
exclusions in these cases resonates with the general non-persecution
principle. In each case, the governmental unit had created a "limited
public forum," opening its facilities to a broad but defined range of
speakers or topics. 28 9 For instance, in Lamb's Chapel and Good News
Club, the school boards had opened their facilities under a New York
education law that allowed after-school meetings for "'social, civic and
recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining
to the welfare of the community,"' provided that such meetings were
286. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102-04 (2001).
287. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 820-
27 (1995). Board of Education v. Mergens is another case that addresses these issues,
although Mergens does so in the context of the Equal Access Act and not the First
Amendment. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
288. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46; Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-97; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276-77. For free speech purposes, the
Court has said "[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based
on its substantive content or the message it conveys." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828
(citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). Discrimination
against speech because of the message conveyed is presumptively unconstitutional
and, furthermore, "[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the
more blatant." Id. at 829 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)). The
Court therefore characterizes viewpoint discrimination as "an egregious form of
content discrimination." Id. at 829.
289. For example, in Widmar the Court explained that, "[t]hrough its policy of
accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for
use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to
justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms."
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("Once it has opened a
limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself
set."). The speech forum thereby created should be distinguished from a "public
forum" which by its nature or design is "open for indiscriminate public use for
communicative purposes." Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392.
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"'non-exclusive"' and "'open to the general public.' ' 29 ° Similarly, in
Rosenberger the Student Activity Fund guidelines authorized fund
access to "student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or
academic communications media groups., 29' But, in those cases the
relevant access provisions mandated explicit exclusions for groups
with religious purposes or content.292 Consequently, in each case a
student organization was admittedly eligible for participation in the
limited forum because it fell within the forum's defined scope, but the
group was nonetheless excluded from participation specifically
because of its religious affiliation or religious purposes.
The Court has consistently condemned these exclusions as
impermissibly discriminating on the basis of religious viewpoint.
While government may permissibly limit the speakers in a limited
public forum according to subject matter and speaker identity, such
exclusions must be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and [must be] viewpoint neutral. 293 In each case, participation
290. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386 (quoting N.Y. Educ. Law § 414(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993) (explaining that New York Education Law section
414 "authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations for the [after-
school] use of school property for 10 specified purposes"); Good News Club, 533 U.S.
at 102-03 (same); see also N.Y. Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 2000). In Widmar, the
Court explained that the stated policy of the University of Missouri was "to
encourage the activities of student organizations," that it "officially recognize[d] over
100 student groups," and that it "routinely provide[d] University facilities for the
meetings of registered organizations." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265. The Christian group
at issue in Widmar had "regularly sought and received permission to conduct its
meetings in University facilities" until the University adopted its policy of religious
exclusion. Id.
291. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824 (describing University guidelines relating to
Student Activity Fund access). Notice that the forum created in Rosenberger involved
more than equal access to facilities-it involved equal access to funding. See Paulsen,
supra note 226, at 654 ("Equal access, according to the Court in Rosenberger, means
no discrimination in eligibility for a right, benefit, or privilege-including funding--on
the basis of religious viewpoint." (emphasis omitted)). Paulsen calls Rosenberger's
recognition of a free-speech right to equal access to a "funding" forum "a major
doctrinal breakthrough in First Amendment law." Id. at 710. He also points out that
the same issue (equal access of religious persons to neutral sources of public funding)
was presented on remand in Witters. Id. at 711 n.140. Paulsen's analysis of
Rosenberger thus underscores the obvious connections between religious free speech
and free exercise jurisprudence.
292. In Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club, the school boards had promulgated
rules stating that "school premises shall not be used by any group for religious
purposes" and that otherwise forbade use "by any individual or organization for
religious purposes." Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at
103. Similarly, in Widmar, the University adopted a regulation that prohibited use of
University buildings or grounds "'for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching."' Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 & n.3. The exclusion in Rosenberger, as befitted
a University setting, was more philosophically-nuanced. Among certain student
activities excluded from the Student Activity Fund were "religious activities," defined
as any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a
deity or an ultimate reality." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825.
293. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-93 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
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was denied for no reason "other than the fact that the [speech] would
have been from a religious perspective, ' 294 and the exclusion therefore
plainly amounted to forbidden viewpoint discrimination. As
explained in Rosenberger, "[b]y the very terms of the [Student
Activity Fund] prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as
a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints., 295 The Court
categorically rejected the use of concepts like "religion," "religious
purpose" and "Christian viewpoint" as legitimate organizing
principles for the exclusion of groups and speech from participation in
the limited public fora.296
The parallels between the Court's reasoning in these cases and its
approach to religious neutrality and non-discrimination in its religion
clause jurisprudence are unmistakable. The Court itself has referred
to its treatment in these cases of public fora to illustrate the proper
scope of religious neutrality in the Establishment Clause area.297
Justice O'Connor made that connection explicit when, in her
Rosenberger concurrence, she observed that the Court's "insistence on
government neutrality toward religion explains why we have held that
schools may not discriminate against religious groups by denying them
equal access to facilities that the schools make available to all," citing
294. Lamb's Chapel, 508 at 393-94; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112
(reaffirming the consistent view that "speech discussing otherwise permissible
subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the
subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint").
295. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
296. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110-12. In Good News Club, the Court
made its most pointed rejection of the argument that the "religious nature" of speech
somehow makes it fair game for exclusion. The school had claimed that the explicit
Christian content of the Good News Club's teaching activities distinguished them
from "pure" moral teaching and character development. In the school's view, the
Club's "Christian viewpoint" was "quintessentially religious" and therefore added an
"additional layer" to otherwise neutral moral teaching. The Court rejected the
school's argument, stating that "we can see no logical difference in kind between the
invocation of Christianity by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or
patriotism by other associations to provide a foundation for their lessons." Id. at 111.
297. For instance, in Mueller v. Allen, the Court approved under the Establishment
Clause a general education tax deduction-one that included deductions for religious
education expenses-for the primary reason that the allowable expenses were
incurred by all parents, regardless of whether their children attended public, private
non-religious, or private religious schools. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). The Court explicitly
relied on the "[s]tate's provision of a forum neutrally 'available to a broad class of
nonreligious as well as religious speakers' in Widmar to support its conclusion that
the tax deduction at issue was also "neutral" for non-establishment purposes. See id.
at 397 (1983) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274). Given Mueller's reliance on
Widmar, it is easier to see the logic of Rosenberger, which "extended" the notion of a
speech forum to a forum defined by a neutral funding mechanism. See, e.g., Paulsen,
supra note 226, at 711 n.139 (stating that "[a]rguably, Rosenberger is a step beyond
Mueller and Zobrest in that it upholds direct state funding of specifically religious
activities").
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Lamb's Chapel and Widmar as examples. 29" The Rosenberger
majority was operating on the same premise, as evidenced by its
concluding statement that "[t]he neutrality commanded of the State
by the separate clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by
the University's course of action." '299  Further clarifying the
connection, the Court went on to explain that "[t]he viewpoint
discrimination inherent in the University's regulation ... was a denial
of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or
hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the
Establishment Clause requires."3 ° In sum, the overarching principle
in these cases is that religious speech-just like religious conduct and
status-may not be excluded from the public arena simply because it
is religious. "Religious" cannot be the organizing principle or the
basis for classification that results in some speech or ideas being
denied entry into an otherwise accessible public forum."'
Significantly, these cases also reject "unreasonable fears of
establishment" as a justification for excluding religious speech from
limited public fora. The governmental units attempted to justify their
religious discrimination by raising their "interest in not violating the
Establishment Clause" or their "compelling interest in maintaining
strict separation of church and state." And in every case, the Court
rejected that argument by concluding that allowing the religious
groups to participate in the public fora was not even a colorable
violation of the Establishment Clause.3 2
Moreover, in Widmar, the University of Missouri also grounded its
discriminatory policy on the Missouri Blaine Amendment, which the
University asserted "ha[d] gone further than the Federal Constitution
in proscribing indirect state support for religion. "303 The Court
298. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 845.
300. Id. at 845-46.
301. See Paulsen, supra note 226, at 662 ("There is no 'religion exception' to the
Free Speech Clause or the Free Press Clause; religious speakers and groups are
entitled to the same equal access to public fora, public facilities, and public funds as
other private speakers and groups receive.").
302. E.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-19; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-76; see also
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837-45; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-97.
303. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275. The University relied in part on the general anti-
religious-funding provision in article IX, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution, the
only possibly relevant part of which provides that no "grant or donation of personal
property or real estate [shall] ever be made by [any governmental unit] for any
religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever." See supra note 107 and
accompanying text (discussing Missouri Blaine Amendment). The University also
relied on article I, section 6 (addressing the "seminary fund") and article I, section 7
(addressing "county and township school funds"), neither of which seem applicable to
the access issue nor to fall within the general parameters of State Blaine Amendments
as I have described them. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court deferred to statements of
the Missouri Supreme Court that the "Missouri Constitution requires stricter
separation of church and State than does [the] Federal Constitution." Widmar, 454
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approached this claim cautiously, first observing that the Missouri
courts had not determined whether "a general policy of
accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing to
gather to engage in religious and nonreligious speech, would offend
the State Constitution. ' '34  Declining to resolve that issue, the Court
also passed over whether the Supremacy Clause would override a
more restrictive state policy toward religious accommodation.3 5 But,
in tension with those preliminary comments, the Court concluded
that:
[T]he state interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of
church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment
Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited by the Free Exercise
Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well. In this
constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State's
interest as sufficiently "compelling" to justify content-based
discrimination against respondents' religious speech.0 6
Thus, although the Court seemed to go out of its way to avoid
addressing any conflict between the Missouri Constitution and the
federal Constitution, its conclusion plainly favored federal religious
and free speech rights.
In sum, the Court's consistent protection of religious speech against
targeted exclusion from limited public fora-including a public forum
in Rosenberger defined by a neutral funding mechanism-reinforces
the non-persecution principle. First, the religious speech cases
underscore the basic idea that religion-whether religiously motivated
conduct, religiously affiliated persons or groups, or speech from a
religious viewpoint--cannot be singled out for exclusion from
participation in public benefits or public fora to which it would
otherwise be permitted. Second, and relatedly, the religious speech
cases reinforce the point that it is the invidious religious classifications
themselves that are constitutionally suspect and per se disfavored.
Third, they make the important additional point that religious
discrimination can neither be justified by erroneous conclusions about
the scope of Establishment nor by pretensions at creating a stricter
separation at the state level. Michael Stokes Paulsen has concisely
summed up the lessons taught and the principles reinforced by this
line of cases: "The Establishment Clause does not authorize, and the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses do not permit, government
discrimination against religious speakers or religious speech on the
basis of religious content, viewpoint, or speaker identity-ever."3 7
U.S. at 275 n.16 (citing Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720 (Mo. 1976)
(en banc)).
304. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275.
305. Id. at 276.
306. Id.
307. Paulsen, supra note 226, at 653 (emphasis omitted).
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V. THE STATE BLAINES AND NON-PERSECUTION
What remains is to apply the non-persecution principle described in
Part IV to the State Blaines. This appears to be daunting, because, as
Part III showed, the State Blaines cover a lot of ground. But, for
constitutional purposes, that complexity can be misleading; what
unites all State Blaines is the explicit object of separating public
benefits from religious persons, institutions, and purposes. I will thus
limit myself to assessing that operation of the State Blaines-i.e.,
whether they may block religious persons' and groups' access to
generally available public benefits on the basis of their religious
affiliation, status, or purpose. First, I will look at whether State
Blaines may operate to prevent the flow of public aid to persons who
wish to use the aid to further their religious education or training.
That inquiry will take us back to the example that opened this
Article-Larry Witters' plan to use public financial assistance to train
for the ministry-as well as the situation presented in Davey v. Locke,
a recent Ninth Circuit decision involving selective state funding of
non-religious degrees that will be heard by the Supreme Court in
December 2003.308 In this first section, I take up general defenses to
the operation of State Blaines grounded in federalism and in the
Supreme Court's non-establishment jurisprudence itself. In the next
section, I address whether a state's control over how and why it
spends money can provide an additional justification for the State
Blaines' religion-sensitive exclusion from equal participation in public
benefits.
A. Educational Funding, Federalism, and Incorporation
I began this article with Larry Witters' dilemma and now return to
it. Recall that Witters qualified for state educational aid because he
was blind, and he wanted to use that aid for ministry training at a
Christian college. The Supreme Court told Witters he could do so
under the federal Establishment Clause, because the funds were
distributed without reference to religion and because they ended up at
a religious school solely as a result of Witters' private choice to use
them there.3 9 But on remand, the Washington Supreme Court
blocked Witters' use of the funds under the Washington Blaine
Amendment-forbidding public funds from being appropriated or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction.31° Witters
arguably fell within the plain terms of the prohibition, but the court
308. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075
(2003).
309. See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (Witters
II); see also supra Part I.
310. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Wash. 1989)
(Witters III); see also supra note 116 (discussing Wash. Const. art. I, § 11).
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added the case law gloss that "religious instruction" meant only
instruction that was "'devotional in nature and designed to induce
faith and belief in the student,"' as opposed to instruction marked by
the "'open, free, critical, and scholarly examination of the literature,
experiences, and knowledge of mankind.' ' '311  How does this
application of a State Blaine fare under the non-persecution
principle?
Notice that Witters' dilemma would arise under the plain terms of
any number of other State Blaines. Utah's Blaine Amendment, for
instance, enacts an identical ban on funding religious instruction.312
Pennsylvania's and Virginia's Blaines specifically disallow grants or
scholarships to students in a "theological seminary or school of
theology '313 or students in a school "whose primary purpose is ... to
provide religious training or theological education. '314 Nor does it
take much hermeneutical imagination to conclude that Witters'
situation implicates the use of public money to "aid," "benefit,"
"assist," or "support" a "society," "seminary," "institution,"
"association," "instruction" or even a "purpose" that is "religious,"
"sectarian," "theological," "denominational," or "controlled by" a
church or religious institution. Indeed, the more difficult task is to
identify any State Blaine whose terms would clearly allow Witters'
contemplated use of the funds.315 The point is not that a court could
leniently interpret any State Blaine to favor Witters-as noted above,
interpretations have gone both ways-but rather that state
constitutions are littered with provisions whose language invites
Washington's separationist result.
That result does not fare well under the non-persecution principle.
First, as applied to exclude Witters' use of the funds, a State Blaine
does not operate as a generally applicable law that incidentally
burdens religiously-motivated conduct. Instead, it would be a law that
targets its disabilities at purpose, conduct, and affiliation because of
their religious character. The funds in question were generally
available funds-they were made available to Witters on a religion-
neutral basis (he qualified for them because he was blind)-and
nothing beyond the religion-sensitive prohibition in the State Blaine
would prohibit his use of the funds for ministry training.316 That
311. Witters III, 771 P.2d at 1122 (citation omitted).
312. See supra note 119.
313. See supra note 107.
314. See supra note 120.
315. Some candidates might be those State Blaines whose prohibitions appear
limited to specific "funds" (such as "educational" or "public school" funds), because
Witters' aid apparently came from a vocational rehabilitation fund. See, e.g., supra
notes 105, 103, 107 (discussing the Kansas, Ohio, and Nebraska Constitutions).
316. This would be different, of course, if the federal Establishment Clause
independently prohibited Witters' use of the funds. In that case, construction of the
State Blaine would not logically be implicated.
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religion-penalizing application of a State Blaine would therefore merit
strict scrutiny under Smith and Lukumi. Notice, moreover, how the
State Blaine's exclusionary operation fits precisely into the
prohibition articulated, over forty years before those decisions, in
Everson-it "exclude[s] individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith... from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.""3 7
Notice further that the State Blaines target everyone on Everson's list
except the "Non-believer," thereby privileging the areligious and the
irreligious over the religious.
Second, the State Blaine's application is patently non-neutral.
Washington State has made a pool of state aid generally available to
handicapped students, but the State Blaine operates to categorize the
recipients of that aid according to whether they will use the aid for
"religious" or "non-religious" instruction.3"8 This is nothing other
than a religious gerrymander.319 A government benefit program has
been structured to exclude religion because it is religious-a
contemplated religious use is the sole disqualifying trigger. Aid is
therefore distributed to disfavor religious persons and purposes.
Finally, the religious speech cases reinforce the analysis. In those
cases, religious groups were eligible to participate in limited public
fora, but they were excluded only because of their religious affiliation
and viewpoint. The limited public fora in those cases are directly
analogous to the neutrally-available educational funds in Witters.320
317. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); see supra note 182.
318. Again, notice that the federal Establishment Clause does not prohibit the
religious use of the aid contemplated by Witters. Thus, the pool of aid is genuinely
"generally available" to Witters. Washington State is thus penalizing Witters'
religious choice because it is religious, and not because its hands are tied by the
Establishment Clause.
319. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534 (1993); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
see also supra notes 218-23, 230, 279 and accompanying text.
320. See Paulsen, supra note 226, at 711-12 & nn.139-40 (explaining Rosenberger's
precedential implications for neutral governmental funding programs and observing
that the same principles were involved in Witters on remand). Indeed, as I have
explained, the Court itself has drawn the analogy between the limited speech fora in
the religious speech cases, and the notion of a "neutral" distribution of public funds
based on non-religious criteria. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983)
(quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)); supra notes 1-4. Both the
majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence seemed to flinch from
embracing the logical application of Rosenberger's holding to neutral disbursements
from "general tax revenue." See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 840-41 (1995) (attempting to distinguish the student fees disbursements
from an expenditure from a general tax fund); id. at 851-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(claiming that the student fund "simply belongs to the students" and is not "tax
revenue"). The distinction is unpersuasive. It is difficult to understand how the
student fee program-which exacts fees from all students and makes them neutrally
available for student groups' private uses-is constitutionally different from the same
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Witters was eligible to receive the funds and the federal
Establishment Clause presented no plausible impediment to his using
them for religious purposes. But the State Blaine operated to
disqualify him solely because his purposes were religious. It is no
rejoinder that Witters involved funding and not speech. The simplest
answer is that Rosenberger, too, involved a religious group's access to
generally available funding. But the better answer is that Rosenberger
logically applied to a discriminatory funding scheme the principles of
religious non-persecution found in the earlier religious speech cases,
in free exercise cases like Smith, Lukumi, and McDaniel, and in the
neutrality principle consistently elaborated in the Court's non-
establishment jurisprudence, going back to Everson itself.3"' Religious
status, purpose, or affiliation may not be independently used to
exclude persons from participation in public benefits.
Notice a further complicating factor in Witters' situation. The
Washington Supreme Court suggested that its Blaine Amendment
targeted only "devotional" religious purposes. That is, if Witters had
wanted to use the funds to become a purely secular expert in
comparative religion, the State Blaine would not have barred his use
of the funds.32 This distinction weakens the constitutional footing of
the State Blaine even further. First, it arguably raises the stakes of
religious discrimination from religiously-motivated conduct to
religious belief itself-Witters is being excluded from using the funds
not simply because of a generally religious purpose, but because he
takes religion seriously enough to become a minister.323 Second, it
opens the State Blaine to an independent viewpoint discrimination
challenge under the Free Speech Clause-the State Blaine is not
merely excluding religion, but is excluding certain religious
kind of program involving "general tax revenues." See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 226,
at 712 (criticizing as unpersuasive the majority's and Justice O'Connor's qualifications
of the holding in Rosenberger as applied to a "general tax fund"); Laycock, supra note
156, at 66-67 & n.144 (arguing that the Rosenberger "majority hedged the opinion
with unpersuasive distinctions and reservations" about general tax revenues and
directness of funding); see also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (comparing limited speech
forum in Widmar to generally available tax deduction for educational expenses).
Since Rosenberger, the Court has relied on the limited forum cases for "instruction"
in assessing the constitutionality of a government subsidy programs derived from
general tax funds. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001)
(observing that "limited forum" cases like Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger "do
provide some instruction" for cases in which "government establishes a subsidy for
specified ends").
321. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 226, at 657 (arguing that "Rosenberger's equal
access to funding follows naturally from Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel, each
of which involved a claim of some type on public resources by a religious group").
322. See Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Wash. 1989)
(Witters III) (citations omitted).
323. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978); id. at 632 (Brennan, J.,
concurring): Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1961).
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viewpoints.3 24 Finally, it unmasks the religious bigotry lurking beneath
the State Blaine: Washington will tolerate handing over its
educational funds to those who engage in "open, free, critical, and
scholarly examination of the literature, experiences, and knowledge of
mankind," but not to those who undertake religious instruction that is
"devotional in nature and designed to induce faith and belief in the
student. 3 25
Witters essentially resurfaced as a statutory matter in the Ninth
Circuit's recent decision in Davey v. Locke.3 26 Davey is significant not
only because it invalidates a fairly widespread statutory discrimination
against religious education 2 7 but also because the Supreme Court will
hear the case in December 2003. Davey addresses Washington State's
"Promise Scholarship," an aid program begun in 1999 to help fund the
first two years of college for high-achieving students from low- to
middle-income families.3 28 But the program specifically excludes from
participation students who are "pursuing a degree in theology. 3 29
Defending its program before the Ninth Circuit, Washington justified
the theology exclusion by reference to the Washington State Blaine-
the same provision that had frustrated Larry Witters' ability to study
324. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 962 n.204 (offering viewpoint
discrimination as a narrower alternative ground for result in Davey).
325. Witters I1, 771 P.2d at 1122 (citations omitted). This "motivational" parsing
of a State Blaine merely deepens its unconstitutional application as to Witters. But a
"categorical" reading would amount to unconstitutional religious discrimination as
well. That is, if the Washington Supreme Court had simply declared that all religious
studies were ineligible for funding-whether or not they were "devotional"-it would
still have singled out "religious" as a category excluded from public benefits. Nothing
in the Court's development of the non-persecution principle would limit persecution
to discrimination against devotional religious motivation only. But the Court has
suggested that religious discrimination targeted at particular qualities of belief is
especially disfavored. See, e.g., Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963), and
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 488).
326. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075
(2003).
327. Washington's certiorari petition lists thirteen other states with similar
statutory funding restrictions on financial aid to theology or divinity students.
Petition for Certiorari at 21 & n.4, Davey (No. 02-1315) (citing laws from Alabama,
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).
328. The scholarship paid $1,125 during the 1999-2000 year and $1,542 for 2000-01
and could be spent on any educational expense, including room and board. Davey,
299 F.3d at 750-51. The general eligibility criteria require that students (1) be in the
top 10% of their 1999 high school graduating class; (2) have a family income no
greater than 135% of the state median income; and (3) attend an accredited public or
private university in Washington. Id. at 751.
329. Washington defines an "[e]ligible student" as "a person who... is not
pursuing a degree in theology." Id. at 751 n.3. The eligibility criteria are codified in
Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(a)-(f). Id. The court also noted that Wash.
Rev. Code § 28B.10.814 provides that "[n]o aid shall be awarded to any student who
is pursuing a degree in theology." Id. at 750 n.1. The court did not say whether
"theology" is defined by Washington state law. See generally id. at 748.
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for the ministry over two decades ago.30  The Ninth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Rymer, declared the theology exclusion in the
Promise Scholarship criteria unconstitutional under the Free Exercise
Clause, relying on the religious non-discrimination principle derived
mainly from Lukumi, McDaniel, and Rosenberger, and denying that
the Washington Blaine could justify the religious discrimination. 3 1
It is hard to see any constitutional difference between the statutory
exclusion for theology degrees in Davey, and the application of
Washington's Blaine to bar Witters from using state funds for
religious instruction. Both operate as laws that target religion-here,
education that is affiliated with religion or has a religious purpose-
for exclusion from otherwise generally available public aid. Neither
imposes merely incidental burdens on religious conduct. Neither is
neutral toward religion in any plausible sense, because both structure
categories of public aid to remove beneficiaries who are motivated by
religion or who simply direct their studies toward religious ends. 331
Both laws, then, violate the religious non-persecution principle and,
under strict scrutiny, must be justified by a compelling state interest.333
In a recent article, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle offer some
thoughtful objections to the foregoing analysis.334 They criticize what
they call the "Free Exercise Clause approach" to attacking the State
Blaines-roughly equivalent to the non-persecution principle-i.e.,
"that the state may not generically treat religious entities worse than
secular ones., 335 Principally, they say the argument proves too much,
330. Id. at 758; see supra note 3 and accompanying text. The plaintiff, Joshua
Davey, was in virtually the same situation as Witters. Already selected as a Promise
Scholar, Davey enrolled in an accredited private Christian school, Northwest,
intending to enter the ministry, and declared a double major in Pastoral Ministries
and Business. The Pastoral Ministries major was "designed to prepare students for a
career as a Christian minister." Davey, 299 F.3d at 751. Northwest's theology
offerings were grounded on the assertion that "the Bible represents truth and is
foundational," whereas theology curricula at Washington public universities were
generally "taught from an historical and scholarly point of view." Id. Washington
determined that Davey's major in Pastoral Ministries constituted a "theology" degree
and therefore disqualified him for scholarship eligibility. Id. Davey chose to forego
the scholarship and continued to pursue his major. Id. at 751.
331. Id. at 752-58. Judge McKeown dissented, relying primarily on the federalism
and funding objections that I address in this and the next section. Id. at 760-68
(McKeown, J., dissenting); see infra notes 342, 398.
332. It was unclear from the Ninth Circuit's opinion whether the statutory
exclusion in Davey has the additional vice, as Witters did, of excluding only
"devotional" theology courses. See, e.g., Davey, 299 F.3d at 755-56, 760; Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 19, at 962 n.203.
333. For a thoughtful defense of Davey, see Kent Greenawalt, Is It Davey's Locker
for the No-Funding Principle?, 45 J. of Church & St. (forthcoming Dec. 2003).
334. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 957-72 (2003). Their objections are not
directed specifically toward the application of State Blaines in Witters and Davey, but
instead are more general. That said, the authors do suggest that Davey would have
been better resolved as a case of viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 962 n.204.
335. Id. at 963-64. My approach, although normatively similar to the approach
Lupu and Tuttle criticize, draws on jurisprudence not only from the Free Exercise
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because "American constitutional law, federal and state, has for many
years done exactly what this argument condemns. ' 36 By this, they
mean primarily that the federal Establishment Clause has often been
interpreted to require government to "single out" religious entities for
"special" treatment in many areas. For instance, government cannot
directly subsidize religious indoctrination, nor can it intervene in
church disputes involving matters of faith.337 Thus, by attacking any
rule drawing a "line between religious and nonreligious
organizations," the free exercise/non-persecution argument against
State Blaines undermines, they say, "each and every religion-specific
doctrine under the federal religion clauses."33
Lupu and Tuttle's second rejoinder, sounding in federalism,
complains that the non-persecution argument is "hostile to notions of
respect for state law, and in particular to the tradition of independent
state constitutional law." '339 They contend that, even if a narrower
form of the non-persecution argument would salvage the religion-
sensitive doctrines in federal constitutional law, it would still "deny
the states any room whatsoever for their own church-state policy."34
In other words, states would be wrongly confined under a ceiling of
federal non-establishment principles-they would have absolutely no
room "to have a non-establishment policy broader than whatever five
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court find to be the content of federal
law at any given moment."34' The authors' resolution of the
federalism issue, by contrast, would leave "each state.. . free to make
its own constitutional policy of church-state relations, and to extend it
beyond the federal policy, so long as the state approach serves
reasonable purposes of the sort associated with the regime of
Separationism."342
Clause but also from the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses. That said, I think
the Free Exercise Clause is the most apt constitutional locus for the State Blaines'
unconstitutional operation.
336. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19 at 964.
337. Id. The authors cite, inter alia, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000)
(reaffirming that the government cannot subsidize religion by using aid that "results
in governmental indoctrination"); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1997)
(holding that the government may not directly subsidize religion); Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979); Serbian East Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-12 (1976) (holding that the government may not intervene in property or
personnel disputes that are internal to religious communities and organizations and
involve religious matters).
338. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 964. The authors also point to the doctrine
excepting clergy-congregation relationships from federal anti-discrimination law, id.
at 964 n.216, as well as various religious freedom restoration acts enacted by the
federal government and many states in response to Smith, id. at 965 n.217 (citations
omitted).
339. Id. at 965-66.
340. Id. at 965.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 966. The authors are cautious, however, about saying what such
"reasonable purposes" might be. They admit that the purposes supporting a "regime
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Lupu and Tuttle's objections go to the heart of the religious-liberty
and federalism issues presented by the State Blaines, but ultimately
they neither undermine the non-persecution principle nor save the
State Blaines from constitutional invalidity. First and foremost, they
largely reduce the non-persecution principle to the untenable
formalist notion that laws may not "single out" religion for any
purpose whatsoever. But the non-persecution principle condemns a
different, narrower kind of legal categorization-it forbids singling out
religion for disfavored treatment and, in the context of the State
Blaines, disfavored treatment of the kind that excludes persons and
organizations from participation in public benefits only because they
are somehow religious. Second, it is reductionist to claim that the
Supreme Court has generally "singled out" religion in its religion
clause jurisprudence in order to "disfavor" religion. Furthermore,
that claim is premised on the implausible notion that, whether as a
textual, historical, or jurisprudential matter, the Constitution itself
singles out religion for disfavor. Third, the authors' federalism-based
argument undervalues the effect of incorporation of the religion
clauses against the states. It is more plausible to conclude that
incorporation limits rather than expands states' power to achieve
greater non-establishment.
of Separationism" are in need of "restatement and reinvigoration," especially because
current defenders of separationism-the Zelman dissenters, for instance-"have
tended to rely excessively on justifications now viewed by many as outmoded." Id.
The authors conclude by stating that "[w]hether states can defend a Separationist
policy broader than the federal constitution requires will thus depend on the efforts of
judges and academics to provide precisely this sort of rehabilitation of the
Separationist ethos." Id. The authors point to two of their articles as laying some
possible groundwork. Id. at 966 n.222 (citing Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 10; Ira C.
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government
Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & Pol. 537 (2002)). Along those
lines, the dissenter in Davey, Judge McKeown, herself articulated some "reasonable
purposes" for Washington's Blaine Amendment. Washington, she said, could justify
its State Blaine in order to "define[] its vision of religious freedom as one completely
free of governmental interference," to "reflect[] its strong desire. .. to insulate itself
from the appearance of endorsing religion," and to evince "the state's strong
prophylactic interest in steering clear of endorsing or supporting religion through
direct funding of religious pursuits." Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 761-62, 766
(McKeown, J., dissenting).
Lupu's and Tuttle's suggestions are intriguing, but they leave unanswered a
fundamental question. Even if judges or academics succeed in "reinvigorating" the
purposes of the "Separationist ethos"-an ethos the authors admit is currently
founded on a tissue of anachronism and anti-religious hostility-why should their
"rehabilitated" purposes suffice as legitimate, not to mention compelling,
justifications for states' targeted exclusion of religious persons and groups from public
benefits? Regardless of what rejuvenated brew of "Separationism" might be
concocted, the legal operation of that "ethos" will still be measured against the free
exercise rights of religiously motivated state citizens who, needless to say, will
continue to object to their religion-based second-class citizenship. In short, it is
implausible that new reasons for religious discrimination will prove any more
legitimate or compelling than the old reasons.
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
At its broadest, Lupu and Tuttle's criticism of the approach this
Article suggests is that "American constitutional law, federal and
state, has for many years done exactly what" the non-persecution
principle "condemns." '343 But what, exactly, does non-persecution
condemn? As I have been at pains to demonstrate, it condemns
(among other things) the targeted exclusion of persons and
organizations from public benefits (1) for which they are otherwise
eligible, (2) because of their religious affiliation or purpose. Is it fair
to say that "American constitutional law" has done exactly this for
many years, or indeed ever?
It is virtually impossible to reduce to specifics what the Supreme
Court has done over the last century as it has worked out the
constitutionally permissible relationships between religion and
government. Its universally criticized jurisprudence has charted an
evolutionary development of doctrines seeking to balance different
theories about what the religion clauses require-and not something
reducible to one purpose such as disfavoring religion by excluding it
from generally available public benefits.3" In other words, what
American constitutional law has been doing since at least Reynolds34 5
in 1878 is, broadly speaking, trying to figure out why the Constitution
singled out religion as it did, and how the purposes behind that
singling out should translate into practical relationships between the
polity and religion. A long-standing generalized object of disfavoring
religion is, to put it mildly, hard to reconcile with the Court's many
statements (dating at least from Everson346 ) that the Establishment
Clause does not require government hostility toward religion347 and
that government acts permissibly and even in concert with "the best of
our traditions" when it seeks to accommodate religious practices and
beliefs.34 It is impossible to reconcile with the ardently pro-religious
and pro-Christian statements from earlier courts, Justices, and
lawmakers.349
343. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 964.
344. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 1397, 1403 (2003) (observing that "[tihe constitutional jurisprudence of
the Religion Clauses navigates among competing tacit accounts of the role of religious
organizations in a democratic society").
345. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
346. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
347. See supra notes 263-72 (discussing the non-hostility thread in Everson, Bowen,
Rosenberger, Grumet, Agostini, Mitchell, and Zobrest).
348. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating that when the
legislature acts to accommodate religious belief or practice, it "follows the best of our
traditions"); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994); id. at 714
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 723 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 743-45 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Each of the Justices acknowledged the consistent American legal
tradition of accommodating religious belief and practice.
349. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-72 (1892)
(explaining that "no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any
legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people"); Davis v. Beason, 133
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Lupu and Tuttle also characterize too broadly what a plausible rule
of non-persecution condemns. Non-persecution simply does not
amount to a formalist (A la Philip Kurland) argument that law cannot
ever use "religion" as a basis for legal categorization.3 0  The non-
persecution rule is narrower than that. It says law may not single out
religion with the object of disfavoring or punishing it. It is clearly
violated when, as State Blaines do, laws exclude religious persons and
organizations from public benefits because they are religious.
The State Blaines represent a political judgment of nineteenth-
century vintage, enshrined in almost forty state constitutions, about
the relationship between religion and public benefits. My argument is
that their collective judgment is at odds with the long-standing and
consistent tradition of religious non-discrimination as seen in free
exercise jurisprudence, in the neutrality concept, and in the more
recent religious speech cases.35' Is it possible that certain of the
Court's non-establishment decisions (particularly in the school aid
context), or indeed certain Justices' individual views, have reflected a
"separationist" or "religion-hostile" cast reminiscent of the State
Blaines? Roughly speaking, yes. Many commentators refer to the
"strict" separationism reflected in certain decisions or periods that
was possibly the result of anti-religious currents.352 The seeds of such
U.S. 333, 341 (1890) (remarking that "[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws
of all civilized and Christian countries"); Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127, 198-99
(1844) (stating it is unnecessary "to consider what would be the legal effect of a devise
in Pennsylvania for the establishment of a school or college, for the propagation of
Judaism, or Deism, or any other form of infidelity [because] [s]uch a case is not to be
presumed to exist in a Christian country; and therefore it must be made out by clear
and indisputable proof"); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294, 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1811) (Kent, J.) (stating that "[t]he people of this state, in common with the people of
this country, profess the general doctrines of christianity, as the rules of their faith and
practice" and that "[t]hough the constitution has discarded religious establishments, it
does not forbid judicial cognisance of those offences against religion and morality
which have no reference to any such establishment"); see also 3 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1871, at 728 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) ("The real object of the [Establishment Clause] was, not
to countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by
prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects."), discussed
in Amar, supra note 1, at 252 n*; see also Amar, supra note 1, at 247 (discussing the
First Congress's "extending the Confederate Congress's Northwest Ordinance of
1787, a regime that one leading scholar has described as 'suffused with aid,
encouragement, and support for religion"' (quoting Gerard V. Bradley, Church-State
Relationships in America 98 (1987))).
350. See supra Part IV.B. (discussing Kurland and formal neutrality).
351. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case against School
Vouchers, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 375, 386 (1999) (stating that "[tihe
Protestant paranoia fueled by waves of Catholic immigration to the United States,
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, cannot form the basis of a stable
constitutional principle, and the stability of the principle has been undermined by the
amelioration of the concerns" (citing Hamburger, supra note 173)).
352. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 12, at 122-23, 151-52, 161-62 (commenting on flux of
"strict separationism" in religion jurisprudence and that "a distrust of Catholic power
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separationism may have been sown in absolutist language in
Everson,3 53  or it may have grown from more deep-seated
misunderstandings about the history and purposes of the religion
clauses.3 54 Certain Justices have been accused, plausibly, of harboring
"separationist" ideas,355 of clinging to outdated notions of religious
"divisiveness, "356 or of simply being anti-religious. 3 57
and Catholic education was still a factor in the stricter 'no-aid' separationism of the
1960s and 1970s," although less so than in the 1940s and 50s); Laycock, supra note
156, at 53-54 (discussing tension between the "no-aid" and "non-discrimination"
strands in the Court's religion jurisprudence, beginning with Everson); Lupu, supra
note 351, at 388 (asking "[i]f the line of decisions from Everson to Lemon was driven
substantially by the then-demographics of public and private education, coupled with
anti-Catholic animus, what remains to justify principles forbidding direct aid to
sectarian elementary and secondary schools?"); McConnell, supra note 17, at 120, 127
(commenting on the tendency of the Warren and Burger Courts "to press relentlessly
in the direction of a more secular society" and "to view religion as an unreasoned,
aggressive, exclusionary, and divisive force that must be confined to the private
sphere"); id. at 127 (arguing that the Warren and Burger Courts' "legal doctrines ...
reinforced their lack of sympathy for religion").
353. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that "[n]either a
state nor the Federal government can.., aid one religion, [or] aid all religions ....
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion").
354. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 31, at 454-63 (discussing misapprehension of
the Everson parties and Justices about the nature of Establishment Clause); see also
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (generally
criticizing Court's non-establishment jurisprudence and observing that "[i]t is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history").
355. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 949-52 (criticizing Justice Souter's
no-aid separationism); Fried, supra note 13, at 188 (criticizing Souter's Zelman dissent
because it treated "twenty years of jurisprudence" from Mueller to Zobrest "as a
mistake," and because Souter's no-aid separationism was actually reflected in the
Court's jurisprudence for a "relatively brief" period from 1971-83).
356. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 952-55 (criticizing Justice Breyer's
concerns with religious divisiveness). Lupu and Tuttle argue that Breyer's Zelman
dissent "shows deep insensitivity to the history, limits, and failings of the concerns for
'political divisiveness,"' and relies on "a history of Protestant-Catholic tension in the
United States that, if anything, should embarrass a Court that spawned the regime of
no-aid Separationism out of deeply anti-Catholic premises." Id. at 954.
357. See, e.g., id. at 952 n.162 (noting Justice Stevens' "long and unbroken record of
opposing the cause of religion no matter what the issues presented"); Bd. of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 749 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that Justice Stevens'
concurrence was "less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism" that
"announce[d] a positive hostility to religion"); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (contending that Stevens' majority
opinion "bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life"); see also Berg,
supra note 12, at 129 (commenting on anti-Catholic rhetoric in the opinions of
Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge); Laycock, supra note 156, at 57 (discussing
historical scholarship documenting that the "intellectual anti-Catholic movement [of
the mid-1900s] attracted the favorable attention of Justices Black, Frankfurter,
Rutledge, and Burton" (citation omitted)); Lupu, supra note 351, at 385 (commenting
that Justice Jackson's Everson dissent and Chief Justice Burger's Lemon opinion were
"open and conspicuous tracts about the pervasive religious indoctrination thought to
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But there is a difference between noticing these elements in the
lengthy and complex history of the Court's religion clause
jurisprudence, and raising them to the level of a normative premise of
that jurisprudence. An argument that American constitutional law
has targeted religion for particular disfavor asks us to make just that
fundamentally implausible interpretive move. Even assuming that
any anti-religious stripe of separationism ever held sway in the Court's
jurisprudence, it has largely vanished-particularly concerning equal
access to neutrally available public benefits, where a far more
neutralist regime is firmly in place.358 Second, as noted above, such a
premise would have been flatly at odds with what the Court has
consistently said about government hostility toward religion." 9 Third,
it is more plausible to argue that any occasional anti-religious currents
in the Court's non-establishment cases were wrong to begin with
because they were out of step with a proper interpretation of how the
religion clauses were supposed to interact. Certainly, when the Court
has consciously altered course in its non-establishment cases, it has
explicitly discarded premises that were at odds with the deeper
principles of the religion clauses."6
The major examples Lupu and Tuttle rely on to support their
"singling out for disfavor" argument fail to do so. It seems strange to
describe the doctrine forbidding government intervention in faith-
based religious disputes as primarily disfavoring religion. Perhaps, as
the authors point out, that doctrine "deprive[s] religious factions of
the opportunity for authoritative dispute resolution by the state," '361
but it seems more plausible that the doctrine simply recognizes the
delicate position religion occupies in our secular polity and seeks to
protect religion from the corrosive effects of direct governmental
meddling in its theological affairs-an area, moreover, in which
government has no special competence. The no-subsidy or no-
funding rule seems a better candidate for a doctrine that affirmatively
accompany the system of Catholic education"); McConnell, supra note 17, at 121-22
(commenting on Black's anti-Catholic bias in his Allen dissent).
358. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 918 (commenting that, on the eve of
Zelman, "only the most ostrich-like Separationist could have denied the flux in the
law of the Establishment Clause," explaining that "[iun the context of access of private
parties to public fora for purposes of religious expression, and direct government
transfer of material resources to religious institutions, norms of non-Establishment
have been tending sharply toward the paradigm of Neutrality and away from the
metaphorical wall of church-state separation" (citations omitted)).
359. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661-62 (2002) (sharply
limiting Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793, 808 (2000) (plurality opinion) (overruling Meek and Wolman); id. at 837
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 222-35 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); see also
Paulsen, supra note 226, at 711 n.138 (noting that Nyquist has not been formally
overruled but it "must be regarded as moribund in light of... subsequent decisions").
361. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 964.
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disfavors religion-by putting a church on lesser footing than a secular
recipient of some forms of government largesse-but it is a weak
foundation on which to build the broad premise that American
constitutional law specially disfavors religion. The parameters and the
historical provenance of the no-subsidy rule continue to be
disputed,362 but assume for a moment that the Establishment Clause
affirmatively requires some form of a rule that prohibits direct,
unrestricted cash payments to religious groups for religious purposes.
It is a long, and in my view insupportable, leap to assume from that
rule alone that the Constitution sanctions a general disfavoring of
religion. Even if such a rule obtains, it is more plausible to regard it
as, at most, one limited disadvantaging of religion that is worked out
in the Constitution itself-a specific resolution, so to speak, of the so-
called "tension" between free exercise and non-establishment. And,
furthermore, there are good reasons to let that stand as a unique
constitutional balance that the states ought not be able to aggravate,
at the risk of trampling on free exercise values, especially when the
federal religion clauses apply with full force to the states themselves
through incorporation. At bottom, the argument that federal non-
establishment doctrine itself disfavors religion begs the more
fundamental question at the heart of the State Blaines' constitutional
validity-can the states legitimately go beyond whatever is
legitimately demanded by federal disestablishment and heap greater
disfavor upon religion as a matter of state constitutional policy?363 As
my arguments throughout this piece demonstrate, that is a notion
rendered deeply implausible by constitutional text, structure, history,
and jurisprudence.
A more fundamental refutation of the notion that American
constitutional law has often singled out religion for disfavored
treatment lies in the text and purposes of the Constitution itself. The
Constitution plainly singles out religion: for instance, it forbids
religious tests for federal office and "accommodates the religious
desires of those who were opposed to oaths by allowing any
officeholder-of any religion, or none-to take either an oath of
362. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 351, at 376 (questioning "the force of the
constitutional case against direct state aid to sectarian elementary and secondary
schools" and claiming that "the arguments against direct aid rest on precedents and
policies whose contemporary relevance has dwindled dramatically"); id. at 377-80
(criticizing the jurisprudential foundation for the "direct/indirect" distinction); id. at
388-93 (questioning reliance on General Assessment controversy and Madison's
Memorial as the basis for "direct funding" prohibition). But see Greenawalt, supra
note 333 (defending the continued vitality of a no-funding principle in non-
establishment law).
363. As explained infra, this question is bound up with the issue of how
incorporation of the religion clauses against the states affects the states' power to craft




office or an affirmation. '3 6 Religious scruples here are singled out for
special solicitude, not disfavor. What of the paradigmatic singling out
of religion-the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses? The
former-forbidding Congress from making any law that prohibits the
free exercise of religion-hardly sounds like it imposes a disadvantage
on religion. Indeed, as already noted, it was originally conceived as
forbidding laws punishing religion qua religion.365 The latter, as Akhil
Amar has persuasively demonstrated, was originally designed to (1)
forbid Congress from creating "The Church of the United States," and
(2) prevent Congress from disestablishing existing state religious
establishments. 66 The claim to find in these materials a general
charter for disabling religious persons or religious organizations vis-i-
vis their secular counterparts is unconvincing. If anything, their text
and purposes alone would seem to leave Congress free to promote the
general flourishing of religion, as it did in the territories and in its
provision of legislative and military chaplains.367 And, as we shall see,
incorporation of the religion clauses against the states only lends
additional weight against the general proposition that American
constitutional law recognizes disfavoring religion as a valid normative
premise.
So, Lupu and Tuttle's first major objection-that the non-
persecution rule condemns (and would therefore dismantle) a long-
standing practice of American constitutional law-turns out to be
overstated. What about their federalism objection? Does the non-
persecution rule unfairly handcuff the states in balancing their own
church-state policy? Perhaps in 1800, but certainly not since 1940 and
probably not since 1865. In other words, the federalism objection fails
to take seriously the effect of incorporating the religion clauses
against the states.
It is common doctrine that both religion clauses apply against the
states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, with the same force as
they apply against the federal government.3 68 As to free exercise, the
effects of this are relatively easy to understand. Free exercise is a
paradigmatic individual and associational right against government
overreaching, and so its application against the states should simply
disable states from legislating to prohibit free exercise, just as the
clause had, before, limited only the federal Congress. 369 Thus, when
364. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; art. VI, cl. 3).
365. See supra notes 23, 174, 179.
366. Amar, supra note 1 at 33-34, 41, 246.
367. Id. at 248 (citing Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA
Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2347 (1997)).
368. See supra note 25.
369. Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash have suggested that the "reconstructed" Free
Exercise Clause can plausibly be interpreted to protect religious exercise more
broadly than the original clause, requiring for instance religious exemptions from
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the Supreme Court holds that a law trenches on someone's free
exercise rights, incorporation makes that the end of the story. State
legislatures cannot pass such laws any longer, and thus the Supreme
Court's decision (whether by a majority of five, six, seven, eight or
nine Justices) in a real sense "den[ies] the states any room whatsoever
for their own church-state policy" on that issue.37° The converse is
slightly different. If the Supreme Court holds that a law does not
violate free exercise, then states have some latitude to accord their
citizens greater rights under state law (provided these greater rights
do not independently violate the Establishment Clause). Thus, even
as Smith interpreted federal free exercise not to command religious
exemptions from general laws, the Court recognized (and arguably
invited) states to legislate such exemptions under state law.371 In other
words, states had more latitude to develop a distinctive church-state
policy under their own laws.
As to non-establishment, the effects of incorporation are knottier.
It is not at all clear that non-establishment is properly described as an
individual or associational right against government-perhaps it is
more accurately a "right of the public at large.""37 This makes it more
difficult to say precisely what rights state citizens themselves gain
when the Establishment Clause is incorporated against their state
governments.373 Regardless, it is safe to say as a matter of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence that incorporation means this:
Whatever the federal government cannot do "respecting an
establishment of religion," the states also cannot do.374 Thus, when
the Supreme Court holds that a particular government practice
establishes religion, that is the end of the story. States may no longer
enact such practices and, to that extent, their prerogatives to
experiment with different church-state policies-which they
doubtlessly had before incorporation-vanish.375  But what about
when the Court, as it recently did in Zelman, declares that an existing
practice does not constitute an establishment? Surely other states are
non-discriminatory general laws. Amar, supra note 1, at 254-56; Lash, supra note 23,
at 1149-56.
370. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 965. Notice that the result would be no
different if the invalidated policy had "been federal constitutional law a few short
years ago"-i.e., if the Supreme Court had held previously that the policy did not
violate free exercise, but reversed itself. Id.
371. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1989).
372. Amar, supra note I at 252.
373. See id. at 33-34, 41, 251-54; McConnell, supra note 21, at 1485 n.384.
374. Even this statement becomes tangled when we notice, as Akhil Amar explains,
that "what the Establishment Clause prohibited the federal Congress from doing"
was, in large part, "meddling with state establishments." See Amar, supra note 1, at
33-34, 41.
375. Lupu and Tuttle do not address why this inevitable effect of incorporation is
not equally "hostile to notions of respect for state law, and in particular to the




not, at that point, required to enact such a practice. But the crucial
question is whether the Court's non-establishment decision sets some
kind of maximum ceiling for a policy of church-state separation in the
states. Or, put another way, can the citizens of a state plausibly claim
more non-establishment rights under state law than the Court has
identified under the federal Constitution? And, if so, can they
coherently claim such rights if their claims are not somehow
connected to the free exercise rights (or other personal rights) that
incorporation plainly gives them?
Akhil Amar has provided a complex but persuasive analysis of this
question with his model of "refined incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights. According to Amar, incorporation of the Establishment
Clause is an awkward matter because (1) the original clause was
primarily a states'-rights provision forbidding Congress from
disestablishing state establishments, and (2) consequently, it is
difficult to identify what additional personal rights were guaranteed to
state citizens through non-establishment incorporation.376  Amar
argues that the object of the Fourteenth Amendment-designed to
protect fundamental rights of United States citizens against state
encroachment-suggests that collective or structural rights like non-
establishment must be subtly "refined" to apply coherently against
state governments.377 On this understanding of incorporation, state
citizens could claim rights of non-establishment against state laws that
coerced their "bodily liberty and property," such as "[t]o the extent a
state created a coercive establishment, decreeing that individuals
profess a state creed or attend a state service or pay money directly to
a state church. '378 Amar notices, of course, that "all these examples
also seem like textbook violations of religious 'free exercise,"' thus
linking the rights citizens may claim under the incorporated
Establishment Clause with their less-awkwardly-incorporated free
exercise rights.379
Amar's refined-incorporation proposal would, of course,
significantly alter the Supreme Court's non-establishment
jurisprudence by allowing the states more latitude in legislating about
376. Amar, supra note 1, at 32-34, 41, 246-56.
377. Id. at 251-56; see generally id. at 215-30 (explaining "refined incorporation").
378. Id. at 252.
379. Id. Amar also suggests that state citizens might also claim certain refined non-
establishment rights that are not strictly grounded in principles of "coercion," but that
sound rather in the "basic touchstones" of Fourteenth Amendment "ideals of liberty
and equality." Id. at 253-54. By this, he seems to mean that state citizens might be
able to object to state laws on the basis of religious equality, such as if a state favored
one religious denomination or declared itself "The Baptist State." Id. At the same
time, Amar admits that non-establishment incorporation "may not matter all that
much" in such cases since "principles of religious liberty and equality could be
vindicated via the free-exercise clause (whose text, history, and logic make it a
paradigmatic case for incorporation) and the equal-protection clause." Id. at 254.
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religion.38 But notice its implications for our present question-may
state citizens claim greater non-establishment rights than the federal
Constitution supposedly gives them? Refined incorporation suggests
they could not. First, because personal non-establishment rights are
an elusive notion-especially when untethered from other, clearly
personal rights like free exercise, free speech, or equal protection-it
would not make sense under Amar's formulation to say that
incorporation has guaranteed any such phantasmal rights to state
citizens against their own governments, much less greater ones. Non-
establishment is best conceived as a structural and collective value,
and so it is hard to explain how state citizens could coherently ask for
"more of it" individually as a result of incorporation. Second, Amar
suggests that state citizens' proper invocation of their incorporated
non-establishment rights would occur only when the state coerces
their consciences or property to support an official state church or
creed, or when the state has violated basic norms of religious
equality-all problems reached more comfortably by free exercise,
free speech, and equal protection principles. Thus, there is a sense
that incorporated non-establishment values simply duplicate other
incorporated rights.381 Finally, Amar's broader view of incorporation
supports a "no" answer. If incorporation of rights was designed to
increase state citizens' personal liberties against state governments
(and it is hard to imagine it was not), it makes little sense to argue
that, post-incorporation, state legislatures have more power to define
their own visions of church-state separation vis-d-vis federal
standards. In other words, incorporation of the federal Establishment
Clause against states should tend to nationalize, rather than localize, a
uniform policy of church-state separation. To say that incorporation
tended to empower states to develop their own church-state policies
runs counter to any plausible understanding of incorporation, refined
or not.382
Whether or not Amar is right, thinking broadly about incorporation
suggests answers to my question. For instance, we know that state
citizens have equally as many free exercise rights against state
governments as against the federal government. And we know that
states are bound, at the very least, by a minimum standard of non-
establishment-that is, what the federal government cannot do, the
380. Justice Thomas has picked up on Amar's suggestion. See Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676-81 & n.4 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Akhil
Amar, supra note 25, at 1159, and Lietzau, supra note 25, at 1206-07); see also Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 19, at 947-49.
381. Amar, supra note 1, at 254.
382. For an illuminating discussion of the irresolvable contradictions raised by the
notion that state and federal governments can legitimately pursue different church-
state policies in this area, see Viteritti, supra note 30, at 1154-55 (arguing that, in this
area, "[t]he differences between federal and state standards are so basic that they
cannot coexist within a single constitutional framework").
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states cannot do. This tells us something about the limits on states
when they experiment with greater church-state separation (as Lupu
and Tuttle insist they can). When states do this, they are not acting on
any affirmative grant of power or prerogative from the federal
Constitution-they are obviously acting in their own state interests.
But they are always acting under an affirmative obligation not to
violate any citizen's federal free exercise rights, which plainly apply
against state governments in full force. This suggests that, whether or
not state citizens can coherently ask state governments for more non-
establishment, what the state does in response is always limited by its
citizens' federal free exercise rights.383 This also suggests that "more
non-establishment" or "greater church-state separation" cannot be
independent justifications for state policies. Those policies must
always be measured against the superior limitations of federal free
exercise (not to mention free speech and equal protection)."
Lupu and Tuttle's concerns with federalism and localized church-
state policies thus turn out to be question begging. Whatever
distinctive church-state policies a state wants to pursue will always be
limited by the demands of free exercise. Incorporation of the federal
Establishment Clause against the states cannot logically be
interpreted as a charter for greater state power in defining its own
separationist vision. Given the logic of incorporation, the only
legitimate direction a state can go in-at least in the area of individual
rights-is in according its citizens greater free exercise rights than
those guaranteed federally. By this logic, of course, states could
plausibly pursue greater church-state separation in ways that do not
encroach on free exercise. They could, for instance, decide not to
employ legislative chaplains or not to use any religious language or
symbolism in state speech or on state property. But an argument that
a principle forbidding religious discrimination or religious persecution
unfairly limits states' freedom to formulate their own church-state
policies is an argument against incorporation itself. By its nature,
incorporation of the religion clauses limits states and it is beyond
dispute that individual free exercise rights are one such limitation.
Thus, assessing the validity of State Blaine Amendments throws us,
not back on incorporation and federalism, but rather onto the key
question-which I have explored in this Article-of whether they
violate free exercise rights.
383. See, e.g., id. at 1154 (discussing the Washington Supreme Court's decision on
remand in Witters III and arguing that "[w]hile secularists in Washington [State] were
confident that the state court was exercising legitimate authority to prevent indirect
aid to a religious school, the action by the state court also served to encumber the
constitutional right of the seminary student to choose a school that reflected his own
values and aspirations").
384. See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note 20, at 605-06 (generally discussing federal




State Blaine Amendments are in large measure concerned with the
destination and use of government funds. So, is my non-persecution
argument against State Blaines open to the basic objection that the
government can, indeed must, control how it spends its own limited
resources?385 The black-letter principles supporting this rejoinder, all
true in the abstract, roll off the tongue. Government is under no
obligation to fund the exercise of my constitutional rights-i.e., I have
a constitutional right to freely exercise my religion, but that alone
does not entitle me to a government-funded Bible.386 Government
may further its own policy choices through the government speech it
funds and the government programs it sponsors-effectively refusing
to endorse other legitimate policy choices and programs.387
Government may create incentives to undertake certain behaviors
legitimately in the public interest through selective funding, even if, to
that extent, it creates disincentives to undertake other behaviors-
behaviors that may be "constitutionally protected.""38  Are these
relatively straightforward maxims the answer to the State Blaine
riddle? Probing under their surface suggests these principles, better
understood, actually condemn the operation of the State Blaines for
largely the same reasons the non-persecution principle condemns
them.
First, it should be clear that the rejoinder that government need not
fund the exercise of constitutional rights adds nothing to the debate.
The non-persecution argument against State Blaines is not grounded
on the naked demand that, simply because religion is constitutionally
protected, religious persons and organizations are entitled to
government funding. Instead, the argument is that, because religion is
constitutionally protected, State Blaines may not exclude persons or
organizations from otherwise accessible government benefits simply
because they are religious. Non-persecution, therefore, is an
argument against religion-sensitive exclusion, not an argument
demanding religion-based inclusion. Furthermore, couching the
385. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
832 (1995) (noting the "unremarkable proposition that the State must have
substantial discretion in determining how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish
its educational mission"); McConnell, supra note 165, at 989 ("The government
cannot spend money on everything. It must be selective.").
386. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 165, at 1001 & n.35 (stating that it is "surely
correct that there is no... general obligation" for government to "provide the
material resources necessary for the exercise of a constitutional right" (citing
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989))).
387. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001); Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 235 (2000);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-95 (1991).
388. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464,474-76 (1977).
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debate in terms of "funding religion" is misleading. Strictly speaking,
non-persecution does not ask that religion qua religion be funded at
all.389 But when a government funding program neutrally furthers
secular interests in, for instance, education, health care, or child care,
a religious person or organization seeks inclusion in the program on
the basis of being a qualified education, health care, or child care
provider-and not as a "religious" provider. It merely asks not to be
discriminated against because of its religious affiliation.9 0
When government spends money to facilitate its own speech-
instead of creating public fora for the exchange of viewpoints-
logically, it should be able to make choices about the content of that
speech.39" ' This principle overlaps with the similar notion that, when
government funds a program to convey a government message-i.e.,
"when it enlists private entities to convey its own message"-it may
"regulate the content of what is or is not expressed" in that
program.392 But, again, do these principles have anything relevant to
say about the operation of the State Blaines? First, notice that they
are only relevant to the narrow question of how State Blaines might
restrict a state government's own speech or a state program enlisting
private entities to spread a government message. If the State Blaines
would typically mean that the government itself cannot use its funds
to speak in a religious voice or spread religious messages, then the
State Blaines do not add anything significant to preexisting federal
constitutional limitations on government speech.393  A different
389. That request itself would run aground on the legitimate historical concerns
behind the religion-funding controversies of the early republic. See, e.g., Laycock,
supra note 156, at 48-49.
390. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 17, at 184. McConnell argues that:
[W]hen the government provides financial support to the entire nonprofit
sector, religious and nonreligious institutions alike, on the basis of objective
criteria, it does not aid religion. It aids higher education, health care, or
child care; it is neutral to religion. Indeed, to deny equal support to a
college, hospital, or orphanage on the ground that it conveys religious ideas
is to penalize it for being religious.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
391. See, e.g., Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (observing that "[w]e have said that
viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker" (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229, 235));
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (recognizing "the principle that when the State is the
speaker, it may make content-based choices" such as when a public university
"determines the content of the education it provides").
392. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, and Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)); see also Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541.
393. It is doubtful, for instance, that government could craft funding programs to
further its own "religious" speech. This would cut against the dominant non-
establishment principle that government must have secular purposes for its laws. As
for the use of religious speech by government itself-e.g., religious language in a
presidential speech, or the employment of legislative chaplains by Congress-those
instances are either non-justiciable (presidential speech) or are permissible under the
Establishment Clause (chaplains). See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Perhaps a Blaine Amendment could be interpreted by a state government to forbid
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situation arises, however, if a State Blaine would prevent government
from including any person or organization in a government message
program, simply because of their religious identity or affiliation.394
This restriction would have nothing to do with government shaping
the content of its message-with regulating "what is or is not
expressed" in the context of its own program-nor with government
"tak[ing] legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee." '395 Precisely because it is
not plausibly related to the content of government expression, this
kind of categorical exclusion savors of disabling religious persons and
organizations because they are religious. It is hard to see how such a
policy would find constitutional shelter under the government speech
doctrine.
Finally, outside the sphere of its own messages, government may
use selective funding to create incentives to undertake certain private
behavior, at least indirectly creating a disincentive to undertake other
behavior.396 A contentious example is abortion: Government may
constitutionally structure Medicaid payments so that they are
available to pay for "childbirth" but not available to pay for
nontherapeutic abortions, thus creating an arguably strong incentive
in favor of childbirth, and against abortion, for Medicaid recipients.397
Is this the answer to the State Blaine issue? Just as government may
the funding of state legislative chaplains or prayers, or to prohibit public officials from
using any religious language in public speeches, or to prohibit any religious symbolism
whatsoever on public property. As I explained supra, however, those applications of
a State Blaine to create a greater church-state separation than the federal
Constitution demands would probably not run afoul of the non-persecution principle,
because they do not plausibly limit anyone's federal free exercise rights. See supra
notes 386-88 and accompanying text.
394. For example, one might claim that the inclusion of a religiously-affiliated
organization in a government message program would-even if the organization fully
complied with the speech requirements of the program-nonetheless run afoul of a
State Blaine that forbade public funds from being spent "for the benefit of," "in aid
of," or "in support of' any "church," "religious society," or "religious institution."
Similarly, one might claim such inclusion would constitute an "appropriation" of
public funds "in aid of" or "for the benevolent purposes of" a religious group.
395. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-200). Nor would it
be any less illegitimate if the same "anti-religious-participant" notion were expressed
in the government's definition of the program itself-i.e., if the government program
were described as a "non-religious child care program." See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note
226, at 666 n.32 (rejecting "definitional manipulation" of a limited public forum to
incorporate "the precise condition that is substantively unconstitutional").
396. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 164, at 39-40 (commenting on government's
"power to create incentives for individuals to alter their conduct by providing
financial support to one choice and not to a substitute").
397. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (constitutional protection
afforded a woman's choice to have abortion "did not prevent [the state] from making
'a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and... implement[ing] that
judgment by the allocation of public funds"' (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474




financially incentivize childbirth and thereby disincentivize the
constitutionally-protected right to choose an abortion, may
government also use selective funding to create financial incentives in
favor of secular or non-religious behaviors and the concomitant
disincentives to religious behaviors and affiliations? This reasoning
has some superficial appeal,39 but to accept it requires ignoring two
basic propositions. Generally, government may not use its selective
funding power to unconstitutionally penalize the exercise of
constitutional rights.3 99 Specifically, there is a profound difference
between the constitutionally-protected right to choose an abortion
and the constitutionally-protected right to free exercise of religion.
A distinction of constitutional magnitude lies between the
government's mere refusal to fund the exercise of constitutional rights
and its penalizing the exercise of those rights by placing conditions on
access to government funds.4' This is not the place to plumb the
depths of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 4" but its basic
tenets reveal that the State Blaines go beyond refusing to fund
religion and instead penalize religious identity, affiliation, and
purposes. As Michael Paulsen explains, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine holds that "[g]overnment may not condition one
legal right, benefit, or privilege on the abandonment of another legal
right, benefit, or privilege," provided that (1) the government could
not directly command the abandonment of the right, benefit, or
privilege, and (2) the condition is not "directly germane to (in the
sense of being practically inseparable from) the nature of the right or
benefit itself. 40 2  Crucial to applying the doctrine is "defining the
398. It was, for example, the rhetorical centerpiece of Judge McKeown's dissent in
Davey. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 764-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J.,
dissenting).
399. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 344, at 1415 ("Government use of funding
leverage can exert coercion, as a long line of constitutional conditions decisions
suggests."); McConnell, supra note 165, at 1015 (noting that "[a] common
understanding of constitutional law is that although the government has no obligation
(absent exceptional circumstances) to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights, it
is forbidden to penalize the exercise of those rights").
400. See McConnell, supra note 165, at 989 (asking "when is the government's
refusal to fund a constitutionally protected choice an impermissible 'burden' on the
exercise of the right?"); see also Davey, 299 F.3d at 754-55 (stating that government
"may selectively sponsor or pay for programs that it believes to be in the public
interest" but "government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right" (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545
(1983))).
401. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1988); Michael W. McConnell,
Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause,
26 San Diego L. Rev. 255 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989); see, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 226, at 665 n.30 (noting
proliferation of scholarly refinements of unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
402. Paulsen, supra note 226, at 664-65. The "directly germane" proviso is
necessarily narrow, referring to "conditions that are directly 'germane,' in the strong
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exact nature of the 'right' which is being conditioned" in order to
"provide a determinate, baseline point-of-reference against which the
constitutionality of the condition may be judged. ' 403 How do the State
Blaines fare under these principles? Take Witters and Davey as
examples.
On the strength of its Blaine Amendment alone, Washington State
essentially said to Larry Witters and Joshua Davey, "You may have
access to state educational aid, on the condition that you not use the
money for ministry training (Witters) or for a theology degree
(Davey).,, 404  Apart from their religious plans, Witters and Davey
were, of course, eligible for the funds. Was Washington simply
refusing to fund their religious choices, or was Washington wrongly
penalizing the exercise of their constitutional right to free exercise?
First, we must define the exact nature of the rights being conditioned.
It is not difficult to imagine, just as the Supreme Court did in
McDaniel, that Witters' and Davey's free exercise rights encompassed
their pursuit of religious vocations.0 Washington asked Witters and
Davey to abandon those rights in order to participate in state
educational funding. Washington, of course, could not have
commanded this abandonment directly. Nor, importantly, was the
condition imposed on access to the funds directly germane to the
nature of the funds themselves. That is, the fact that instruction was
religious was not fundamentally at odds with the neutral provision of
educational funds for the handicapped (Witters) or for high-achieving
students in certain income brackets (Davey).4"6 It is thus difficult to
escape the conclusion that Washington did more than refuse to fund
the exercise of Witters' and Davey's constitutional rights; instead,
Washington penalized the exercise of those rights by exacting the loss
of all state educational assistance.4 7
sense of being inextricably intertwined with the nature of the right or benefit itself."
Id. at 666 n.32. The exception is narrow, explains Paulsen, to prevent government
from "circumvent[ing] the general rule against unconstitutional conditions by the
expedient of simply defining its 'limited' public forum in terms of the precise
condition that is substantively unconstitutional." Id.
403. Id. at 665. Similarly, Michael McConnell explains that, in assessing selective
funding problems, one must first engage in "careful consideration of the nature of the
constitutional right implicated by the funding decision, including the nature of the
countervailing interests of the government." McConnell, supra note 165, at 992.
404. See supra notes 1-4, 326-36.
405. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978); see also id. at 632, 635
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that ministerial exclusion penalizes both religious
belief and status).
406. Imagine, by contrast, that Witters' or Davey's religious use of the funds would
have independently violated the Establishment Clause. Perhaps only in that sense
would a "no religious use" condition on the funds have been "directly germane" to
the funding program. Of course, in that instance, the condition would merely
duplicate the federal non-establishment constraints on Washington.
407. The loss of all scholarship funds underscores the penalizing nature of
Washington's condition. This was not a case where someone is merely forced to
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But is this analysis inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decisions
that allow government to fund childbirth but not abortion? Briefly,
no.4"8 The abortion right and the free exercise rights at issue here are
not congruent. Government is not required to act in an evenhanded
way as between abortion and childbirth; it must refrain from imposing
an undue burden on a woman's choice to have an abortion.4 9
Government, however, has a legitimate interest in the protection of
fetal life throughout pregnancy.4 ° Thus, short of unduly burdening
abortion rights, government is free to promote childbirth.' " In other
words, encouraging childbirth is a legitimate government purpose that
is legally and logically separable from objective hostility to the
abortion right.412 Government can therefore encourage childbirth in
"bear the costs" of exercising constitutional rights, but rather a case in which someone
is "made worse off than he would have been had he not exercised" those rights. See
McConnell, supra note 165, at 1015 (emphasis added). Because of their religious
choices, Witters and Davey lost the entire scholarship, not merely the amount of
money that might have gone toward "religious" instruction or training. Compared to
a scholarship student enrolled, say, in biochemistry or philosophy, Witters and Davey
are not merely "poorer," proportionally speaking; instead, they have been excluded
from the funds altogether. A wholesale exclusion from benefits, as opposed to a
reduction in benefits only "to the extent of the cost of exercising the constitutional
right," is more in the nature of a penalty. See generally id. at 1015-19.
408. Michael McConnell exhaustively explores various answers to this question in
his Selective Funding article. See McConnell, supra note 165.
409. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (state regulation
violates constitutional guarantee of liberty only if it "imposes an undue burden" on
woman's choice to abort); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)
(explaining that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), did not declare an "unqualified
'constitutional right to an abortion' but rather protected a woman from "unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy"). Casey explained that an undue burden is "a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 505 U.S.
at 877.
410. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (referring to "the recognition that there is a
substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy"); see also id. at 875
(observing that "in practice" Roe's trimester framework "undervalues the State's
interest in the potential life within the woman").
411. See id. at 878
To promote the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is
informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be
invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on
the right.
Id.; see also McConnell, supra note 165, at 1034-38 (describing, pre-Casey, an
alternative to a pure "privacy" rationale for abortion rights, one recognizing that "the
government's interest in protecting unborn life is legitimate, but limited to non-
coercive means").
412. See McConnell, supra note 165, at 1006 & n.49 (explaining the difference
between reasons for selective funding that are "hostile" to rights-i.e., reasons that
"depend for their persuasive power upon antipathy to the exercise of the rights in
question"-and "non-hostile" reasons that "could be accepted even by proponents of
the affected rights," even if they were not persuaded by them) (emphasis omitted).
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its own speech and can structure programs like Medicaid to fund
family planning services that include childbirth but exclude abortion.
By contrast, government must adopt a distinctly more agnostic
stance toward religion. The notion that government funds could be
spent in order to incentivize "the secular" over "the religious" simply
flies in the face of a century-and-a-half of religion clause
jurisprudence. Non-establishment doctrine has long recognized that,
just as government may not prefer religion over non-religion, it also
may not prefer non-religion over religion.4"3 Similarly, the Free
Exercise Clause, as originally understood and as confirmed by Smith
and Lukumi, forbids laws that adopt a hostile stance toward religion-
where laws overtly or covertly target religion qua religion-and not
where neutral laws incidentally burden religious exercise.4"4 Finally,
the religious speech cases, based on equal access to public fora for
religious and non-religious viewpoints alike, are impossible to square
with a government interest in furthering the secular over the
religious.415 None of this is contradicted by the proposition that laws
must have secular objects-certainly they must, but they also cannot
have "encouragement of non-religion and discouragement of religion"
as an object. That is, when laws have a genuinely secular purpose,
they are simply agnostic toward religion; but when a law has as its
413. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (stating that "State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them" and
that the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary"); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion,
but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion.").
414. See supra Part IV.A. This forecloses the suggestion that there persists in free
exercise jurisprudence a general form of balancing test analogous to the abortion-
rights inquiry. Admittedly, the Sherbert line of unemployment compensation cases
engaged in such balancing. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (discussing the Sherbert balancing test); see also Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). And, relying on Sherbert, Judge McKeown
claimed in her Davey dissent that a "substantial burden" test was still the controlling
standard for free exercise violations. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 763-64 (9th
Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting). It is difficult to square that view with Smith,
however. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85 (confining applicability of Sherbert to cases,
like the unemployment compensation context, where a benefit program invites
"individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,"
essentially empowering government to determine whether religious reasons justify
compensation). Smith explicitly excludes any form of Sherbert balancing from cases
involving "across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct." Id.
at 884. In my view, the best reading of these passages from Smith is that Sherbert is
essentially dead, insofar as it advocates a "balancing" approach to free exercise
challenges to general laws. See id. at 885 (stating that "[t]he government's ability to
enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to
carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development"' (citation
omitted) (emphasis added)).
415. See supra notes 301-10, 320-25.
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purpose the encouragement of non-religious purposes, it is hard to
understand that purpose, legally or logically, apart from an objective
hostility to religion itself. 16
Thus, the application of the Washington State Blaine to Witters and
Davey appears to constitute an impermissible penalty on their
exercise of religion under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
This accords with Michael Paulsen's broad statement of the doctrine
as applied to religious persons and groups seeking equal access to
public fora or public benefits. Paulsen argues that "government may
not condition a religious speaker or group's equal access to a public
forum, public benefit, or any otherwise generally available privilege
on the religious speaker or group's abandonment of rights of religious
autonomy, identity, self-definition, self-governance, or religiously-
motivated conduct." '417 Notice how Paulsen's statement of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine interacts with the non-
persecution principle. Government may not broadly and neutrally
offer benefits-whether in the form of access to a public forum, to
public funding, or to inclusion in government programs-but
essentially exclude religious recipients by attaching religion-sensitive
conditions to those benefits.
We can plausibly understand the State Blaines' targeted exclusion
of religious persons, groups, and purposes from public benefits in this
alternate way, as a generalized condition that these persons and
groups abandon their religious identity, affiliation, or purpose in order
to access public benefits. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
suggests that such a condition typically amounts to a penalty on the
exercise of religion. Government generally cannot condition access to
a legal benefit on the abandonment of religious purposes, identity, or
affiliation. Of course, government could do so if it could command
the abandonment directly-but it is hard to imagine that government
could ever plausibly do that. More importantly, when would such a
condition be so directly germane to the benefits offered that
government would have no choice but to exclude religious persons or
groups from access to them? One plausible answer, of course, is if the
federal Establishment Clause affirmatively forbade religious inclusion
in those benefits. But, as we have seen, non-establishment law today
will rarely compel exclusion of religious persons or groups from
neutrally-available government benefit programs.4" 8  Thus, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine suggests that when states,
through their State Blaines, try to reach beyond the Establishment
Clause in this way-excluding religious persons and groups from
416. See McConnell, supra note 165, at 1006 & n.49.
417. Paulsen, supra note 226, at 667.
418. See supra note 264.
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neutrally available benefits because they are religious-states
unconstitutionally punish religious exercise.4 19
Generally, this section addresses a rejoinder to my argument
grounded in government's ability to control how and why it spends
money. It suggests that the general proposition that government must
selectively allocate its resources sheds no light on the debate. It also
suggests that, when government itself is speaking or spreading its own
message through private entities, State Blaines may plausibly operate
to require state government to speak in a non-religious voice. But it is
doubtful that State Blaines could legitimately require state
governments to restrict the participation of religious persons or
groups in government message programs simply because they are
religious. Such a categorical restriction has little to do with
government's ability to shape its own message. Finally, the range of
legitimate government purposes suggests that, while government may
legitimately (albeit, non-coercively) structure subsidies to encourage
childbirth over abortion, government may not legitimately encourage
non-religion over religion. Relatedly, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine suggests that government may not legitimately condition
access to public benefits on recipients' abandonment of religious
identity or affiliation. The State Blaines' overall exclusion of religious
persons, groups, and purposes from participation in public benefits
runs aground on these principles. More generally, however, the
"funding" rejoinder to my non-persecution argument, much like the
419. Much of the current debate over unconstitutional conditions on religious
participation in public benefits addresses more subtle conditions on religious
providers. The debate centers on whether religious providers' access to public
benefits can be conditioned on their abandonment of principles or practices
connected to their religious identity. For instance, may religious schools'
participation in a neutral voucher program be conditioned on their not discriminating
in selecting students on the basis of religion? On their not discriminating in hiring
teachers on the basis of religion? On their agreement not to require voucher students
to participate in religious observance or instruction? On their agreement not to
impart religious teaching that may run afoul of anti-discrimination laws? See, e.g.,
Paulsen, supra note 226, at 662-63; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 972-82; see
generally Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1212
(2003). This important inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article. But my assessment
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as applied to State Blaines, does suggest
some general answers. It would seem, generally speaking, that such conditions cannot
have the object or effect of circumventing the foundational principles of religious
non-discrimination. That is, if the general principle is that government may not
exclude religious providers from otherwise available benefits, government cannot
then condition participation in a way that essentially accomplishes the same thing.
Such conditions would not be genuinely neutral. So, for instance, a public university
cannot condition religious groups' access to generally available funds or fora on the
groups' not "discriminating" on the basis of religion in selecting its officers. See
Paulsen, supra note 226, at 691. Similarly, government cannot condition religious
schools' participation in a voucher program on the schools' not teaching religious
tenets that "discriminate" against other religions or against behavior objectionable
from their religious standpoint. The issues here quickly become far more complex,
but this is not the occasion to explore them more fully.
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"federalism" rejoinder, begs the foundational question posed by non-
persecution: In the allocation of otherwise available public benefits,
may government constitutionally discriminate against religious
persons, organizations, or purposes because they are religious? The
answer provided by constitutional text, structure, history, and
jurisprudence is a consistent and resounding no.
VI. CONCLUSION
This extended analysis of the State Blaine Amendments has focused
on the historical context in which the State Blaines developed and also
on the legal context in which they currently operate. The State
Blaines arose during a period of divisive national upheaval over the
issue of funding Catholic schools. They are a legal residue of that
crisis, representing a set of judgments about the relationship between
religion and the public square, and they persist to the present day in
almost forty state constitutions. The State Blaines use a variety of
linguistic formulas, but they are united by an overarching purpose-to
exclude religious persons and groups from the equal enjoyment of
public benefits. Given the sentiments motivating their birth, we
should not be surprised that the general operation of the State
Blaines, from today's vantage point, is out of harmony with the
foundational currents of the Supreme Court's religion clause
jurisprudence. One of those currents in particular calls the State
Blaines into serious question-the Court's consistent condemnation of
laws that target religious belief, worship, status, and affiliation for
disfavored treatment.
In this Article, I have focused on the likely operation of State
Blaines implicated when public benefits are made generally available
to religious and non-religious persons and groups on a neutral basis.
As broad and varied as the State Blaines are, they will likely operate
legitimately in some limited areas.42° But in this increasingly common
context-seen in the rise of "voucher" programs and "charitable
choice" movements-the operation of the State Blaines raises serious
constitutional questions under the First Amendment. When the State
Blaines exclude persons and groups from participation in broad-based
social programs, they single out religion for disfavored treatment.
That disfavor cannot be justified by states' own federalism interests,
nor by their prerogative to selectively fund certain activities over
others. The Supreme Court has never approved a law that singles out
religious persons or groups for special burdens because of their
religious character. When the Court finally takes the constitutional
measure of the State Blaines-and it will have that chance this term-
the State Blaines are likely to fall.
420. See supra Part III.
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